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Abstract 
Effective diabetes management provided in primary care has the potential to reduce 
hospitalizations and mortality. To improve diabetes management, a Diabetes 
Management Incentive (DMI) was introduced by the Ontario government for family 
physicians practicing in patient enrolment models. This thesis has three main objectives: 
1) review the literature on the association between financial incentives for diabetes care 
and diabetes-related hospitalizations and mortality; 2) and 3) examine the impact of DMI 
on: diabetes-related services, diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related 
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in Ontario. A review of the literature on the 
incentives revealed inconsistent findings. The impact of DMI was assessed using 
longitudinal administrative data from the ICES, and analyzed using multivariable 
difference-in-difference linear regression models. The results showed that DMI was 
associated with an increase in the provision of diabetes-related services, but had no effect 
on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Diabetes Mellitus 
Diabetes mellitus, commonly referred to as diabetes, is a chronic disease that affects 
millions of people worldwide today.1,2 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines 
diabetes as a disease in which the pancreas does not produce adequate amount of insulin 
in one’s body, or when the body cannot effectively use the insulin produced.3 Insulin is a 
hormone produced from the pancreas to regulate the body’s blood sugar. The insulin 
helps transfer the extra sugar from the blood into cells of the body to be used for 
energy.3,4 Diabetes is often characterized by chronic hyperglycemia or high blood 
sugar.3,5 There are three common types of diabetes. Type 1 diabetes, commonly 
developed during childhood or adolescence, is when there is a deficiency of insulin 
produced in the body.3,6 This occurs when the immune system mistakenly destroys the 
beta-cells that stores and releases insulin.3,5 A risk factor for type 1 diabetes is having a 
family history of this disease; however, research on the exact risk factors of this type of 
diabetes is still ongoing.7 Type 2 diabetes, the most common type, is when the body does 
not effectively use the insulin released or the body does not produce enough insulin.3,5 
Type 2 mostly develops later in life such as during adulthood and in the old age.3,5,6 
There are a number of risk factors for type 2 diabetes such as family history, age of 40 
years and older, overweight, and members of certain racial/ethnic backgrounds (e.g. 
African American).7–9 Lastly, gestational diabetes develops during pregnancy, and it is 
when the glucose levels are above normal, but lower than the threshold level for 
diabetes.3,10 
Diabetes places a substantial burden worldwide, and the WHO estimated it to be the 
seventh leading cause of death in 2016.3  Globally, the estimated number of adults with 
diabetes increased from 108 million in 1980 to 422 million in 2014.11  Specifically in 
Canada, over the past decade the prevalence of diabetes had doubled.10 Statistics Canada 
reported that in 2017, over 2.2 million Canadians aged 12 and older are living with 
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diabetes, of which 965,100 patients were from Ontario.12 Based on 2013-2014 data, 
approximately 200,000 Canadians were newly diagnosed with diabetes.13 Consequently, 
diabetes presents a significant economic burden on the healthcare system both in Canada 
and worldwide.10 The estimated global cost of diabetes for the year 2015 was $1.31 
trillion (United States dollar [USD]).14 As for Canada, in 2010, the total cost of diabetes 
was estimated to be $12.2 billion (in 2005 Canadian dollars).15 In 2018, Diabetes Canada 
reported the estimated direct cost of diabetes to the healthcare system was $3.6 billion.16 
The direct cost includes cost of direct and cardiovascular-related hospitalizations, general 
practitioners, specialists, and medications.10,15 
Many individuals diagnosed with diabetes develop a number of diabetes-related short-
term and/or long-term complications over time.10 Diabetes-related short-term 
complications include diabetic ketoacidosis, hypoglycemia, and hyperosmolar 
hyperglycemic state.17,18 Over the long-term, specific complications such as retinopathy 
associated with potential blindness, neuropathy with the risk of amputations and foot 
ulcers, and nephropathy with a risk of renal failure can be developed.5,10 Diabetic patients 
are also at risk of cancer, psychiatric illnesses, cognitive decline, heart failure, 
cardiovascular, cerebrovascular, and peripheral vascular diseases.5,10,19 Diabetes-related 
complications can lead to hospitalizations, premature death, and reduce an individual’s 
life expectancy by 5 to 15 years.10,20 In 2008-2009, one in ten deaths in Canadian adults 
aged 20 years and older were attributed to diabetes.20,21  
Currently there is no cure to diabetes, however, appropriate management of the disease 
can reduce the incidence of diabetes-related complications while reducing mortality and 
morbidity.22 For type 2 diabetes, lifestyle interventions such as modifying food intake 
and physical activity levels are crucial.19 Diabetic patients generally receive a 
standardized diabetes education regarding the dietary intervention, and the significance of 
physical activity.19 A patient’s weight can be reduced through these interventions, thus 
improving glycemic control and reducing cardiovascular risk factors.19 Patients 
unsuccessful with lifestyle modifications, or whom are predicted to be unsuccessful at 
diagnosis, are directed towards medications and insulin therapy.19  
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1.2 Diabetes and Hospitalizations 
Diabetic patients are frequently admitted and readmitted to the hospital due to their acute 
and chronic complications.18,23 In Canada, compared to individuals without diabetes, 
diabetic patients are more than three times as likely to be hospitalized with heart disease, 
over 12 times for end-stage renal disease, and over 20 times for non-traumatic lower limb 
amputations.21 However, effective diabetes management at primary care can potentially 
reduce diabetes-related complications and hospitalizations.24–26 Therefore, diabetes is 
listed as an ambulatory care sensitive condition (ACSC).1,18,24,27–29 An ACSC is a health 
condition where accessibility to, and effective management at primary care can reduce 
hospitalizations.1,18,24,27,28 For instance, certain conditions such as diabetic ketoacidosis, 
and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state require immediate hospital admissions, however, 
with adequate primary care many of these hospitalizations can be prevented.18  
1.3 Diabetes Diagnosis and Management 
Based on the Diabetes Canada (previously known as Canadian Diabetes Association) 
Clinical Practice Guidelines from 2018, diabetes is diagnosed through venous samples 
and laboratory methods.30 It is assessed using diagnostic tests that examine the following: 
fasting plasma glucose level (FPG), 2-hour plasma glucose levels (2hPG) from a 75g oral 
glucose tolerance test (OGTT), glycated hemoglobin (HbA1C) levels, or random plasma 
glucose (PG) levels. A patient is diagnosed with diabetes when they have a FPG ≥ 7.0 
mmol/L, or 2hPG in a 75 g OGTT	≥ 11.1 mmol/L, or HbA1C in adults ≥ 6.5% or 
random PG ≥ 11.1 mmol/L.30  
Diabetes Canada reports that approximately 80% of care for diabetic patients takes place 
at the primary care level, and that the diabetes care should be provided using a chronic 
care model. This model is used to provide care to patients with chronic diseases, and 
includes strategies to improve the quality of health services provided to patients and their 
health status.30 The chronic care model consists of the following six elements: 1) delivery 
systems design - systematic changes are made to the primary care practices and health 
systems to improve patient care, 2) self-management support - focuses on the patient 
taking an active role in their care by self-monitoring and/or help make decisions, 3) 
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decision support - provide physicians with the best practice information to date to help 
make decisions, 4) clinical information systems – assists with organizing population and 
patient data to provide more efficient care (e.g. electronic medical records), 5) 
community - social and environmental factors such as food security that affects the 
patient’s heath, and 6) health systems - providing support to diabetes care from a health 
care system perspective which includes services and strategies to help improve health 
outcomes.30 Providing financial incentives to physicians to compensate for spending 
adequate time with diabetic patients for the effective disease management is also part of 
the health systems support.30 
Diabetes management is a multifactorial approach which involves an interprofessional 
team of physicians and requires patients to be heavily involved in the care. Diabetes 
Canada has additionally noted some crucial tests that patients must take as part of the 
diabetes care. These tests include the HbA1C blood tests, nerve damage tests, monitoring 
blood pressure, urine tests, foot examinations, blood tests to check cholesterol and other 
fat levels, eye examinations, and reviewing blood glucose monitoring records from 
home.31 Following Diabetes Canada’s recommendations and having a FP who provides 
effective care can help manage diabetes.    
1.4 Ontario’s Primary Health Care and Reform 
In Canada, primary care services are provided by FPs and general medical practitioners 
who diagnose and treat patient’s illnesses and injuries.32 Services provided at primary 
care includes prevention and treatment of diseases, providing referrals to other levels of 
care (e.g. specialist care), health promotion, primary mental health care, basic emergency 
services, and rehabilitation services.32  
In the late 90s and early 2000’s, the primary health care sector was confronted with a 
number of challenges internationally.33,34 Some of the common challenges were 
maldistribution of physicians, gaps between the recommended care and those provided to 
patients, patient and provider dissatisfaction, and poor access to care.33,35 In Ontario, the 
most populous province in Canada, primary care was historically delivered mostly by 
solo and small-group practices that were managed and owned by physicians.35 Physicians 
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are paid by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC).35 
Traditionally, FPs were paid by the fee-for-service (FFS) payment, where physicians 
billed every service  provided to the patients.36 Although FFS payments motivated 
physicians to provide services, there were some concerns such as physicians were more 
likely to provide shorter consultations, physicians tend to have a disincentive to prevent 
illnesses, services may be overprovided or prescriptions may be written when it was not 
necessary, and the increased costs to the healthcare sytem.36,37  
In response to the challenges and to increase the emphasis on chronic disease prevention 
and management, policy-makers in Canada and other countries initiated primary care 
reform which included a number of changes such as implementing new models of 
reimbursement, new governance structure, various pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives, 
interdisciplinary teams and electronic health records.33,35 The primary care reform in 
Ontario began in the early 2000s. During 2002 to 2007, a number of primary care 
organizational and funding models (Patient Enrolment Models; PEMs) were introduced, 
and each model had its unique characteristics to suit the physician and patient needs.35 
Physicians and patients were able to voluntarily enroll into these models. The newly 
developed models attracted many physicians as they were promised to obtain increased 
income, and improved infrastructures (e.g. electronic medical records in some practices). 
In addition, physicians enrolled to these models were reimbursed through blended 
payments such as capitation (fixed payment per patient per annum adjusted for age and 
gender), FFS, salary, and P4P incentives for preventive care and chronic disease 
management.35  
1.5 Financial Incentives  
Financial incentives, such as P4P, are provided to physicians, in addition to their existing 
base payments, as rewards for meeting specific outcomes or performance targets (e.g. 
improving preventive care provided to specific patients).38,39 Financial incentives can 
influence FP’s behaviour and motivate them to deliver a higher quality of care to their 
patients.18 Financial incentives have been introduced in numerous countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Taiwan, United States, and Australia to improve disease 
management at primary care.18,28,38,40,41  
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On April 1, 2006, the MOHLTC introduced the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) 
in Ontario.38 The DMI is a $60 annual payment per patient to FPs for documenting and 
providing ongoing care to diabetic patients in accordance with the Diabetes Canada’s 
Clinical Practice Guidelines.38,42 Physicians must document the Diabetes Canada’s 
required elements that have been completed for the patient over the past 12 months. 
Documentation can be done using a flow sheet and must be stored in the patient’s 
record.38,42,43 The elements that must be recorded are: “a) lipids, cholesterol, HbA1C, 
blood pressure, weight and body mass index, and medication dosage; b) discussion and 
offer of preventive measures including vascular protection, influenza and pneumococcal 
vaccination; c) health promotion counselling and patient self-management support; d) 
record albumin to creatinine ratio; e) discussion and provide referral for dilated eye 
examination; and f) foot and neurologic examination”.44,45  
To claim the DMI, FPs are required to submit the Q040 fee code for their diabetic patient 
once per year.38,42,43,46 As of October 1, 2015, FPs are only eligible to bill this incentive if 
they have submitted at least three K030 fee codes for their patient within the same 12-
month period.45,47 The K030 billing code, introduced on April 2002, is the Diabetic 
Management Assessment (DMA) fee code for providing diabetes-related services other 
than insulin therapy support to patients.44,48 The K030 can be billed a maximum four 
times per patient over a 12-month period, and receive $39.20 each time it is billed.45 
There were a few changes in the value of the DMI and DMA since their introduction, 
therefore, a timeline mapping these changes are presented in Figure 1.1.49   
When the DMI was first introduced, FPs enrolled in specific PEMs were eligible to bill 
the incentive for their enrolled patients. The specific PEMs include: Family Health 
Networks, Family Health Groups, Family Health Organizations, Comprehensive Care 
Models, Group Health Centre, St. Joseph’s Health Centre, Primary Care Networks, 
Health Service Organizations, Rural and Northern Physician Group Agreement, and 
South Eastern Ontario Academic Medical Organization.38,50 FPs practicing in the 
traditional FFS, and non-enrolled patients in the above PEMs were ineligible for DMI. 
However, as of April 1, 2009, all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI for all patients with 
diabetes.38,43,46  
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1.5.1 Gaps in the Literature Regarding the Impact of Financial 
Incentives for Diabetes Care  
Financial incentives for diabetes care are implemented in many countries to improve the 
provision of services for diabetic patients and effective management of diabetes. It is 
important to understand the impact of these incentives on long-term patient outcomes 
such as hospitalizations and mortality. This will inform the effectiveness of these 
incentives in improving patient health. Furthermore, understanding the impact of these 
incentives on hospitalization costs is also vital, as hospitalization costs accounts for the 
largest portion of the estimated direct cost of diabetes.10,51 A number of published papers 
have assessed the relationship between incentives for diabetes care and hospitalizations, 
hospitalization costs, or mortality. Thus, a literature review summarizing these findings is 
warranted in order to understand this relationship. 
To date, there is a lack of studies that have focused on the impact of DMI in Ontario. One 
study in Ontario observed improvements in prescribing performance measures for 
diabetes care after physicians enrolled into either of the two new PEMs: Family Health 
Groups and Family Health Networks.42 The authors briefly mention that some of the 
observed improvements may be due to the DMI.42 Another study in Ontario which 
directly focused on the DMI found that, physicians participating in the Family Health 
Organization model were more responsive to the DMI compared to physicians in the 
Family Health Group model.38 However, to date, it is unknown if the introduction of 
DMI is associated with increased diabetes-related services, and decreased diabetes-
related hospitalizations, associated costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients in 
Ontario. It is important to assess the above relationships, in order to inform health 
researchers and policy makers the effectiveness of this incentive.  
1.6 Research Objectives  
This thesis has three main objectives: 
1. Perform a literature review on the relationship between financial incentives for 
diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization 
costs, and mortality. 
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2. Examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed 
with diabetes in Ontario. 
3. Examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related 
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with diabetes in 
Ontario. 
Objectives 2 and 3 are examined using longitudinal data spanning from April 1st, 2002 to 
March 31st, 2009. Data were accessed from several administrative databases housed at 
ICES. These two objectives will be examined by comparing diabetic patients enrolled to 
FPs practicing in PEMs eligible for DMI (DMI group) to patients affiliated to FPs 
practicing in the traditional FFS (comparison group). 
1.7 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the existing literature that assessed the 
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality (Objective 1). Chapter 3 examines 
Objective 2 using four multivariable linear regression models with the difference-in-
difference (DID) approach. Findings from these models are presented and discussed in 
this chapter. Chapter 4 examines Objective 3 using a similar methodological approach as 
Chapter 3, and the results are presented and discussed. Chapter 5 provides a summary of 
the main findings from the three studies. It also includes the areas where potential future 
research can be performed to gain further insights into the impact of DMI. 
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of the introduction of Q040 DMI and K030 DMA fee codes in Ontario 
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Chapter 2  
2 The Relationship between Financial Incentives for 
Diabetes Care and Hospitalizations and Mortality: A 
Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
Diabetes mellitus in adults aged 18 and over is affecting millions of individuals 
worldwide today. In 2017, it was estimated that about 451 million individuals had 
diabetes between the ages 18 and 99 worldwide.1 Diabetes can damage one’s blood 
vessels, nerves, and organs if not managed appropriately.2 In 2016, approximately 1.6 
million deaths were caused by diabetes, and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimated diabetes to be the seventh leading cause of death that year.3 Diabetes also 
places a substantial economic burden: the total healthcare expenditure for diabetes 
worldwide was estimated to reach 850 billion United States dollar (USD) for those aged 
18 to 99 years in 2017.1 
Individuals with diabetes often develop diabetes-related short-term complications such as 
diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state, and long-term 
complications such as kidney failure, non-traumatic limb amputation, and heart attack.2 
These complications can lead to diabetes-related hospitalizations and premature death.2,4 
In Canada, hospitalization costs is the leading source of direct health care costs for 
diabetes.2 Appropriate treatment and management of diabetes at primary care can 
potentially reduce the risk of hospitalizations, and mortality.5–7 At the primary care level, 
the family physician (FP) can: monitor the disease, order necessary tests, prescribe 
appropriate medications to prevent acute complications, refer the patient to appropriate 
specialists to deal with the diabetes-related complications, and offer advice regarding 
lifestyle modifications.8,9 Therefore, diabetes is considered an ambulatory care sensitive 
condition (ACSC).5,10–12 An ACSC is a condition in which hospitalizations for that 
condition can be avoided with adequate access to effective primary care.5,9,10,13  
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There are several ways effective diabetes management at the primary care setting can 
potentially reduce hospitalizations and associated hospital costs. First, better diabetes 
management at primary care settings can reduce the likelihood of being admitted to the 
hospital and/or emergency admissions.8,9,14 Second, better disease management can 
potentially result in healthier patients. Therefore, if they do get admitted, then they are 
more likely to have fewer complications, and a shorter length of stay which can lower the 
hospital costs.8 Third, in the event of a hospitalization, family practices that focus on 
better disease management will likely provide follow-up care following the hospital 
discharge.8 Therefore, this may reduce the risk of readmissions and associated hospital 
costs. In a similar manner, primary care also plays an important role in reducing patient’s 
risk of mortality from chronic conditions. This is often due to the interventions provided 
at the early stages of the disease.7 With effective primary care, diseases can be diagnosed 
early, and risk factors can be identified and potentially modified in some instances.15–17 
Effective management of diabetes in primary care can reduce the risk of mortality in 
patients from causes such as stroke, ischemic heart disease, and chronic kidney disease.15  
To improve chronic disease management at primary care and patient outcomes, many 
countries around the world introduced financial incentives such as the pay-for-
performance (P4P) incentive schemes. These incentives reward FPs for the achievement 
of quality-of-care processes (e.g. periodic glycated hemoglobin [HbA1C] testing for 
diabetic patients, completing recommended laboratory tests, and etc.), and some for 
obtaining improved intermediate outcomes (e.g. cholesterol control in diabetic 
patients).18,19 A number of studies that examined the relationship between P4P incentives 
for diabetes and diabetes-related services, or the quality of care provided to patients had 
observed a positive relationship.14,19–21 However, some studies have also found the effect 
of these incentives to decline over time20,22, or have no effect on the provision of 
diabetes-related services.23,24  
It is also important to assess if these incentives led to improvements in patient outcomes 
(i.e. hospitalizations, mortality), and hospitalization costs for diabetes. Existing 
systematic reviews in this research area have mostly focused on the impact of P4P 
incentives for disease management on quality of care or on intermediate outcomes.25–28 A 
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few reviews included papers that assessed the effect of these incentives on patient 
outcomes or costs10,29–31, however, they either solely focused on one P4P scheme (the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) from the United Kingdom (UK)), or assessed 
all types of P4P incentives. There was a lack of reviews that focused exclusively on P4P 
incentives for diabetes care and hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality. 
Therefore, the purpose of this literature review is to examine the impact of financial 
incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related 
hospitalization costs, and mortality. This review paper includes articles on hospitalization 
for ACSCs (includes both type 1 and type 2 diabetes) as part of the diabetes-related 
hospitalization and associated cost measures.  
2.2 Methods 
This literature review focuses on two issues: (i) the effect of financial incentives for 
diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations and associated costs, and (ii) the effect 
of financial incentives for diabetes care on mortality. A literature search was performed 
to identify relevant published studies that examined (i), and (ii).  
2.2.1 Search Strategy and Study Selection  
A search strategy was used to identify related published studies on the relationship 
between financial incentives for diabetes care and (i) diabetes-related hospitalizations or 
diabetes-related hospitalization costs and (ii) mortality. Four research databases were 
used to conduct the search: MEDLINE using the Ovid interface, EMBASE, Scopus, and 
Web of Science. Specific keywords, and subject headings were used to identify a list of 
articles related to the research area of interest. First, the research topic was divided into 
four broad concepts, and then keywords and subject headings that addressed each concept 
were identified and used. The four broad concepts and a keyword used from each concept 
in the search are presented: avoidable hospitalizations (e.g. ‘avoidable hospital*’), 
diabetes management (e.g. ‘diabetes care’), primary care settings (e.g. ‘family 
physician*’), and financial incentive (e.g. ‘primary care incentive’, ‘pay-for-
performance*’). The second part of the search (ii) which looked at mortality was 
performed using the same keywords except replacing the keywords that covered the 
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hospitalizations concept with the keywords for mortality (e.g. ‘mortality*’). Following 
this, the keywords were combined together using AND/OR to enter a final search 
statement for parts (i) and (ii) separately into the database. An example of the search 
performed in the MEDLINE-Ovid database is presented in Appendix A2.1 (Table 2.1 for 
part (i) and Table 2.2 for part (ii)). Reference lists of studies based on the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were subsequently searched to identify any additional articles. The final 
search was performed on November 2017. 
Articles identified from the literature search were screened by title and abstract to 
identify relevant papers for the current review based on an inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (indicated below). Following this, the remaining articles were full-text reviewed 
for an in-depth screening. All articles were screened and reviewed independently by one 
reviewer. The inclusion criteria were: studies that focused on financial incentives that 
were provided to FPs or primary care physicians or general practitioners for diabetes 
management with an outcome measure for part (i) of diabetes-related hospitalizations, 
avoidable hospitalizations, hospitalizations for ACSCs, or hospitalization costs, and for 
(ii) mortality, mortality risk, mortality rate, or mortality score; and studies must be 
published in English language. Published reviews that met the above criteria were also 
included. Studies were excluded if they were: not related to the research topic (i.e. 
exposure measure of the study was not related to the financial incentives for diabetes 
care, and/or the outcome variable did not measure hospitalizations or hospitalization 
costs or mortality as indicated in the inclusion criteria), duplicate articles, and lastly 
relevant but not primary research articles or systematic reviews (e.g. editorials, 
commentaries). 
Data were extracted from the final set of studies that were included in this review. The 
information abstracted were the author and year of publication, the exposure measure(s) 
or financial incentives assessed, the country or region of study, the outcome(s) measured, 
study design, study population, confounders controlled for (if any), statistical analysis 
techniques used, main study findings, and the strengths and/or limitations.  
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Main Search Results 
The literature search on the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care 
and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs identified 430 articles.  
After screening the articles by title and abstract and removing duplicates, there were 19 
relevant articles left, however, the full-text screening led to 16 articles. Following this, 
reference tracking was conducted on the remaining papers, and four additional articles 
were found. Finally, 20 articles were included for data extraction (Figure 2.1). From the 
20 articles, 14 articles assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes 
care and diabetes-related hospitalizations; five articles assessed the relationship of the 
incentives on both hospitalizations and associated costs; and one article looked at 
hospitalization costs. Details of the studies can be found in Appendix A2.2 (Table 2.3).  
There were variations in the financial incentives for diabetes care that were studied in the 
literature. These incentives differed based on their design and context, however, a large 
number of studies focused on the P4P program implemented in the UK called the QOF 
which covered a number of chronic diseases including diabetes18, and the Taiwan’s P4P 
program that also covered diabetes.14 Both P4P programs were implemented at a large-
scale national-level, with the UK’s QOF implemented in all practices in all four countries 
of the UK when it was first introduced. In addition, the studies were conducted in a 
number of countries that included Italy (! = 3)11,13,32, Canada (! = 1)9, Taiwan	(! =
7)14,20,22,33–36, UK (! = 5)5,8,18,31,37, and United States (US) ! = 3 .19,23,38 It is also 
worth to mention that these articles did not have the same outcome measure. Some of the 
hospitalization or hospitalization cost outcome measures were avoidable hospitalizations, 
hospitalizations for ACSCs, hospitalization for diabetic ACSCs, hospitalizations for 
diabetes-related complications, and hospitalization for all-causes. A few studies looked at 
emergency hospital admissions. However, all studies did include hospitalizations or 
emergency admissions that were due to diabetes. 
The literature search on the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care 
and mortality identified 421 articles. After the abstract-title screening and removing 
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duplicates, nine articles were left. Finally, the full-text screening led to only including 
seven articles, and no additional articles were included after reference tracking (Figure 
2.2). The details of the articles included can be found in Appendix A2.2 (Table 2.4). The 
articles here either focused on the QOF P4P program or the Taiwan’s P4P program for 
diabetes. Therefore, the studies were only conducted in the UK	(! = 5)15,31,39–41 and in 
Taiwan ! = 2 .33,42 There were variations to how mortality was measured with some 
measuring all-cause mortality, cause-specific mortality (includes diabetes), mortality 
reduction per 100,000 individuals or where one study41 used a score to measure mortality 
reduction.  
2.3.2 The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes 
Care and Diabetes-related Hospitalizations and Diabetes-
related Hospitalization Costs 
Diabetes-related hospitalizations. There were nineteen articles that evaluated the 
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related 
hospitalizations. These studies assessed this relationship using a variety of study designs, 
including comparing patients enrolled to a P4P program by their FPs who participated in 
the financial incentive scheme to a comparison patient group, and comparing the 
outcomes before and after the incentive was introduced.  A number of studies found that 
P4P incentives for diabetes care led to a reduction in diabetes-related 
hospitalizations.5,10,11,13,14,18–20,22,31–34,36,37 Four of those studies were performed in the UK 
assessing the QOF incentive scheme.5,18,31,37 Dusheiko et al. (2011)5 investigated cross-
sectional and longitudinal associations between the quality of diabetes management and 
unplanned emergency hospital admissions due to short-term diabetes complications in 
England following the introduction of QOF. They found that the proportion of diabetic 
patients who achieved good glycemic control increased from 51.4% to 59.3% during the 
study period.5 Cross-sectional findings revealed that a higher proportion of patients with 
good or moderate glycemic control was significantly associated with a decreased rate of 
unplanned emergency admissions for all short-term diabetic complications (p < 0.01), 
and for acute (p < 0.01) and nonspecific hyperglycemic complications (p < 0.01).5 
Similar findings were observed longitudinally. One limitation of this study was that, the 
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authors did not have data for certain quality measures prior to QOF; therefore, the authors 
were unable to assess the direct impact of QOF on emergency admissions.5  
In Taiwan, six studies found P4P to be associated with reduced diabetes-related 
hospitalizations.14,20,22,33,34,36 One cross-sectional study that compared patients with 
diabetes enrolled in the P4P program (intervention group) to those who were never 
enrolled to P4P (comparison group), found that the net effect of the P4P program was a 
decrease in admissions by 2.7 admissions per 100 enrolled patients per year (p = 0.003).14 
Cheng et al. (2012)20 also had an intervention and comparison group, but instead used 
longitudinal data. They found that the net effect of the P4P program was fewer 
hospitalizations (Difference-in-difference (DID) Coefficient: -0.01). In addition, they 
observed the effect to be larger when comparing patients who were continuously enrolled 
in the program throughout the study period to their respective comparison group.20 This 
study used propensity score matching to alleviate potential selection bias based on 
observables; however, unmeasured factors could have affected the study findings. In 
Hawaii, one study19 found no significant difference in the all-cause hospitalization rates 
between diabetic patients who visited a P4P-participating physician and those who visited 
a non-P4P-participating physician during one year.19 In contrast, patients who saw a P4P-
participating physician for three consecutive years were significantly less likely to be 
hospitalized compared to their non-participating counterparts (Incident Rate Ratio [IRR]: 
0.75; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.61 to 0.93; p < 0.01).19 
In the Emilia Romagna region of Italy, there were three forms of incentive mechanisms 
implemented to improve care for patients with chronic diseases: P4P program, Pay-for-
Participation (P4Pa), and Pay-for-Compliance (P4C). In the P4P program, FPs are paid 
based on their achievement of specific targets; in the P4Pa FPs are paid based on the 
number of patients with specific chronic conditions under their care; and in the P4C 
scheme, FPs are paid based on the number of collaborative activities they participated in 
(e.g. attended diabetes audit meetings).11,13 In addition to these incentives, there was also 
a lower-powered incentive scheme introduced in 2003 in the same region named the 
Diabetes Management Program. FPs can receive the associated incentives that came with 
enrolling into this program if they complete the required activities. FPs were 
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compensated for delivering care to diabetic patients, and for coordinating with the local 
Healthcare Districts and secondary care facilities.32 Three articles11,13,32 and one review 
paper10 found some of the financial incentives in Italy to have a statistically significant 
negative effect on diabetes-related hospitalizations. A study by Fiorentini et al. (2011)11 
revealed that only P4P (Coefficient (logit scale): -0.02; p ≤ 0.05) and P4C (Coefficient 
(logit scale): -0.04; p ≤ 0.10) programs influenced the probability of inappropriate 
hospitalizations (defined as hospitalizations for 27 medical diagnostic-related groups that 
were identified by the Emilia-Romagna region as at risk of inappropriateness in primary 
care).11 In contrast, P4Pa had a significant effect only when the authors separately 
analysed the impact of this incentive on admissions due to acute diabetes complications 
(comas) in a subpopulation of type 2 diabetic patients. The authors rationalized that P4Pa 
was linked with management of specific chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes), therefore, the 
program’s effects will likely be loosely measured in the general population.  
In contrast, a few studies found financial incentives to have no effect on diabetes-related 
hospitalizations9,13,23,37,38, while one study found an increase in emergency visits.35 One 
study that observed a non-significant finding was a study from Italy.13 This study found 
that from the two forms of incentives (P4Pa and P4C), P4C received by FPs for diabetes 
care did not have a significant effect on the probability of hyperglycemic emergency 
admissions for diabetic patients (Coefficient (logit scale) = -0.04).13 Similarly, two 
studies from the US also observed financial incentives to have no effect on 
hospitalizations.23,38 In contrast, one study that assessed the diabetic P4P program in 
Taiwan found that, emergency visits due to diabetic hypoglycemia was significantly 
higher after P4P implementation in patients enrolled into P4P compared to before.35 
Two of the studies that were included in this review used an ecological study design to 
assess the impact of the incentives on diabetes-related hospitalizations.9,37 One of the 
studies was by Bottle et al. (2008)37 from England. The authors found that in patients 
aged 59 years and younger, there was a statistically non-significant association between 
quality of care scores for diabetes care from the QOF P4P scheme (total points awarded 
to family practices based on their achievement on specific indicators that are part of the 
QOF [e.g. points given based on proportion of diabetic patients with blood pressure ≤ 
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145/85 mmHg]) and hospital admissions for diabetes.37  However, they found a negative 
association between the QOF quality of care scores for diabetes care and hospital 
admissions in patients 60 years and older. An important note is that this study did not 
directly assess the impact of QOF on hospital admissions for diabetes, but assessed 
quality of primary care using QOF data on hospital admissions. The other study was 
conducted in Canada, which examined whether the policy changes at primary care in 
2003 improved the rate of diabetes-related hospitalizations in two provinces of Canada: 
British Columbia (BC) and Alberta.9 Financial incentives for diabetes management were 
introduced to FPs in BC only in 2003. Findings from the study revealed that the post-
2003 period had no effect on the hospitalization rate in both provinces.9 
 Diabetes-related hospitalization costs. Six studies evaluated the relationship between 
financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalization costs. Three of 
these studies were conducted in Taiwan,14,20,36 of which two were longitudinal20,36 and 
one was cross-sectional.14 All three studies found that the P4P program was associated 
with lower hospitalization costs in diabetic patients. A longitudinal study by Cheng et al. 
(2012)20, however, found that lower expenses for diabetes-related hospitalizations was 
evident only when patients who continuously stayed in the P4P program throughout the 
study period were compared to their respective comparison group of patients who were 
never enrolled. Over time, the net difference increased from -3,106 New Taiwan (NT) 
dollars in 2006 (approximately -$111 Canadian dollars [CAD] in 2006) to -5,099 NT 
dollars in 2009 (approximately -$167 CAD in 2009) per patient (p < 0.001).20 The 
remaining three studies were conducted in the UK.5,8,18 Two of the studies that examined 
the impact on hospital costs were performed after the QOF was introduced in the UK in 
2004.5,18 One study that used QOF data reported that on average in 2006/07, a family 
practice that had 5% more patients with moderate glycemic control over poor glycemic 
control would have reduced the hospital costs for short-term diabetes complications by an 
estimated £771 ($1,204 CAD).5 The other study found that during the 2010/11 financial 
year, the estimated reduction in admissions for incentivized ACSCs due to the QOF 
introduction was 8%.18 This was equivalent to a reduction of 53,000 emergency 
admissions in England, thus resulting an estimated annual cost saving of £92.5m ($147 m 
CAD).18 It is important to note that the findings on hospitalization costs from the two 
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studies were estimated reduction in costs rather than an analysis on the impact of P4P on 
hospitalization costs. In contrast, the third UK study investigated the relationship between 
the quality of disease management at primary care for ten chronic diseases (e.g. diabetes) 
using QOF data and hospital costs, and found a statistically significant reduction in 
hospital costs only for stroke care.8  
2.3.3 The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes 
Care and Mortality 
Seven studies investigated the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care 
and mortality. The findings from these studies were inconsistent as three studies reported 
a reduction in mortality33,39,42 while four studies found no effect.15,31,40,41 Two of the three 
studies that reported a reduction in mortality were from Taiwan.33,42 For example, Lin et 
al. (2016)33 found that the risk of all-cause mortality was lower in type 2 diabetic patients 
in the full P4P participation group compared to their control group (Hazard Ratio [HR]: 
0.41; 95% CI: 0.74 to 0.84); also in the partial participation group compared to their 
corresponding control group (HR: 0.77; 95% CI: 0.74 to 0.81).33 The full P4P 
participation group were patients with a full enrollment to the program and had complete 
annual evaluation records that included a management plan, examinations, biochemical 
tests, and the patient’s medical history. The partial participation group had at least one 
physician’s claim data in the program, and either did not have complete annual 
evaluation records or the physician’s claims were discontinued during the study’s follow-
up period.33 Although patient and physician characteristics were controlled for in this 
study, other unmeasured factors such as patient’s education could have affected this 
association. In the UK, one study found that based on the 2004 QOF contract, as the 
primary care performance (for chronic diseases including diabetes) improved from pre-
contract (2003) to achievement of target levels for full incentive payment, additional 11 
lives were estimated to be saved per 100,000 population per annum (lower-upper 
estimates: 7-16).39 However, between 2005 and 2006, the additional mortality reduction 
dropped to zero.39 Additionally, the authors found that if all eligible patients were treated 
over and above the set target levels for full incentive payment, then for the 2004 QOF 
contract an additional 56 lives (lower-upper estimates: 29-81) per 100,000 population per 
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annum would have been saved.39 Disease areas with the largest estimated mortality 
reductions were heart disease, diabetes, and primary hypertension.39 A major limitation in 
this study was that it was difficult to state that the improvement in performance seen in 
FPs was solely due to the QOF.39 
Several studies found that financial incentives have no effect on mortality based on the 
evaluation of QOF in the UK.15,31,40,41 One study found that there was a weak correlation 
between the clinical QOF point score and the Public Health Impact score.41 In the QOF, 
family practises were awarded points based on the proportion of patients who achieved 
specific targets for the QOF clinical indicators. These points are later converted into 
payments.18 The clinical QOF point scores measured the family practice’s level of 
achievement for those clinical indicators.41 The Public Health Impact score measured the 
estimated mortality reduction per 100,000 registered patients per annum.41 The authors 
concluded that the financial awards from the QOF are not directly aligned with mortality 
reduction for preventable chronic diseases in family practices.41 Likewise, a systematic 
review that examined if the QOF improved care and outcomes for patients with long-term 
conditions found no clear effect on mortality.31 
Two other studies that found no effect differed from the above studies as an ecological 
study design was used to assess the relationship. Ryan et al. (2016)15 used country-level 
data comparing UK to other high-income countries, and found QOF was not significantly 
associated with age, and sex-adjusted population mortality for chronic diseases covered 
by the QOF including diabetes (-3.68 per 100,000 population; 95% CI: -8.16 to 0.80).15 
The second study, Kontopantelis et al. (2015)40, used data collected at the lowest 
available geographic level named the “lower layer super output area”, found no 
statistically significant relationship between primary care practice’s performance on QOF 
indicators, and all-cause or cause-specific mortality rates for six chronic conditions 
including diabetes after controlling for area and population-level characteristics.40 In 
other words, the primary care performance incentivized by the QOF scheme did not seem 
to reduce mortality in the population. Overall, specific limitations in some of these 
studies such as the use of an ecological study design and/or presence of unmeasured 
confounders may have led to the contradictory findings.  
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this review was to identify relevant literature and understand the 
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality. This literature 
review identified 20 articles on the association between financial incentives for diabetes 
care and diabetes-related hospitalizations or hospitalization costs, and seven articles on 
the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and mortality. Studies 
identified were from several countries including Canada, UK, US, Italy, and Taiwan. To 
date, the literature assessing the effectiveness of these incentives in reducing diabetes-
related hospitalizations have produced conflicting results. The majority of the papers 
found that the incentives were associated with reduced diabetes-related hospitalizations, 
however, a few articles observed no effect, while one found an increase in diabetes-
related emergency visits. The potential reason behind the increase in the diabetes-related 
emergency visits in this study could be due to, the Taiwan P4P program’s aim to have the 
patient’s HbA1C < 7%, and this intensive glycemic control plan can increase the risk of 
emergency visits for hypoglycemia.35 As for the effects of financial incentives for 
diabetes care on hospitalization costs and mortality, mixed findings were also 
documented.  
There are a couple of potential explanations as to why such discrepancies were found in 
the literature. First, the differences could be due to the institutional context and design of 
the financial incentives. This review included studies that evaluated a number of diverse 
incentives, with the QOF being the largest P4P program.30,31 The QOF, introduced in 
April 2004, pays up to 25% of the FP’s income, and their payment under QOF was linked 
to their performance on more than 100 clinical and organisational quality indicators 
including for diabetes.18 The diabetes-related indicators that are included in this scheme 
covers process of care measures (e.g. record of foot examination) and intermediate 
outcomes (e.g. control of HbA1C levels, cholesterol, blood pressure).5,43 For the clinical 
indicators, family practices earned points based on their level of achievement for each 
clinical indicator, and then these points are converted to payments for each family 
practice after adjusting for list size and disease prevalence.18 During the first year, the 
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incentives for an indicator ranged from £75 (approximately $179 CAD in 2004) to 
£4,200 ($10,014 CAD in 2004) for an average practice. By the second year the incentives 
increased by 68%.18 In contrast, smaller incentives were introduced in some areas such as 
in BC in 2003 where FPs received $75 (increased to $125 later) per year per patient for 
providing disease management for diabetes patients and following British Columbia’s 
Clinical Practice Guidelines.44,45 Therefore, these differences may have affected the 
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs differently. Second, the differences in the 
study design or setting may also contribute to the different conclusions. Some studies 
included in this review were cross-sectional; thus, it is difficult to infer a temporal 
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and the outcomes. Some of 
these cross-sectional studies found the incentives to have an association with the 
outcomes, while in some longitudinal studies such associations disappeared. Differences 
in the setting of the study also plays a role as the health care systems, policy initiatives 
already introduced, and policy or system changes that simultaneously occurred in the 
country during the study conduction differs in each setting and can affect the results. 
Additionally, some of the studies adopted an ecological perspective such as 
Kontopantelis et al. (2015)40 and Laberge & Pefoya (2016)9. Findings from these 
ecological studies may not be applicable to individual-level outcomes. Lastly, the 
discrepancies in the literature may have also been due to the specific limitations found in 
some of the individual studies included in this review such as unmeasured confounding, 
selection bias, and smaller sample size. 
Although some of the individual studies had its own limitations (e.g. unmeasured 
confounding); several of the included studies still had their own strengths such as 
assessing the relationships using longitudinal data, having before-and-after comparisons, 
or having a valid comparison group. A number of studies that assessed Taiwan’s P4P 
program for diabetes did have all three strengths. However, selection bias was an issue, 
since in Taiwan, FPs voluntarily participated in the P4P program and patients enrolled to 
the program were selected by their physicians.14,20,34 To alleviate this bias, some studies 
used propensity score matching to make the intervention and comparison groups 
comparable in terms of the observable characteristics. Other studies outside of Taiwan 
such as the one by Harrison et al. (2014)18 in England compared the outcomes before and 
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after the financial incentives were introduced to assess if the incentives resulted any 
changes. Harrison et al. (2014)18 also adjusted for the underlying trends in the admission 
rates to get a conservative estimate of the QOF’s impact.  
Similar to this literature review, existing systematic reviews regarding P4P incentives in 
general have also observed conflicting findings.29,30,46 For instance, Mendelson et al. 
(2017)30 reported that a number of studies found positive outcomes associated with P4P, 
but inconsistent findings were also present, and it was difficult to confidently indicate 
that the changes in the outcomes were solely due to P4P. Gillam et al. (2012)29 also 
indicated the presence of conflicting findings in the literature, and reported that some 
modest reductions in hospital admissions and mortality were found. In contrast, one 
systematic review which focused on the QOF found that the P4P program did slow down 
the increase in emergency admissions, however, there was no effect on mortality.31 
Another systematic review, Gibson et al. (2013)10,  which included one paper on 
financial incentives for diabetes care, also found that the incentives was associated with 
fewer diabetes-related hospitalizations.10 Although the current review observed 
inconsistent findings similar to previous systematic reviews, the findings from this 
review provides knowledge on the relationship between P4P incentives for diabetes care 
and patient outcomes and hospitalization costs exclusively. This differs from existing 
reviews which either focused on the QOF P4P scheme alone, or had reviewed all types of 
P4P incentives together (e.g. including cancer screening, smoking cessation).  
As for the policy implications, the effect of financial incentives for diabetes care on 
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs is unclear in the existing literature. There is no 
strong evidence that consistently shows these incentives to improve patient outcomes 
(hospitalizations and mortality) and diabetes-related hospitalization costs. The diverse 
designs of the incentives and the setting of the studies play a large role for this. It can also 
be that physician financial incentives alone cannot produce the desired improvements, 
and combining these incentives with other methods may promote better long-term health 
to patients. In addition, some of these incentives may be unintentionally disadvantageous 
to certain patients. For instance, in Taiwan, patients with more comorbidities or severe 
conditions were less likely to be enrolled into the P4P program.47,48 Therefore, this group 
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of patients may be less likely to receive adequate diabetes care or management compared 
to other patients, as the FPs may not focus on them as much as those in the P4P program. 
Similarly, in the UK, there is exception reporting within the QOF. Exception reporting is 
when certain patients are excluded for specific or all incentivized targets from the QOF, 
if the physician judges it to be inappropriate for the patient based on a set criteria agreed 
for exception reporting.39,49,50  Practices will not be penalized financially for missing 
targets for these patients, as they will not be included when calculating the proportion of 
patients who achieved the target level for the specific QOF indicator.39,49,50 However, it 
has been reported that exception reporting is increasingly found in patients with multiple 
chronic health problems, individuals with mental illnesses, and those living in deprived 
areas.49–51 Since these patients are being missed from the P4P incentives, it is possible 
that the true effect of these incentives in improving patient outcomes and costs are 
ambiguous.   
There are some strengths of this literature review.  First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first literature review that assessed the impact of financial incentives for 
diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality. 
Existing systematic reviews had either focused only on the QOF, or summarized findings 
from P4P incentives in general rather than diabetes specific. Second, studies conducted in 
a wide range of countries were included in this review to be more informed on the use 
and impact of these incentives around the world.  
This literature review also had a couple of limitations. The main limitation of this review 
was that the evidence mostly came from observational studies; no randomized trials were 
available to be included in this review. Therefore, it is difficult to infer if the outcomes 
observed were due to the P4P incentives or not. Furthermore, the evidence was affected 
by the limitations found in the specific individual studies included in this review, and the 
heterogeneity in the study population, study design, study setting, nature of financial 
incentives examined, and the outcomes measured. Although, it was advantageous to 
include studies from a diverse range of countries, findings from such studies cannot be 
easily generalized to the Canadian context. Moreover, some of the studies included from 
the UK did not directly measure the impact of the P4P scheme on diabetes-related 
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hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality. These studies used QOF data to 
evaluate quality of diabetes management in primary care on patient outcomes or 
hospitalization costs, and were conducted after the QOF scheme was introduced. 
However, these studies did provide some knowledge on the effect of the QOF’s 
indicators and/or scores on patient outcomes and hospitalization costs. Another limitation 
was that the articles were screened and reviewed by one reviewer, and this may have 
impacted the selection and assessment of the studies in this review. Lastly, findings from 
this review may not be informative to policy makers due to the lack of consistency of 
financial incentives linked to improved patient health outcomes.   
Based on the available evidence from observational studies and systematic reviews, the 
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality is unclear. Existing 
literature on this topic has produced conflicting findings. In addition, there is a lack of 
literature on the impact of financial incentives for diabetes care on hospitalizations costs 
and mortality, with most of the existing studies performed in the UK and Taiwan. 
Therefore, future research should assess the above relationship in other countries over the 
long-term to potentially get a better understanding of the impact of these incentives.  
Moreover, it is also important to determine ways to revise the existing incentives so that 
improvements in the patient outcomes can be observed in the future.  
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2.5 Figures    
 
Figure 2.1: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial 
incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization 
costs 
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Figure 2.2: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial 
incentives for diabetes care and mortality 
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Appendices 
Appendix A2.1: Literature Search Tables 
Table 2.1: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for the diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, and hospitalization costs 
# Searches Results 
1 avoidable hospital* OR preventable hospital* OR unplanned 
hospital* OR ambulatory care sensitive* 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “avoidable 
hospitalization” 
1941 
2 primary health care/ OR "continuity of patient care"/ 86064 
3 General Practitioners/ 6245 
4 physicians, family/ OR physicians, primary care/ 18957 
5 general practice/ OR family practice/ 73998 
6 Physician Incentive Plans/ 2192 
7 Fee-for-Service Plans/ 3302 
8 Family Doctor* OR Family Physician* OR Family Practice OR 
General Practice OR Primary medical care OR Primary health 
care delivery OR Primary health care OR Primary healthcare 
OR Family medicine or General practi* OR Primary care 
physician* OR Primary care 
259508 
9 Primary care incentive OR Financial incentive* OR Financial 
Awards OR Fee for service OR pay for performance* OR pay-
for-performance* OR pay-for-performance incentive* 
12131 
10 2 OR 3 OR 4 OR 5 OR 8  
 
-Final search statement for the concept “primary care settings” 
277604 
11 
 
6 OR 7 OR 9 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “financial incentive” 
13666 
12 diabetes management OR diabetes care 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “diabetes management” 
10354 
13 1 OR 12 
 
-Search statement to find results related to diabetes care or 
hospitalizations  
12278 
14 10 AND 11 AND 13 
 
-Final search statement for the entire search on Ovid  
125 
-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized  
*  Truncations used to broaden the search  
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Table 2.2: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for mortality 
# Searches Results 
1 primary health care/ OR "continuity of patient care"/ 86097 
2 General Practitioners/ 6248 
3 physicians, family/ OR physicians, primary care/ 18965 
4 general practice/ OR family practice/ 74010 
5 Physician Incentive Plans/ 2192 
6 Fee-for-Service Plans/ 3307 
7 Family Doctor* OR Family Physician* OR Family Practice 
OR General Practice OR Primary medical care OR Primary 
health care delivery OR Primary health care OR Primary 
healthcare OR Family medicine or General practi* OR 
Primary care physician* OR Primary care 
259611 
8 Primary care incentive OR Financial incentive* OR Financial 
Awards OR Fee for service OR pay for performance* OR pay-
for-performance* OR pay-for-performance incentive* 
12145 
9 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 7 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “primary care 
settings” 
277706 
10 
 
5 or 6 or 8 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “financial incentive” 
13680 
11 diabetes management OR diabetes care 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “diabetes 
management” 
10359 
12 Mortality/ 41662 
13 Death/ 16984 
14 mortality* OR death* OR risk of mortality OR risk of death 1372862 
15 12 OR 13 OR 14 
 
-Final search statement for the concept “mortality” 
1372862 
16 11 OR 15 
 
-Search statement to find results related to diabetes care or 
mortality 
1382541 
17 9 AND 10 AND 16 
 
-Final search statement for the entire search on Ovid 
164 
-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized  
*  Truncations used to broaden the search 
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Appendix A2.2: Literature Review Tables 
Table 2.3: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-
related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs 
Author & 
Year 
Exposure 
Variable(s) 
Outcome 
Variable(s) 
Methods Study Findings Strengths/ 
Limitations 
Bottle et al. 
(2008) 
• Quality of 
primary care 
using QOF 
(P4P) scores in 
England 
• Hospital 
admissions for 
diabetes (i.e. 
total diabetes 
admission rate 
and ketoacidosis 
admission rate)  
• Cross-sectional and 
ecological  
• QOF data – April 2004 to 
March 2005 
• Population: Individual with 
diabetes registered in family 
practices 
• Confounders/Covariates: 
neighbourhood SES, 
prevalence of diabetes, QOF 
scores, age- and sex-adjusted 
admissions rate 
• Analysis: Analysis at 
primary care trust level, 
calculated directly 
standardized rates for each 
primary care  trust, 
standardized admission 
ratios, regression for total 
and ketoacidosis admissions   
• Weak, but significant negative 
association between total 
QOF scores for glycemic 
control and hospital 
admissions for ages 60 and 
over (both total and 
ketoacidosis)  
• Non-significant associations 
for patients younger than 60.  
• Neighborhood SES had a 
strong association with 
hospital admissions.   
• Large study  
• Cross-sectional  
• No patient-level 
data  
 
Bruni et al. 
(2009)  
• P4Pa and P4C 
incentives in 
Emilia-
Romagna 
region of Italy 
 
• Hyperglycaemic 
admissions 
linked with 
ketoacidosis and 
hyperosmolar 
nonketotic coma 
 
• Cross-sectional study  
• Population: Type 2 diabetics 
above the age of 35  
• Confounders: Patient- 
physician-, and district level 
confounders 
• Analyses: Multilevel logit 
• Significant association 
between outcome and one set 
of incentives received for 
diabetes care  
• Larger share of diabetes-
related payment is associated 
with lower probability of 
• Adjusted for GP, 
patient, and 
district level 
factors  
• Multilevel 
modelling 
• Cross-sectional 
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model with 3 hierarchal level 
(patient, GP, district), uses 
IGLS algorithm with 1st order 
marginal quasi likelihood 
procedure 
hyperglycaemic emergency 
admissions 
• P4Pa coefficient is significant 
while P4C coefficient is not 
data 
• Patient 
comorbidity not 
controlled for 
Chen et al. 
(2010) 
• P4P status (P4P 
participating 
vs. non-P4P- 
participating 
physician) in 
Hawaii 
• Receipt of 
QOC (Yes vs. 
No)   
• Receipt of QOC 
for 1 year 
(Patients who 
had claims for at 
least 2 A1C tests 
and 1 LDL 
cholesterol test)    
• Hospitalization 
rates (all-causes) 
• Longitudinal (January 1, 
1999 to December 31, 2006) 
• Population:  Diabetes 
patients aged between 18 to 
75 who saw P4P or non-P4P 
physicians 
• Confounders: Age, sex, 
comorbidity index, number 
of PCPs seen, visit to an 
endocrinologist, insulin 
dependence, year   
• Analysis: Univariate 
analyses, multivariate 
models, random-effects logit 
model, random-effects 
negative binomial models.  
• Patients with P4P physician 
were significantly more likely 
to receive QOC 
• Patients who received QOC 
were significantly less likely 
to be hospitalized  
• During one year, there was no 
significant difference in 
hospitalization rates for 
patients who consulted P4P-
physicans compared to those 
who did not consult them  
• Patients who consulted P4P 
physician for 3 consecutive 
years were significantly less 
likely to be hospitalized  
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Another DM 
program 
introduced 
shortly after P4P 
• Did not compare 
trends for pre- 
vs. post-P4P  
Chen et al. 
(2016a) 
• Patient 
enrollment into 
P4P for 
diabetes care in 
Taiwan 
• Time dummy 
variables  
• Interaction 
terms of the 
two  
• Number of 
essential 
exams/tests 
patients received 
• COC index 
• Hospitalization 
for diabetes-
related 
conditions 
• Natural experiment and 
longitudinal study design  
• Population: Type 2 diabetes 
patients age 18 years and 
older (MCC vs. non-MCC 
patients) 
• Intervention: patients 
enrolled into P4P in 2005; 
Comparison: patients never 
enrolled into P4P  
• Confounders: Patient, and 
provider characteristics   
• Analysis: DID, GEE models, 
logarithmic and logit link 
functions 
• P4P led to increase in number 
of exams, improved COC 
between patients and 
physicians, & significant 
reduction in the likelihood of 
having a hospital admission, 
and ED visit 
• Similar findings for MCC vs. 
non-MCC 
• Effects reduced after second 
year of P4P  
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Not 
generalizable 
due to unique 
healthcare 
system  
46 
 
Cheng et 
al. (2012) 
• P4P program 
for diabetes 
care in Taiwan 
• Number of 
essential 
exams/tests, 
health care use 
(i.e. diabetes-
related 
hospitalizations; 
physician visits), 
health care 
expenses (i.e. 
diabetes-related 
hospitalizations,  
physician visits) 
• Natural experiment and 
longitudinal design  
• 2004 to 2009 – 6-year data   
• Population: Diabetes 
patients over the age of 18 
• Intervention group: Patients 
enrolled in P4P in 2005; 
Comparison: Patients from 
same physicians but not 
enrolled in P4P  
• All participants matched set 
and consecutive participants 
matched set 
• Confounders: Patient’s sex, 
age, DCSI score, CIC count, 
hospital location, hospital 
accreditation 
• Analysis:  DID method, 
GEE, poisson distribution, 
negative binomial 
distribution, log link function 
with gamma distribution, 
bootstrap for standard errors  
• All participants matched 
set: Positive and statistical 
significant difference between 
both groups, difference 
decreased over time for 
exams. P4P had significant 
positive effect on visits but 
difference declined over time. 
Net effect of P4P on 
hospitalizations suggest fewer 
hospitalizations over time and 
marginally significant. No 
difference in hospitalization 
expenses   
• Consecutive participants 
matched set: Similar 
findings. However, 
magnitude of the effect on 
hospitalizations were larger. 
Lower hospital expenses 
reported in intervention group 
than the comparison group 
and the net difference 
increased over time.  
• Longitudinal 
study 
• DID between 
intervention and 
comparison  
 
Cheng et 
al. (2015) 
 
• Trends and 
factors in 
Taiwan’s 
healthcare 
system 
• Healthcare use 
and costs of 
services such as 
physician visits, 
hospital 
admissions, 
antidiabetic drug 
prescriptions 
• Repeated cross-sectional 
study analyzed for 2000, 
2005, 2010 
• Population: Type 2 diabetes 
patients aged 20 years and 
above matched to non-
diabetes individuals; P4P vs. 
non-P4P  
• Confounders: Patient 
characteristics, time, disease 
severity, policy intervention, 
and care seeking pattern 
• 2000 to 2005 total healthcare 
costs increased for diabetes 
and non-diabetes patients, but 
from 2005 to 2010 a greater 
decrease in costs for diabetes 
than non-diabetes 
• Completeness of tests and 
adherence to medications 
increased over time 
• P4P enrollment associated 
with lower risk of admissions, 
and total medical costs 
• Comparison 
group 
• Causality cannot 
be inferred  
• Repeated cross-
sectional study 
• No biochemical 
data to confirm 
patient’s disease 
diagnosis  
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• Analysis: DID, GLM with 
negative binomial 
distribution, GLM with log-
link and gamma distribution, 
trend analyses, logistic 
models 
• Diabetes duration, NHI 
registration locations, P4P 
program, care seeking pattern 
were correlated with diabetes 
management and costs  
Chien et al. 
(2012) 
• Hudson Health 
plan’s P4P for 
diabetes care in 
New York 
• Diabetes care 
processes (i.e. 
HbA1C, blood 
pressure), 
outcomes (i.e. 
HbA1C <9) 
• Emergency 
department 
visit/admission 
and inpatient 
care for diabetes 
• Two quasi experimental and 
one cross-sectional analyses 
• First Analysis: Compare 
between the Hudson plan and 
non-Hudson Medicaid plan  
•  2003 to 2007 data  
• Second Analysis: Patients 
continuously enrolled in P4P 
for 6 months or more  
• Third: Cross-sectional survey 
• Population: Diabetes 
patients from the Hudson 
Health plan 
• Confounders: Second 
Analysis: Patient 
characteristics 
• Analysis: (First)  DID, GEE 
with binomial family and 
logistic link; (Second)  
interrupted-time series, 
logistic regression models 
with clustering 
• No significant difference in 
process of care and outcome 
measures between two groups 
• Younger adults and those 
with comorbidities had 
greater odds for ED visit or 
hospitalization for diabetes & 
reduced odds of receiving 
recommended care   
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Had comparison 
group 
• Missing data 
issue  
• Not 
generalizable 
due to unique 
P4P   
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Dusheiko 
et al. 
(2011a) 
• Quality of DM 
in family 
practises 
measured using 
QOF (P4P) 
clinical 
indicators in  
England   
• Unplanned 
hospital 
admissions for 
short-term 
diabetic 
complications 
(i.e. due to poor 
short-term 
glycemic control, 
acute 
hyperglycemia, 
nonspecific 
hyperglycemia, 
and 
hypoglycemia)  
• Cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analysis; 
ecological  
• QOF incentive scheme data 
for 2004/2005 to 2006/2007 
• Population:  Diabetic 
patients from English family 
practices  
• Confounders: low income 
scheme index, population 
(i.e. income, education) and 
practice characteristics 
• Analysis:  Unit of analysis at 
family practice level, random 
effects multiple regression 
count data, fixed-effects 
count data multiple 
regression 
• Cross-sectional: High 
proportion of patients with 
good or moderate measure of 
glycemic control significantly 
linked to lower rates for all 
admissions. No significant 
association for hypoglycemic 
admissions  
• Longitudinal: Increase in 
proportion of patients with 
good and moderate glycemic 
control was significantly 
associated with lower 
admissions especially for 
acute and nonspecific 
hyperglycemia  
• No significant difference 
between good and moderate 
control on admissions  
• Cross-sectional 
and longitudinal  
• Controlled for 
practice and 
population 
covariates 
• No individual-
level data  
Dusheiko 
et al. 
(2011b) 
• Quality of 
disease 
management 
for 10 diseases 
(i.e. diabetes) 
in general 
practice using 
QOF (P4P) 
data in England 
• Hospital costs: 
total, emergency 
admissions, 
elective 
admissions, and 
outpatient visits  
• Cross-sectional and panel 
data methods - 2004/5 to 
2007/8 
• Population: Patients 
registered in English general 
practice 
• Confounders: Individual, 
small area needs, indicators 
of supply variables  
• Analysis: OLS models using 
practice cluster and robust 
standard errors, other cross 
section and panel data 
models  
• Only the quality measure for 
stroke care was statistically 
significant 
• The aggregate quality 
measure of weighting all 10 
diseases together showed a 
negative significant result 
• 10 separate models on 
hospital costs showed that the 
quality measures for asthma, 
CHD, diabetes, 
hypothyroidism were 
negative and significantly 
associated to expenditure 
• Stroke care had consistent 
results of lowering hospital 
costs  
• Controlled for 
some 
confounding 
• Uses cross-
section and 
panel data 
methods 
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Fiorentini 
et al. 
(2011) 
 
• Financial 
incentives in 
Emilia-
Romagna 
region of Italy 
(i.e. P4P, P4Pa, 
P4C)  
• Avoidable 
hospitalizations 
using two 
indicators: 27 
medical DRGs 
and ACSCs 
• Cross-sectional study using 
2005 dataset  
• Population: Patients aged 18 
and 74 years 
• Confounders:  Patient-, 
physician-, and district level 
confounders  
• Analysis: Multilevel 
modeling, 3-level logit model, 
intraclass correlation 
coefficients 
• P4Pa did not have a 
significant effect, but P4P and 
P4C affected the probability 
of avoidable admissions using 
27 DRGs 
• P4Pa is only significant when 
conducted with a 
subpopulation of type 2 
diabetes patients and using 
admissions via acute 
complications for diabetes as 
the outcome variable   
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Cross-sectional 
data 
• Not generalizable 
due to variance 
of incentives  
Forbes et 
al. (2017)* 
• UK’s QOF  • Processes and 
outcomes of care 
• Includes 
holistic and 
personalised 
care, 
mortality, 
service use 
and etc. 
• Systematic review  
• Empirical quantitative reports  
• Includes RCTs and 
longitudinal studies 
• Studies that controlled 
longitudinal trends, before-
after analysis, systematic 
reviews  
• Search performed on 
electronic databases for 
studies published between 
2004 to May 2016 
• Three systematic reviews and 
five primary studies  
• Studies were rated as good 
quality  
• Results: Modest slowing in 
the increase in admissions 
and consultation rates, 
improvements in certain 
diabetes outcomes, no 
significant effect on mortality 
 
• First review to 
assess these 
outcomes for 
QOF for long-
term diseases 
• Qualitative 
research not 
included 
• Other factors 
may have 
confounded the 
relationship 
Gibson et 
al. (2013) 
• Primary health 
care resourcing 
(i.e. payment 
incentives, 
amount of 
primary health 
care provided)   
 
• Diabetes-related 
hospitalizations   
 
• Systematic review 
• Databases: EconLit, Medline, 
Google scholar 
• Published articles – 2002 to 
2012   
• Confounders: Adjusted for 
individual level, population 
health risk or community 
level factors  
  
• Ten studies included  
• All except one showed 
significant association 
between level of primary 
health care resourcing and 
outcome 
• Economic incentives provided 
to PCPs to improve care for 
diabetes patients decreased 
the probability of 
hospitalization  
• Adjusted certain 
confounders 
• Lack of studies 
looking at 
financial 
incentives  
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Harrison et 
al. (2014) 
• Quality and 
Outcomes 
framework 
(QOF P4P) in 
the England  
 
• Admissions for 
ACSCs. 
Compared it with 
non-incentivized 
ACSCs and non-
ACSCs  
 
• Longitudinal study – April 1 
to March 31 (1998/9 to 
2010/11)   
• Population:  Patients 
registered with family 
practice in England  
• Controlled for trends in 
admission rates between 
incentivized ACSCs and the 
other comparison groups 
• Analyses:  clustering, used 
inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation for admission 
rates, used trend adjusted 
rates, interrupted time series 
for supplementary analysis  
• Incentivized ACSC had a 
lower trend-adjusted 
admission rate than non-
incentivized and non-ACSC. 
As years go by the rate 
difference became larger  
• After the introduction of 
QOF, admission rate for 
incentivized ACSC decreased 
at a rate of 3.6%/year 
• Overall, moderate & sustained 
reduction in emergency 
admissions for incentivized 
ACSCs 
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Controlled for 
trends in the 
admission rate 
• Several other 
policy changes 
occurred at the 
same time 
• No control group 
as all family 
practices used 
incentives 
Huang et 
al. (2016) 
• Diabetes P4P 
program in 
Taiwan  
• Number of 
recommended 
exams, rate of 
attending 
diabetes visits, 
and 
hospitalization 
rate due to 
diabetes-related 
ACSCs 
• Longitudinal study 
• Follow-up between 1 to 5 
years during the study period 
of 2003 to 2011  
• Patients with MCC vs. those 
without 
• Intervention: Patients newly 
enrolled to P4P from 2004 to 
2007; Comparison: Patients 
never enrolled in P4P  
• Population: Type 2 diabetic 
patients age 20 years and 
older 
• Confounders: Healthcare 
provider and patient 
characteristics  
• Analysis: DID, GEE models, 
poisson distribution, and 
sensitivity analysis was 
conducted  
• Non-MCC: P4P had 
significant positive net effect 
for number of exams and 
number of visits. 
Hospitalizations increased for 
non-P4P but P4P had lesser 
admissions.  
• MCC: P4P had significant 
positive effect on number of 
exams and visits. P4P had 
fewer admissions through 
study and was significant 
effect. P4P’s effect was 
stronger in MCC patients.  
• Nationally 
representative 
data 
• Longitudinal  
• Results may not 
be generalizable 
due to 
differences in 
healthcare 
systems and P4P 
in Taiwan 
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Iezzi et al. 
(2014) 
• DM program 
with financial 
incentives in  
Emilia-
Romagna 
region of Italy 
• Diabetic 
avoidable 
hospitalizations 
(i.e. diabetic 
ACSCs) 
• Admissions for 
short-term and 
long-term 
diabetes  
complications  
• Longitudinal using panel data  
• 2003 to 2005  
• Population: Type 2 diabetes 
diagnosed patients  
• Physician groups: never vs. 
always incentivized  
• Confounders: Physician 
level, and district level 
variables 
• Analysis: Poisson regression, 
NB model, LR test, Hausman 
specification test, fixed and 
random effect models  
• Financial incentives have a 
negative and statistical 
significant effect on three 
dependent variables (i.e. total 
admissions, long-term and 
short-term complications) 
• Patients with PCPs who has 
higher share of income from 
this DM program are less 
likely to be admitted for 
diabetes-related avoidable 
hospitalizations  
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Robustness 
check 
• No pre-
intervention data 
• Does not provide 
effects over the 
long-run  
Laberge & 
Pefoyo 
(2016) 
• Primary care 
policy changes 
introduced in 
2003 (i.e. 
Financial 
incentives in 
BC, while in 
AL they 
transformed 
primary care 
and provided 
funding for 
PCNs)  
 
• Annual age-sex 
standardized rate 
of diabetes 
hospitalizations 
per 100 patients 
 
• Longitudinal study using 
ecological perspective 
• Used administrative health 
databases and physician 
billing claims from April 1, 
1996 to March 31, 2010   
• Population: Individuals  
< 75 years old with diabetes 
at index date of each year in 
AL and BC 
• Confounders: Age, sex, and 
trends of hospitalizations 
rates over time   
• Analyses: Age-sex 
standardized, data was set as 
time-series and were 
analyzed using fixed-effects 
regression model 
• Increased hospitalizations 
over time but at a slower pace 
(i.e. decreased rate over time)  
• Decrease in rate before and 
after 2003  
• No significant effect of post 
2003 on outcome à reform 
introduced in 2003 does not 
have a significant effect on 
the decrease in hospitalization 
rate 
 
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Use of fixed-
effects model 
• Patient 
characteristics 
not controlled for 
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Lee et al. 
(2010) 
• P4P program 
for diabetes 
care in Taiwan 
 
• Number of 
exams/tests 
conducted each 
year, diabetes-
related physician 
visits, hospital 
admissions, and 
health care 
expenses to NHI 
 
• Natural experimental design 
• Comparing 2005 vs. 2006 
• Population: With ICD-9-CM 
codes 250 or A181 between 
2004 to 2006; also filled 
diabetes prescription claims 
for 3 months each year  
• Intervention group: 
enrolled in P4P in 2006; 
Comparison: Patients with 
diabetes who never joined 
P4P  
• Analyses: DID regression, 
Poisson distribution, negative 
binomial distribution, normal 
distribution in regression 
models, and GEE 
• Increase in average number of 
exams/tests and physicians 
visits in both groups, but more 
in intervention group  
• Intervention group had fewer 
diabetes-related 
hospitalizations 
• Expenses for diabetes-related 
inpatient services decreased 
for intervention and increased 
for comparison group 
• P4P improved service use, 
physician follow-up, and was 
associated with lower hospital 
admissions and 
hospitalization costs   
• A comparison 
group included 
• Pre- versus post-
P4P analyses 
• Selection bias 
due to voluntary 
enrollment 
• Cross-sectional 
study  
Lin et al. 
(2016)* 
• P4P program in 
Taiwan 
• Hospitalizations 
for diabetic 
complications, 
and all-cause 
mortality 
• Retrospective cohort design; 
longitudinal  
• Patients included from 
January 2002 to December 
2006 and observed to end of 
2012 
• Population: Diabetes 
patients above 30 and first 
diagnosed with Type 2 
diabetes 
• Two sets: Full P4P 
participation and Partial 
participation; each group 
with a control group matched 
• Confounders: 
Characteristics of patient, 
provider, and the cohort 
• Analysis: Multivariable Cox 
regression 
• Full participation of DM P4P 
had a significant lower risk of 
being hospitalized for 
complications compared to 
controls  
• Hazard ratio for all-cause 
mortality was lower for those 
in full and partial P4P 
programs versus controls  
 
• Large 
nationwide 
diabetes 
population 
• Longitudinal  
• Other factors 
may affect 
relationship  
• Unclear if death 
was due to 
diabetes because 
of the lack of 
data  
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Peterson et 
al. (2017) 
• Extending the 
CareFirst’s 
commercial 
medical home 
program 
(includes 
financial 
incentives) to 
Medicare FFS 
patients in the 
United States 
• All-cause and 
ACSC 
hospitalizations, 
ED visits, 
quality of care 
process 
measures, cost 
spending 
• Longitudinal – 1-year 
baseline and 2.5-years 
intervention period 
• Population: Medicare 
patients 
• Intervention: 14 panels 
(primary care practitioners 
participating in a unit) 
selected to participate in the 
expansion program; 
Comparison: 42 panels 
participating in the 
commercial but not the 
expansion program 
• Confounders: Patient 
characteristics 
• Analysis:  DID with 
multivariate linear 
regressions, accounted for 
patient and panel level 
clustering 
• Separate analysis conducted 
for high-risk patients 
• Intervention group was 
associated with significant 
reduction in the probability of 
receiving all 4 recommended 
diabetes processes of care; 
this was not seen for high-risk 
group 
• For all other outcomes, the 
intervention group and the 
high-risk group was not 
significantly associated with 
any outcome changes 
• Reduction in all-cause 
hospitalizations seen in 
intervention group when 
compared to baseline, 
however, similar trends seen 
in the comparison group  
 
• Controlled 
certain variables 
• Intervention vs. 
comparison 
groups 
• Not 
experimental 
• Generalizability 
concern 
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Yu et al. 
(2014)  
• Taiwan’s P4P 
for diabetes 
care  
• Emergency care 
for diabetic 
hypoglycaemia  
• Retrospective longitudinal  
• Population: New onset of 
Type 2 diabetes patients 
(2001 – 2009)  
•  (1) P4P (i.e. regular & 
irregular treatment) vs. non-
P4P; (2) Before and After 
effects of P4P  
• Confounders: Patient age & 
gender, premium based 
monthly salary, residence, 
catastrophic illness status, 
comorbidity, DCSI, level of 
healthcare organization, 
ownership of organization, 
hospital annual service 
volume and physician annual 
service volume for diabetes 
patients  
• Analysis: Chi-square, and 
cox proportional hazards 
model  
• Hazard ratio for emergency 
care was higher in patients in 
P4P (regular and irregular 
treatment) compared to not 
enrolled in P4P 
• Diabetic hypoglycaemia 
emergency visits were 
significantly higher after P4P 
than before   
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Attempted to 
control for 
confounding 
• Not 
generalizable 
due to unique 
healthcare 
system  
P4P, Pay-for-performance; P4Pa, Pay-for-participation; P4C, Pay-for-compliance; DRGs, Diagnostic related groups; ACSC, Ambulatory Care Sensitive 
Conditions; GP, general practitioner; BC, British Columbia; AL, Alberta; PCN, Primary Care Networks; NHI, National Health Insurance; ICD-9-CM 
International Classification of Diseases Ninth Revision Clinical Modification; DID, Difference-in-Differences; GEE, General Estimated Equations; QOF, Quality 
and Outcomes Framework; ACSC, Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions; PCP, Primary care physician; vs, versus; QOC, Quality of care; A1C, glycated 
hemoglobin ; LDL, low-density lipoprotein; DCSI, Diabetes Complication Severity Index; CIC, Chronic illness with complexity; DM, Diabetes management; 
OLS, Ordinary Least Squares; CHD, Chronic Heart Disease; MCC, Multiple Chronic Condition; COC, Continuity of Care; ED, Emergency Department; NHI, 
National Health Insurance; GLM, Generalized Linear Models; UK, United Kingdom; RCT, Randomized Controlled Trial; FFS, Fee-for-service. 
*Lin et al. (2016) and Forbes et al. (2017) studies consist both hospitalization and mortality outcomes data, thus is included in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.  
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Table 2.4: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and mortality 
Author & 
Year 
Exposure 
Variable(s) 
Outcome 
Variable(s) 
Methods Study Findings Strengths/ 
Limitations 
Ashworth et 
al. (2013) 
• Practice (i.e. 
QOF indicators) 
and population 
predictors of the 
PHI in England   
• PHI score, 
maximum 
potential PHI 
score,  and PHI% 
performance 
score   
• Cross-sectional – 2009/2010 
• Population: 8136 general 
practises in England  
• PHI score is the estimated 
mortality reduction. It’s 
constructed from 20 QOF 
clinical indicators, mortality 
reduction estimates, 
comorbidity correction factor, 
prevalence calculations 
• Analysis: Univariate and 
multivariate analyses, two-
level multilevel regression 
models, clustered at primary 
care trust level 
• Sensitivity analysis 
undertaken using 11 QOF 
indicators with RCT evidence 
of mortality reduction. 
• Based on the performance of 
the 20 QOF indicators, the 
estimated mean reduction in 
mortality rate was 258.9 lives 
per 100,000 registered 
patients per annum 
• PHI score weakly correlated 
with total QOF score and 
clinical QOF score  
• PHI% score moderately 
correlated with total and 
clinical QOF scores  
• Overall, weak correlation 
between PHI and QOF 
scores, implying that the 
financial rewards of the QOF 
are not  reducing mortality  
• New metric 
produced in 
England 
• Cross-sectional 
study 
• PHI measures 
impact of QOF-
related activity 
instead of the 
P4P itself  
Chen et al. 
(2016b) 
• P4P program in 
Taiwan 
• All-cause 
mortality 
• Retrospective, longitudinal 
cohort study 
• Population: Type 2 diabetes 
patients diagnosed prior to 
December 31, 2003 
• Intervention group: patients 
18 years and older enrolled 
newly in P4P in 2004; 
Comparison: Patients not in 
P4P using PSM  
• Confounders: demographic, 
utilization, clinical 
• After an average of 5.13 years 
of follow-up, the cumulative 
survival rate was higher for 
P4P group than non-P4P 
• Unadjusted analysis, but with 
PSM indicates mortality rate 
significantly lower in P4P 
group vs. non-P4P group. 
When adjusted for covariates, 
there was no difference in 
mortality between P4P and 
non-P4P 
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Accounted for 
selection bias 
• Some relevant 
variables were 
not controlled 
for in the PSM  
• Cause of death 
unknown 
• Mortality rates 
were not 
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parameters 
• Analysis: Chi-squared and t-
t-tests, log-rank test, time-
dependent Cox regression 
model, competing risk 
adjusted cox regression, GEE 
• P4P group had significantly 
higher physician visits, 
exams, hypoglycemic drug 
use, insulin and statin uses vs. 
non-P4P 
compared 
between before 
and after P4P  
 
Fleetcroft et 
al. (2010) 
 
• P4P contract 
(QOF)  in 
England 
focusing on 25 
clinical 
indicators  
• Population 
mortality 
reduction per 
100,000  
• Cross-sectional and 
modelling study 
• 2003 and 2005 data were 
used for baseline 
performance for 2004 P4P 
and 2006 revision of P4P  
• Population: English 
population 
• Adjusted variables: 
Comorbidity, pre-existing 
trends 
• Analysis: Mid estimate – 
Health gains between 
indicators were additive and 
reduced by a factor of 
20.4/29.3 to adjust for 
comorbidity, Higher 
estimate- Similar method but 
comorbidity ignored, Lower 
estimate – Highest indicator 
for each health domain used 
and accounted for 
comorbidity.  
• Reduced mortality was found 
in 25 out of 80 indicators in 
2004 and 2006 P4P (includes 
diabetes indicators) 
•  2004 - additional 11 lives 
saved per 100,000/ year when 
performance improved from 
pre contract to level of targets 
for full incentive payment 
• 2006 -  no additional 
mortality reduction  
• Disease domains with largest 
reduction in mortality are 
heart disease, diabetes, and 
hypertension  
• Compared 
baseline 
performance 
• Comorbidity 
accounted for 
• Difficult to 
indicate 
causation 
• Some baseline 
data obtained 
from large 
databases while 
others from 
small studies   
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Forbes et al. 
(2017)* 
• UK’s QOF  • Processes and 
outcomes of care 
• Includes holistic 
and personalised 
care, mortality, 
service use and 
etc. 
• Systematic review  
• Empirical quantitative 
reports  
• Includes RCTs and 
longitudinal studies 
• Studies that controlled 
longitudinal trends, before-
after analysis, systematic 
reviews  
• Search performed on 
electronic databases for 
studies published between 
2004 to May 2016 
• Three systematic reviews and 
five primary studies  
• Studies were rated as good 
quality  
• Results: Modest slowing in 
the increase in admissions 
and consultation rates, 
improvements in certain 
diabetes outcomes, no 
significant effect on mortality 
• First review to 
assess these 
outcomes for 
QOF for long-
term diseases 
• Qualitative 
research not 
included 
• Other factors 
may have 
confounded the 
relationship 
Kontopantelis 
et al. (2015) 
• Practice’s 
performance on 
QOF indicators 
in England 
• All-cause and 
cause-specific 
premature 
mortality for 
QOF-linked 
conditions (i.e. 
diabetes, heart 
failure, and etc.)  
• Longitudinal spatial study  
• Population: Focus on the 
England population 
• Confounders: Area and 
population characteristics, 
2010 deprivation, urban 
versus rural, ethnicity, and 
morbidity load. Age and sex-
standardized outcomes.  
• Analysis: Multiple linear 
regression models with 
spatial weighted estimation. 
Additional sensitivity 
analyses performed.  
• All-cause and cause-specific 
mortality rates decreased over 
time 
• No statistical significant 
relationship between 
practice’s performance on 
QOF indicators and all-cause 
and cause-specific mortality 
rates  
• Longitudinal 
study 
• Population-level 
data 
• Potential 
underestimation 
of deaths  
• Unmeasured 
confounding  
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Lin et al. 
(2016)* 
• P4P program in 
Taiwan 
• Hospitalizations 
for diabetic 
complications, 
and all-cause 
mortality 
• Retrospective cohort design; 
longitudinal  
• January 2002 to December 
2006 and observed to end of 
2012 
• Population: Diabetes 
patients above 30 and first 
diagnosed with Type 2 
• Two sets: Full P4P 
participation and Partial 
participation; each group 
with a control group matched 
• Confounders: 
Characteristics of patient, 
provider, and the cohort 
• Analysis: Multivariable Cox 
regression 
• Full participation of DM P4P 
had a significant lower risk 
of being hospitalized for 
complications compared to 
controls  
• Hazard ratio for all-cause 
mortality was lower for those 
in full and partial P4P 
programs versus controls  
 
• Large 
nationwide 
diabetes 
population 
• Longitudinal  
• Other factors 
may affect 
relationship  
• Unclear if death 
was due to 
diabetes because 
of the lack of 
data  
Ryan et al. 
(2016) 
• QOF P4P 
program in the 
UK  
• Age- and sex-
adjusted 
mortality per 
100,000 for QOF 
disease areas (i.e. 
diabetes)  
composite 
outcome 
• Secondary: 
Age- and sex-
adjusted 
mortality for 
IHD, cancer, and 
non-targeted 
QOF conditions  
• Longitudinal – 1994 to 2010 
data 
• Comparison: 27 countries 
with high-income 
epidemiological profile 
without large-scale P4P.  
• Population: UK and 
comparison countries 
• Analysis: DID, linear 
regression, root mean-
squared prediction error ratio 
test, non-parametric 
permutation test, parametric 
t-tests 
• Sensitivity Analysis: 
Synthetic comparison groups 
were developed due to the 
violation of parallel trends 
assumption 
• Before start of QOF, UK had 
the highest age and sex-
standardized mortality than 
the combined comparison 
countries for composite, IHD, 
cancer; but lower for death 
not related to QOF  
• However, mortality for UK 
and synthetic comparison was 
identical  
• QOF was not significantly 
associated with mortality for 
composite, IHD, cancer or 
non-target diseases, when 
compared to synthetic 
comparison  
• Cross-national 
study 
• Longitudinal 
study  
• Coding 
differences in 
practices & 
systems 
• Lack of 
individual-level 
data 
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P4P, Pay-for-performance; QOF, Quality and Outcomes Framework; DM, Diabetes Management; UK, United Kingdom; IHD, Ischaemic Heart Disease; DID, 
Difference-in-Differences; PHI, Public Health Impact; RCT, Randomized Controlled Trial; PSM, Propensity Score Matching; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index; 
DCSI, Diabetes Complication Severity Index; GEE, General Estimated Equations; vs, versus.   
* Lin et al. (2016) and Forbes et al. (2017) studies consist both hospitalization and mortality outcomes data, thus is included in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
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Chapter 3  
3 The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on 
Diabetes-related Services in Ontario 
3.1 Introduction  
Diabetes mellitus is a chronic disease that affects millions of individuals worldwide.1 The 
number of individuals with this disease increased from 108 million in 1980 to 
approximately 422 million in 2014.1 In Canada, over 2.2 million individuals aged 12 and 
over were diagnosed with diabetes in 2017, of which 965,100 individuals were from the 
province of Ontario.2 Moreover, Diabetes Canada estimated the prevalence of diabetes 
(type 1 and type 2 diagnosed) to increase to about 4.8 million by 2029.3,4 This was 
estimated using the Canadian Diabetes Cost Model which provided the projections on the 
prevalence of diabetes in Canada using national data from the National Diabetes 
Surveillance System and Statistics Canada’s medium population projection.4 Diabetes 
places a substantial economic burden on the Canadian healthcare system. The direct cost 
of diabetes to the healthcare system was an estimated $3.6 billion in 2018, and it is 
expected to rise to $4.7 billion by 2028.5 
Patients diagnosed with diabetes often develop diabetes-related complications such as 
kidney failure, retinopathy, heart attack, and stroke.6 These complications can be life-
threatening, leading to hospitalizations, and reduce life expectancy by five to fifteen 
years.6 Currently, there is no cure to diabetes. However, appropriate diabetes 
management, treatment, and monitoring can potentially reduce the incidence of diabetes-
related complications, and improve patient’s morbidity and mortality risk over the long-
term.7,8 Previous literature documented that effective diabetes management in primary 
care settings can potentially reduce complications associated with diabetes.7,9,10 This is 
because, patients who have access to a family physician (FP) who provides effective 
diabetes management will: order required tests, follow-up with patients regarding their 
test results, and support patients with managing their disease (e.g. recommend lifestyle 
modifications).9  
61 
 
In order to strengthen primary care such as improve its access, and increase emphasis on 
chronic disease management, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-term Care 
(MOHLTC) initiated primary care reform in the early 2000s. New primary care Patient 
Enrolment Models (PEMs) were introduced as an integral part of the primary care reform 
initiatives. Physicians practicing in these new models were reimbursed via blended fee-
for-service (FFS) or blended capitation payments combined with various pay-for-
performance (P4P) incentives. Prior to the primary care reform, most FPs were solely 
paid by the traditional FFS. Following the reform, the majority of the FPs switched to 
either blended FFS or blended capitation models. Participation in these models were 
voluntary for physicians and patients.11,12 P4P incentives were given to FPs in PEMs who 
provided diabetes management, congestive heart failure management, and other 
preventive care services to their eligible patients.11 
Several countries such as the United States (US), Italy, Taiwan, Australia, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and Canada introduced P4P incentives to FPs to improve diabetes 
management at primary care settings.7,10,13–15 FPs in most of these countries were 
rewarded with these incentives if they improved process of care measures (e.g. 
prescribing laboratory tests) and for improved intermediate outcomes (e.g. controlled 
patient’s glycated hemoglobin [HbA1C] levels).14,16 The aim of these incentives was to 
motivate and influence the FP’s behaviour to provide a higher quality of care to their 
patients.7  
Existing literature that assessed the effectiveness of these incentives in improving the 
provision of diabetes-related services has been mixed. Some studies found that P4P 
incentives increased diabetes-related services in primary care. Vamos et al. (2011)17 
assessed the association between the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) P4P 
scheme and diabetes management at primary care in the UK, and observed an 
improvement in the recording of diabetes-related process of care measures (e.g. if 
HbA1C, cholesterol, and blood pressure were measured) and in prescribing 
medications.17 Likewise, two other studies found similar findings regarding the P4P 
program for diabetes care introduced in Taiwan.14,18 A longitudinal study by Chen et al. 
(2010)19 examined the effectiveness of a P4P program implemented in Hawaii in a 
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preferred provider organization setting, and found that patients with physicians who 
participated in the P4P program were more likely to receive two HbA1C tests and one 
low-density lipoprotein cholesterol test in one year compared to those without. Similar 
results were observed when patients visited the P4P-participating physicians for three 
consecutive years.19    
Although there were studies that found the P4P incentives to increase diabetes-related 
services, some studies found the effect to decline over time or have no effect. Cheng et 
al. (2012)’s20 longitudinal study on the P4P program in Taiwan concluded that the P4P 
program has a positive and statistically significant effect on completing the essential 
examinations or tests for diabetes care. However, the magnitude of this effect decreased 
over the study period.20 Similar results were found in another study in Taiwan using 
diabetic patients with and without multiple chronic conditions.21 In contrast, one study 
found no difference in the clinical testing for HbA1C, lipid, and eye exam comparing the 
Hudson’s Health Plan which contains a P4P program for diabetes care, to other non-
incentivized health care plans in New York (a state in the US).22 In Ontario, Canada, 
researchers assessed the relationship between a Diabetic Management Assessment 
(DMA) fee code, and quality of diabetes care measured by the frequency of retinal eye 
examination, cholesterol, and HbA1C tests.8 The researchers found a gradual increase in 
the proportion of diabetic patients receiving the recommended tests; however, 
longitudinal results revealed that the magnitude of improvement seen after the DMA was 
introduced was similar to the pre-DMA period.8,23 
The plausible reason behind such mixed findings in the literature may be due to the 
differences in the nature of the incentives, study design, and the institutional environment 
within which P4P incentives were implemented.16,20,24 Moreover, limited attention has 
been paid to unmeasured confounding. Therefore, the relationship between the P4P 
incentives and provision of diabetes-related services remains unclear.  
In Ontario a P4P incentive for diabetes care, named the Diabetes Management Incentive 
(DMI), was introduced by the MOHLTC on April 1, 2006.13,25–27 FPs practicing in 
specific PEMs were eligible to bill this incentive for their enrolled patients.25 Table 3.1 
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lists the specific PEMs that were eligible for the DMI. On the other hand, FPs practicing 
in the traditional FFS, FPs not participating in the specific PEMs, and non-enrolled 
patients in the specific PEMs were ineligible for the DMI. However, as of April 1, 2009 
all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI for their patients with diabetes regardless of their 
participation and patient’s enrollment status in a PEM.13,26 In order to claim the DMI, the 
FP must provide ongoing diabetes management to their patient, and complete a flow 
sheet which tracks the required elements for diabetes care (e.g. track patient’s HbA1C 
levels), consistent with the Diabetes Canada’s Clinical Practice Guidelines. The full set 
of elements that needs to be tracked, and a sample of the flow sheet is found in Appendix 
A3.1.13,25–28 The FPs claim the DMI by submitting the Q040 fee code to the MOHLTC 
for their patient once per 12-month period, and its’ value is $60 per annum per 
patient.25,26,29 On October 1, 2015, an additional requirement for the DMI claim was 
introduced which was that, FPs must provide a minimum three K030 services to the 
patient within the same 12-month period (i.e. FPs are only eligible for the P4P incentive 
(DMI) if they have billed at least three K030 fee codes).27,30 The K030 is the DMA fee 
code that was introduced on April 2002 for providing diabetes-related services other than 
insulin therapy support to patients.8,27,31 Details regarding the DMA can be found in 
Appendix A3.1. The K030 DMA can be claimed a maximum four times per patient per 
12-month period at a value of $39.20 each time it is billed.8,27,31 
To date, it is unknown if the introduction of DMI is associated with an increase in 
diabetes-related services. Existing literature that have assessed the relationship between 
P4P financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related services have been 
uncertain. Moreover, limitations found in the previous studies make it difficult to 
generalize those findings to the DMI context in Ontario. Therefore, the objective of this 
study is to examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed 
with diabetes in Ontario. Provision of diabetes-related services will be captured through 
the DMA billing code K030. This study uses patient-level longitudinal data, and 
compares diabetic patients enrolled to FPs in PEMs eligible to bill DMI to those affiliated 
with the traditional FFS FPs.   
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3.2 Methods  
3.2.1 Data Sources 
The data for this study were obtained from multiple Ontario healthcare administrative 
databases housed at ICES. These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers 
and analyzed at ICES. This is a longitudinal, population-based, cohort study that used 
data spanning from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 (i.e. April 1st 2002 to March 31st 2009). The 
study began from fiscal year 2002 as DMA was introduced then, and concluded at the 
end of the 2008 fiscal year as DMI was made available to all FPs on April 1st, 2009. The 
Ontario Diabetes Dataset (ODD) was used to identify adults diagnosed with diabetes 
from April 1st, 1991 and onwards in Ontario.32,33 The ODD was created using the Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) claims database, Canadian Institute for Health Information 
(CIHI) Discharge Abstract Database (DAD)/Same Day Surgery (SDS) data, and 
Registered Persons Database (RPDB).33 An adult (19+) diabetic patient in the ODD was 
defined as those with two OHIP claims with the diagnosis recorded as diabetes, or one 
OHIP fee code: K029 (Insulin Therapy Support), K030 (DMA), K045 (Diabetes 
management by a specialist), K046 (Diabetes team management), and Q040 (DMI) 
claim, or one diabetes-related hospital admission within two years. The ODD does not 
contain individuals with gestational diabetes, and does not distinguish between type 1 and 
type 2 diabetes.34 However, the majority of the individuals included in this study are 
expected to have type 2 diabetes given they are diagnosed during the adulthood.34 The 
ODD provides the patient’s diagnosis date, and their age at the diagnosis date. 
The RPDB was another database used in this study, which provided patient-level 
demographic information (e.g. age, and sex) for all individuals eligible for OHIP 
coverage.8,32,33 Postal codes from RPDB and Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion 
File (PCCF) were utilized to obtain census dissemination area (DA) level income 
quintiles, and rural residence.35 The rural residence definition included individuals in 
rural and small town (i.e. in areas with an urban area population size less than 10,000, 
plus rural areas).36 The Ontario Marginalization Index was used to determine material 
deprivation index,37,38 which focuses on the inability for individuals to have access to or 
attain basic material needs. This dimension is composed of indicators from 2001 and 
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2006, and compiled at the census DA level. It is categorized into five quintiles,37–39 and 
can be used as a proxy for patient’s socioeconomic status.37,38 The Aggregated Diagnosis 
Groups (ADGs) from the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) System 
Version 10.0 was used to determine patient’s comorbidity.40 The ACG system allocates 
the 9th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) and the 10th 
revision (ICD-10) codes into one of the 32 diagnosis clusters named the ADGs. Each 
disease or condition is grouped into one of the 32 ADGs based on five clinical criteria: 
severity of the condition, duration of the condition, etiology of the condition, diagnostic 
certainty, and speciality care involvement.40–42 Each patient can be assigned to as little as 
zero and as many as 32 ADGs43; the greater the number of ADGs the more comorbid the 
patient is.  
The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables and Corporate Provider Database 
(CPDB) were used to identify patients enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs, and the type 
of PEM the patient and physician were enrolled to. Patients who were not enrolled to a 
FP from CAPE were assigned to FPs via a virtual roster algorithm. The virtual roster 
method determined the patient’s FP by identifying the responsible physician who claimed 
the highest amount of OHIP billings for that patient from 18 core primary care fee codes 
during the previous two years.44,45 The CPDB also provided information on FPs 
practicing in Ontario such as their eligibility. The ICES Physician Database (IPDB) was 
used to obtain physician’s demographic information such as their age, sex, International 
Medical Graduate (IMG) status, and the year they graduated from their medical degree. 
The OHIP claims database was used to examine the OHIP billings claimed by Ontario 
FPs, and the details of these claims (e.g. date of service and codes for the service).  
3.2.2 Study Population  
The ODD was used to identify Ontario adults diagnosed with diabetes on or between 
April 1st, 1991 to April 1st of each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008. In other words, patients 
diagnosed with the disease on or prior to the beginning (April 1st) of that specific fiscal 
year were included. This captured old and newly-diagnosed patients each fiscal year. 
Patients were included if they were first diagnosed with diabetes at or between the ages 
19 and 75 years. Patients were excluded from the study if they died on or before April 1st, 
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2002, or had missing data for age, sex, and ICES key number (IKN). The IKN is the 
patient’s unique encoded identifier used to link data across the administrative databases. 
Following this, patients were further excluded if they had missing data for any of the 
patient and physician-level characteristics used in this study (listed in Section 3.2.3), or 
had missing data for the location of physician’s practice using Local Health Integration 
Networks (LHINs: Regional administrative units in Ontario) (see Figure 3.1). Patients 
with complete data were then categorized into two study groups. The first group was the 
DMI eligible group which comprised of patients with a FP exposed to DMI for all three 
years (2006 to 2008). The physicians of these patients had to be in the ‘Eligible for DMI’ 
section from Table 3.1. The second group was the DMI ineligible group which consisted 
of patients who were affiliated with a FP practicing traditional FFS throughout the study 
(i.e. the patient’s physician was never exposed to the DMI). The DMI eligible group is 
labelled as the ‘DMI group’, and the DMI ineligible group is labelled as the ‘comparison 
group’ throughout the remainder of this thesis.  Patients who did not fit the criteria to be 
in either study group were excluded from analysis. Overall, there were 2,760,989 patient-
year observations for analysis (2,652,076 observations for the DMI group and 108,913 
observations for the comparison group). This panel dataset is unbalanced in nature (i.e. 
some patients were not observed or had no data for some of the years in the study).   
One concern with having an unbalanced panel dataset is a potential efficiency loss from 
having missing data,46 and may induce bias to the parameter estimates.47  Therefore, to 
alleviate the above complications, the main analysis was conducted on the balanced panel 
of the dataset (i.e. only in those who were observed each year during the study period 
from fiscal years 2002 to 2008). However, the analysis using unbalanced panel data was 
conducted to ascertain robustness of the conclusions. The balanced panel ended up with 
1,207,157 patient-year observations for analysis. Figure 3.1 shows the process by which 
the study population was selected. Table 3.2 shows the number of patients in each study 
group for each fiscal year for the main analysis (i.e. balanced panel), and in the 
unbalanced panel.     
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3.2.3 Variables 
The exposure measure in this study was whether the patient’s FP was eligible to bill the 
DMI from fiscal years 2006 to 2008. Using this exposure, a dichotomous variable was 
created to reflect the two study groups of patients: DMI group (took the value 1) and 
comparison group (took the value 0). The outcome variable of interest was the DMA fee 
codes billed (measures diabetes-related services) for each patient. This variable was also 
a dichotomous variable which reflected whether or not the patient had three or more 
DMA fee codes billed by their physician during each fiscal year. The quantity ‘three or 
more’ was chosen because it represents effective management of diabetes. Usually 
diabetic patients visit their FP every three to four months to complete the necessary 
bloodwork (e.g. HbA1C blood test), discuss diabetes management, and have their 
diabetes care elements tracked in a flow sheet (e.g. track their HbA1C test result). Most 
diabetic patients are required to have their HbA1C measured approximately every three 
months to ensure that the patient is meeting their glycemic targets based on the Diabetes 
Canada’s Clinical Practice Guidelines.48 Therefore, following these guidelines, the FP 
should be able to bill at least three DMA fee codes for the patient within one year. In 
addition, as of October 1, 2015, the DMI can be billed only if the FP renders a minimum 
three DMA services for the patient over the one-year period, thus the rationale as to why 
the quantity ‘three or more’ was selected.27,30  
Various patient- and physician-level characteristics were controlled in the analysis. 
Patient characteristics included were age, sex, comorbidity (defined by the number of 
ADGs), rural residence, duration of diabetes (measured in years), income quintiles 
(ranged from quintile 1 (Q1) = lowest income to quintile 5 (Q5) = highest income), and 
material deprivation (ranged from Q1 = least deprived to Q5 = most deprived). Physician 
characteristics included were age, sex, IMG status (0 = Canadian Medical Graduate 
(CMG), and 1 = IMG), and years since graduation (measures physician’s experience). 
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3.2.4 Statistical Analysis  
3.2.4.1 Main Analysis   
Individual patient-level data were utilized to conduct all analyses. Descriptive statistics 
were obtained for each fiscal year to describe the patient-level characteristics, and the 
DMI and DMA fee code billings for the DMI and comparison groups. Descriptive 
statistics were also obtained for physician-level characteristics for FPs who provided care 
to patients in the DMI group, and for FPs who provided care to patients in the 
comparison group. Categorical variables were described in frequencies and percentages, 
while continuous variables were described using means and standard deviations. In 
addition, a chi-square test and an independent sample t-test were performed to compare 
the outcome measure (DMA fee codes billed) between the two study groups. The DMA 
outcome variable was also treated as a continuous variable (i.e. number of DMA fee 
codes billed) for the descriptive analyses, hence why a t-test was also performed. The two 
tests were only performed for the 2002 and 2008 fiscal years to evaluate if differences in 
the DMA billings were present between the two groups at the beginning and end of the 
study period.  
Multivariable linear regression models with the difference-in-difference (DID) 
methodology were used to study the relationship between the DMI and diabetes-related 
services (measured by DMA billings). The DID methodology is used to estimate the 
effect of a policy change by comparing the difference in the outcomes between two 
groups (i.e. study group that was exposed to the policy change, and a comparison group 
that was not exposed), before and after the policy change was introduced.49 The DID 
effect in this study was estimated using a multivariable linear regression model which 
included the following variables: 1) a dichotomous variable that indicated the two study 
groups (DMI group versus comparison group), 2) a pre- and post-period dichotomous 
variable that reflected if the year of observation was before versus after DMI was 
introduced, and 3) a variable for the interaction between the variables from 1) and 2).49,50 
The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable captured the impact of DMI on the 
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician. A time 
trend measure was also included in the model, and it was labeled as ‘!’. This was the 
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DID unadjusted pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Model 1). Previous 
literature in this area had explored the effectiveness of P4P incentives for diabetes care 
by controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, as they can potentially 
confound this relationship.8,18,19,22 Therefore, a DID adjusted pooled OLS model (Model 
2) that controlled for patient- and physician-level characteristics to account for observed 
heterogeneity was used. All patient- and physician-level characteristics discussed in 
Section 3.2.3 were included except for physician’s years since graduation, as it was 
highly correlated with physician’s age. Patient and physician’s age-squared variables 
were included. Within-clustering of patients was also used to adjust standard errors, as 
patients were observed over time.  
Although Model 2 reduced bias from confounding by controlling for observed 
characteristics, unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity (i.e. heterogeneity due to 
patient’s race, preferences) may still be present, and can potentially bias the 
relationship.22,51 Assuming that the above patient-specific factors are time-invariant, 
patient fixed-effects DID model adjusting for patient and physician-level characteristics 
was then performed (Model 3).51,52 A fixed-effects model removes the effect of 
unobserved time-invariant patient factors so that the net effect of the DMI on the 
outcome can be examined. Finally, patients may have their own specific time trend as 
over time patients’ behaviours can change (i.e. medical compliance, visiting their FPs on 
a regular basis, etc.), and this is not accounted by the fixed-effects DID model. Therefore, 
a high-dimensional fixed-effects DID model adjusting for patient and physician-level 
characteristics and individual fixed-effects was used to control for the patient-specific 
time trend (Model 4).52,53 In addition, a two-way clustering for within patients and 
between physician levels was allowed for in this model. It is essential to cluster at the 
physician-level as a FP’s behaviour and the way they deliver care would affect all 
patients who received care from that specific physician in a similar manner.54 
This study used linear regression models to evaluate the effect of DMI on a binary 
outcome. When evaluating binary outcomes, nonlinear probability models such as logit 
and probit models are commonly used.55,56 However, a linear probability model (LPM) 
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can be used to estimate consistent parameter estimates. The LPM for a binary outcome 
‘y’ is specified as:  
" # = 1 & = 	()	 + (+&+ + 	(,&, …+ (.&/. + 0/;   
where &/ is the covariates, 1 is the number of covariates, and 0/ is the error term.
55–57 
This linear model is interpreted as the probability that the event will occur given &/. 
Although there are a couple of disadvantages of LPM such as heteroscedasticity (can be 
dealt with using robust standard errors in Stata software), and predicted probabilities, ‘#’, 
may lie outside the range of zero and one57; the LPM has a number of advantages that led 
to its use in this study. One of the main advantages of using the LPM is that the 
interpretations of the coefficients are much easier compared to nonlinear models, 
especially when there are interaction terms involved.58,59 In addition, the coefficient 
estimates in a LPM can be directly interpreted as the “mean marginal effect” of the 
covariate on the outcome, while extensive calculations are required to determine the 
marginal effects in a logit model.60 Second, using nonlinear models becomes more 
complicated when working with panel data.61 This was one of the main reasons the LPM 
was used in this study, as it is less complicated to perform fixed-effects and high-
dimensional fixed-effects using a linear model compared to a nonlinear model. Lastly, it 
has been claimed that in large samples the LPM produces similar findings as the logit and 
probit models.58,62 Therefore, the LPM was used in this study to estimate the impact of 
DMI on the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s 
physician. However, the coefficient of the interaction variable from the LPM, and the 
average derivative of the interaction variable from the logit model were compared to 
illustrate that the impact of DMI on the outcome is similar between the two type of 
models.59 This was done for Models 1 and 2 only, as performing the fixed-effects logit 
model is very complex and high-dimensional fixed-effects logit model is not feasible. All 
data analyses were performed using Stata 15.1 at ICES Western site.  
The equations for the four multivariable linear regression models with the DID 
methodology described above are presented below: 
	" #/2 = 1 & = 	()	 + 	(+	
345/	 + 	(,6789:;2 + 	(<345/×6789:;2 + (>! + 	0/2          (1)    
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" #/2 = 1 & = 	()	 + 	(+	
345/	 + 	(,6789:;2 + 	(<345/×6789:;2 + (>! + 	(?	
@/2 + 	0/2      (2) 
" #/2 = 1 & = 	()	 + 	(+	
345/	 + 	(,6789:;2 + 	(<345/×6789:;2 + (>! + 	(?	
@/2 + A/ + 	0/2 
                                       (3) 
" #/2 = 1 & = 	()	 + 	(+	
345/	 + 	(,6789:;2 + 	(<345/×6789:;2 + 	(?	
@/2 + A/ + B/2 + 	0/2
                                          (4) 
Equations (1) to (4) specify Models 1 to 4 respectively. " #/2 = 1 &  is the probability of 
having three or more DMA fee codes billed for patient 9 by their physician in fiscal year 
C; 345/	 is a dichotomous variable equals to 1 if patient 9 is in the DMI group and 0 if 
patient 9 is in the comparison group; 6789:;2 is a pre- and post- dichotomous variable 
equals to 0 if the year of the observation is before DMI was introduced and 1 if it was 
after DMI was introduced; 345/×6789:;2 is the interaction variable which denotes the 
DID estimate; ! is a time trend which denotes the year of observation; @/2 is the set of 
observable covariates (i.e. patient and physician-level characteristics); A/ is the 
unobserved individual patient fixed-effects; B/2 is the high-dimensional fixed-effects in 
which the patient interacts with their own time trend; and 0/2 is the error term.  
3.2.4.2 Subgroup Analysis   
Subgroup analyses were also performed to examine if the impact of DMI on the DMA 
fee codes billed varied among different subpopulations. The analyses were performed in 
two subgroups: 1) comorbidity (those with below versus at or above median number of 
ADGs at baseline), and 2) sex (males versus females). If any one of the two subgroup 
analyses revealed the impact of DMI on the outcome to be statistically significant but 
with a large difference in the magnitude of effect among the levels of that subgroup, 
interactions were then tested in that subgroup. Using interactions is a more persuasive 
approach when proving that a difference in the effect of DMI among the different levels 
of that subgroup is present.63 Subgroup analysis was performed in the comorbidity 
subgroup, because patients with comorbidities (or have multiple chronic conditions) will 
have complex health needs, and a higher demand for healthcare services.64–66 In diabetic 
patients, increase in the healthcare utilization (i.e. care from FPs, specialists, and 
hospitals) is found with increasing number of comorbidities.66 Therefore, it is important 
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to assess if the impact of DMI varied in this subgroup. In addition, a few studies have 
found that P4P incentive schemes may not benefit patients with multiple chronic 
conditions as the guidelines from these incentives focus on specific diseases and may not 
be appropriate for those with a greater comorbidity.67,68 This further increases the need 
for this subgroup analysis. Subgroup analysis by sex was also performed, because sex-
specific differences have been noted in diabetic patients for the quality of care received, 
and for their medical compliance. Women are less likely to attain the recommended 
targets for diabetes (e.g. targets for HbA1C, lipids), and be compliant with the medical 
recommendations.69,70 One potential reason behind this is due to behavioural factors as 
one study found that women with diabetes had a higher prevalence of depression and 
diabetes-related distress than men, and that lower psychological well-being was 
associated with lower levels of self-care attitudes, satisfaction of treatment, and diabetes 
empowerment.71,72 If women have poor medical compliance, then they will less likely 
visit their FP to have their diabetes monitored and controlled. Likewise, existing 
literature have found women to less likely to receive monitoring and treatment for 
diabetes compared to men.69,70 Therefore, it is important to assess if the impact of DMI 
on the provision of diabetes-related services differ by sex.    
3.2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis   
Two sensitivity analyses were conducted to evaluate the robustness of the study findings. 
First, a sensitivity analysis was performed treating the DMA outcome as a continuous 
variable to check if the findings remained similar to the main results. Second, to reduce 
potential selection bias that arose from only assessing patients who were part of the 
balanced panel (i.e. patients who were observed each and every year during the study 
period), an analysis was performed using the unbalanced panel dataset (i.e. all patients 
including those without data for some of the years in the study). The unbalanced panel of 
the dataset was made up of those who were in the balanced panel, those in the DMI group 
who entered the dataset after April 1, 2002 (patients diagnosed with diabetes after the 
study began) but on or prior to April 1, 2006 to be eligible for the DMI group, and those 
from the DMI group who had no data for some of the fiscal years. Subgroup analyses 
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were performed in both sensitivity analyses along the lines of the balanced panel 
analysis.    
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive Results  
In total, there were 172,451 adult diabetic patients in Ontario who were included in this 
study (15,559 patients were in the comparison group and 156,892 patients were in the 
DMI group). Patient and physician characteristics for both study groups for fiscal years 
2002 to 2005 (i.e. before DMI introduction) are reported in Table 3.3 and the 
corresponding data for fiscal years 2006 to 2008 (i.e. after DMI introduction) are 
presented in Table 3.4. On average, patients in the DMI group were slightly younger, had 
fewer number of ADGs (i.e. less comorbid), and had slightly less duration of diabetes 
compared to the comparison group. In addition, in the DMI group, there was a slightly 
greater proportion of female patients, and patients who resided in rural areas, in lesser 
deprived quintiles, and higher income quintiles compared to the comparison group. The 
number of physicians providing care in each study group differed for each fiscal year, 
with the number decreased from 1,191 in 2002 to 797 physicians in 2008 in the 
comparison group. On average, the physicians providing care to the DMI group were 
younger, had fewer years of experience, and were less likely to be IMGs. Furthermore, 
there was a greater proportion of female physicians providing care in the DMI compared 
to the comparison group.   
As for the DMI billings (Tables 3.3 and 3.4), the proportion of patients in the DMI group 
who had a DMI billed by their physician increased from 21.91% in 2006 to 27.43% in 
2008. Similarly, an increase was observed in this group for the proportion of patients 
with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician per year (0.63% in 2002 to 
7.85% in 2008), and in the average number of DMA fee codes billed per year. The 
proportions and averages for the DMA fee code billings were higher in the DMI 
compared to the comparison group. In the comparison group, the proportion of patients 
with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician increased from 0.39% in 
2002 to 1.79% in 2008, however, it was not a steady increase throughout. The difference 
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in the DMA fee codes billed between the two study groups was compared at baseline and 
at final fiscal year; and a statistical significant difference was detected between the two 
groups (p < 0.001) (Appendix A3.2). Figure 3.2 presents the trends in the DMA fee code 
billings in the DMI and comparison groups. Figure 3.2a shows that there was a sharp 
increase in the average number of DMA fee codes billed in the DMI group; and the gap 
between the two groups widened following the introduction of DMI. A sharp increase 
was also observed in the DMI group for the proportion of patients with three or more 
DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician per year (Figure 3.2b). The difference in 
this proportion between the study groups increased from 0.002 (2002) to 0.061 (2008).  
3.3.2 Regression Results  
The linear regression results for the estimated impact of DMI on having three or more 
DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician are presented in Table 3.5. All four models 
show that DMI has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of 
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician (p < 0.01). This 
finding suggests that there is an increase in the provision of diabetes-related services after 
the introduction of DMI. The DID unadjusted pooled OLS model (Model 1) indicates 
that the effect of DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee 
codes billed by patient’s physician by 4.2 percentage points 
(95%	G:HI9;7HG7	9HC78JKL	 M5 	4.0, 4.3	678G7HCKS7	6:9HCT). However, a slight 
decrease in the effect size was observed after adjusting for patient- and physician-level 
characteristics (Model 2), and a similar magnitude of effect as Model 2 was observed in 
the fixed-effects DID model (Model 3). Lastly, the high-dimensional fixed-effects DID 
model (Model 4) showed the smallest estimated effect compared to the previous models; 
2.1 percentage points increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes 
billed by patient’s physician (95%	M5	1.5, 2.6	678G7HCKS7	6:9HCT). Since Model 4 
adjusts for patient-specific time trend, individual patient fixed-effects, and observable 
patient and physician-level characteristics; therefore, this model is likely to be closer to 
the true effect of the DMI on the study outcome.  
The average marginal effects of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by 
patient’s physician were compared between Models 1 and 2 to equivalent models 
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performed using a logistic regression model (Appendix A3.3). Since similar marginal 
effects were obtained from the logistic and LPM regression models, the estimates from 
the LPM are reliable.  
Patient and physician-level characteristics in the regression models displayed certain 
effects on patients having three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician (Table 
3.5). Patient’s age has a positive and statistical significant effect on the probability of 
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician based on Model 2. In 
Models 3 and 4 patient’s age cannot be identified, because it was correlated with the time 
trend variable. However, the quadratic term for age was present, and it was positive and 
statistically significant in Models 3 and 4. Females (based on Model 2), and those with 
higher number of ADGs (based on all models) were significantly less likely to have three 
or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician. The remaining patient-level, and all 
physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
outcome in the final model (Model 4).    
3.3.3 Results from the Subgroup Analysis  
Subgroup analyses performed across the two subgroups (comorbidity, and sex) are 
presented in Table 3.6. The results for the impact of DMI on having three or more DMA 
fee codes billed by patient’s physician in the subgroups were similar to the main results. 
Based on the final model, the comorbidity subgroup analyses showed the effect size to be 
similar in both comorbidity groups. However, subgroup analyses by sex revealed the 
effect to be slightly larger in males compared to females (4:;7L	4:	(< Z[\]^ =
0.023; 	95%	M5	0.017, 0.029;	(<(a]b[\]^) = 0.018; 	95%	M5	0.012, 0.024).	Following 
this, interactions were tested to examine if there was a statistically significant difference 
in the impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s 
physician according to patient’s sex. Interactions were performed in Models 1 and 2 only, 
because patient’s sex is a time-invariant characteristic that is constant for each patient, 
thus, its effect is omitted in fixed-effects and high-dimensional fixed-effects models. 
Findings from the interactions revealed that the difference in the DMI’s effect on the 
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outcome between males and females is statistically significant (4:;7L	2:	( =
−0.006; 95%	M5 − 0.008,−0.005).  
3.3.4 Results from the Sensitivity Analysis  
The first sensitivity analysis was performed assessing the impact of DMI on the outcome 
treated as a continuous variable instead of a binary variable. This variable measured the 
number of DMA fee codes billed for the patient in each fiscal year. Similar to the main 
results, the DMI has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of DMA 
fee codes billed. The second sensitivity analysis was performed using patients who were 
part of the unbalanced panel dataset. In total, there were 480,517 adult diabetes patients 
part of the unbalanced panel, and Table 3.2 illustrates the number of patients in each 
study group for each fiscal year. Similar results were observed in the unbalanced panel as 
the main results of this study. Subgroup analyses were also performed in the unbalanced 
panel dataset, and the results were consistent with the results from the subgroup analyses 
in the main study. For the comorbidity subgroup analysis in the unbalanced panel, the 
same median number of ADGs at baseline as the main study population was used. This 
was done to be consistent with the subgroup analysis performed in the main study, and 
also, because the median number of ADGs at baseline could not be computed for the 
unbalanced panel as not all patients were present at baseline (2002). Results for the 
sensitivity analysis are not presented in this chapter, but are available upon request.     
3.4 Discussion  
To date, the literature assessing the impact of P4P incentives on diabetes-related services 
has been mixed. Furthermore, no research has been performed assessing the effect of 
DMI on diabetes-related services in Ontario. Therefore, the aim of this study was to 
evaluate the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services (measured by DMA billings) in 
diabetic patients in Ontario. Results from this study revealed that the proportion of 
patients who had three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician increased in 
both study groups, however, the increase was much smaller for the comparison group. A 
large increase was also observed in the average number of DMA fee codes billed in the 
DMI group in 2008 compared to 2002. The main regression results revealed that DMI 
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increased the provision of diabetes-related services, and the findings were consistent 
through all four DID models. However, the magnitude of the effect was much smaller in 
Model 4 compared to Model 1. This was observed as Model 4 compared to Model 1 
controlled for the observable patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual 
patient fixed-effects, and the patient-specific time trend as these factors can potentially 
affect the study relationship. The estimated magnitude of effect was an increase in the 
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician by 2.1 
percentage points. As for the subgroup analyses, findings revealed the DMI’s effect was 
similar across the comorbidity groups. However, there was a difference in the magnitude 
of effect found between males and females, in which the effect size was slightly larger in 
males. A potential reason behind this finding is that female diabetic patients are known to 
have poor medical compliance, and are less likely to receive diabetes-related services 
compared to males.19,69,70 The main findings of this study were based on the balanced 
panel of patients. By focusing on the same patients over time, any changes seen in the 
outcome after DMI was introduced can be more likely linked to the incentive; thus 
having a higher internal validity. However, sensitivity analyses were performed using the 
unbalanced panel of the dataset to ensure that findings from this study were robust. This 
patient cohort improves the external validity of the study as it consists a larger cohort 
which includes: those from the balanced panel, those in the DMI group without data for 
some of the fiscal years, and those in the DMI group who were diagnosed with diabetes 
after April 1, 2002 but on or prior to April 1, 2006. Findings from the unbalanced panel 
were consistent with the main study results. An additional sensitivity analysis was 
performed using a continuous DMA outcome, and findings were very similar to the main 
study results.   
The results found in this study are consistent with a number of existing studies that also 
reported P4P incentives increased diabetes-related services in primary care.14,15,17,19,20 
One study assessed the impact of a P4P scheme that was introduced in Australia on 
quality of care, measured by whether the FP ordered a HbA1C test during a consultation 
with the patient.15 The study’s findings revealed that the introduction of this scheme led 
to a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of ordering a HbA1C test.15 Another 
study observed that the odds of receiving at least two HbA1C tests and one lipid test were 
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1.16 times greater in patients who saw a P4P-participating physician versus those who 
saw a non-P4P-participating physician.19 These results underscore that P4P incentives 
can influence the FP’s behaviour, and improve quality of diabetes care at primary care.7 
Therefore, this in turn reflects the improvement in delivering diabetes-related services for 
diabetes management such as ordering tests (i.e. HbA1C test, lipids test).9 Over time, this 
will induce improvements in intermediate outcomes (e.g. cholesterol control)9,16 and 
eventually in patient outcomes (e.g. avoidable hospitalizations and mortality risk).10  
On the other hand, a few studies found that P4P incentives for diabetes care have no 
effect on diabetes-related services,8,22 which differed from what was found in this study. 
For instance, Chien et al. (2012)22 noted that there was no statistically significant 
difference in the diabetes care process (e.g. lipid, HbA1C exam rates) comparing the 
Hudson Health Plan’s P4P program to other non-incentivised healthcare plans in New 
York. Possible reasons to why the results of the current study differed from some 
literature can be due to the differences in the level of analysis (e.g. Chien et al.’s study22 
used plan-level data), sample size, nature of the P4P incentive, design of the study, and 
institutional setting of the study. 
In this study, there was also an interesting observation which was that the proportion of 
patients with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician was increasing 
before DMI was introduced, and the proportions were larger in the DMI group (Figure 
3.2b). This suggests that physicians providing care to patients in the DMI group were 
already billing the DMA fee codes more than the physicians providing care in the 
comparison group. However, once the DMI was introduced, the improvement was much 
larger than the pre-incentive period, suggesting that the DMI did have a positive effect on 
the outcome. The increasing trend in the DMA billings observed in the DMI group prior 
to the introduction of DMI, may be due to the primary care reform which began in the 
early 2000s in Ontario. The reform introduced new PEMs, in which one of the objectives 
was to increase emphasis on disease prevention and chronic disease management.11 
Therefore, over time more and more FPs switched from the traditional FFS into one of 
the new PEMs in the DMI group, hence there was a slight increasing trend in the billing 
of the DMA fee codes prior to the introduction of DMI.  
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Another issue that needs to be noted is that even though there was an increase in the 
proportion of patients with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician from 
2002 to 2008, and the number of patients with DMI billed from 2006 to 2008; the 
numbers were not large enough. In the DMI group in 2008, only 27.43% of the patients 
received DMI billings and 7.85% of the patients had three or more DMA fee codes billed 
by their physician. Therefore, there is a low uptake of the DMI and DMA fee codes and 
there are a couple of reasons to why this may be the case. First, the size of the incentive 
and the fee code may have been too small for the physicians.8,22,52 Other P4P programs 
such as the QOF in the UK pays FPs up to 25% of the physician’s income. Moreover, for 
the QOF, family practices earn points based on clinical and organisational quality 
indicators with more points obtained for intermediate outcome indicators.16 Points are 
then converted to payments to the family practice adjusting for disease prevalence and 
list size.16  Second, some physicians may be unaware of the DMI and DMA fee codes, 
especially right after switching to PEMs. Third, there have been other P4P incentives 
introduced around the same time period which may have affected the intake of the DMI. 
Fourth, the administrator burden of completing the diabetes flow sheet may be an issue 
for some practices as it is very detailed, thus, can be straining to complete for each 
patient.8 Lastly, patients demand to complete the required diabetes tests may be low or 
they may not visit their FP frequently enough for the FP to provide diabetes-related 
services and bill the DMI and DMA fee codes.52  
This study also found that females, and those with a higher comorbidity had a lower 
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician. Similar to 
this study, previous studies had also found females8,19 less likely to receive quality of care 
or recommended tests. In addition, Kiran et al. (2012)8 observed that, those with 10 or 
more ADGs (higher comorbidity) to less likely to receive all three recommended tests 
(i.e. retinal eye exam, HbA1C and cholesterol test). On the other hand, contrasting results 
were also found in existing literature such as Chen et al. (2010)19 and Chien et al. 
(2012)22 found those with higher comorbidities to more likely receive quality or 
recommended diabetes care. 
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There are some strengths of the current study. This is the first study to evaluate the 
impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed with diabetes 
comparing patients whose physicians were exposed to DMI to a comparison group. This 
study also helps fill the knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of DMI using panel 
data from 2002 to 2008. Using panel data is advantageous as, it gives more efficiency, 
informative data, variability, less collinearity among variables, and present ways to deal 
with heterogeneity.51,73 Lastly, the patient cohort in this study was derived from validated 
health administrative databases such as the ODD which has a high sensitivity (86%), and 
specificity (97%).32,33  
There were also some limitations of this study. First, the comparison group in this study 
was much smaller compared to the DMI group. This can be an issue, since in a small 
group, patients with data that are outside the normal range or with extreme data 
observations may skew the results. Moreover, this can result in having two study groups 
that are not comparable with each other. Second, although several patient- and physician-
level characteristics, time-invariant patient factors, and patient-specific time trend were 
controlled; some selection bias may still remain. Most FPs who provided care to patients 
in the DMI group were initially practicing in the traditional FFS, however, over time 
these physicians switched into the PEMs voluntarily. On the other hand, FPs providing 
care to the comparison group were physicians who practiced in the traditional FFS 
throughout the entire study. Therefore, differences among the physicians between the two 
study groups may have introduced some bias. In addition, the descriptive results revealed 
that there were slight differences observed between the DMI and comparison group for 
the patient- and physician-level characteristics. Therefore, patient- and physician-level 
characteristics were adjusted for in the multivariable analyses to help reduce the bias.  
Lastly, findings from this study may not be generalizable to other jurisdictions due to the 
differences in how the P4P incentives for diabetes care is designed, or its size in Ontario 
versus other jurisdictions outside of Ontario.  
In terms of future research, more research is required to further explore the impact of 
DMI on diabetes-related services beyond fiscal year 2008. As of April 1, 2009, all FPs 
(including FPs in traditional FFS) became eligible for DMI. Therefore, future research 
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can assess the effects of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients enrolled to 
physicians in PEMs and in patients with FFS physicians separately. Future works could 
also explore LHIN-level analysis.  Research can also be performed assessing the effect of 
DMI on improving intermediate outcomes of diabetes such as HbA1C and cholesterol 
levels to understand if the incentive helped improve patients’ health. This study found 
that DMI has improved the provision of diabetes-related services, and it would be 
worthwhile to investigate the benefits to patients’ health. Finally, it is important to assess 
the effect of this incentive on healthcare system costs and determine if this incentive is 
cost-effective.  
3.5 Conclusions 
The findings from this study revealed that DMI has increased the provision of diabetes-
related services in patients diagnosed with diabetes. The estimated magnitude of effect of 
DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by 
patient’s physician by at least 2 percentage points. Moreover, the effect of DMI on 
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician were similar across the 
comorbidity subgroups. However, subgroup analyses by sex revealed the effect of DMI is 
slightly larger in males than in females. Findings from this study are important since all 
FPs are currently eligible to bill the DMI, and it may also have a positive effect on the 
provision of diabetes-related services in the current population. 
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3.6 Tables and Figures    
Table 3.1: Physicians’ eligibility for the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) as of 
2006 
Physician’s Eligibility Statusa 
Eligible for DMI Ineligible for DMI 
Family physicians in the following PEMs 
can bill the DMI for their enrolled 
patients:  
  
Family Health Networks, Family Health 
Groups, Family Health Organizations, 
Comprehensive Care Models, Group 
Health Centre, St. Joseph’s Health Centre, 
Primary Care Networks, Health Service 
Organizations, Rural and Northern 
Physician Group Agreement, and South 
Eastern Ontario Academic Medical 
Organization 
Fee-for-service (FFS) family physicians, 
family physicians not in the ‘Eligible for 
DMI’ section (found on the left), and non-
enrolled patients receiving care from 
family physicians in PEMs.  
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; PEMs, Patient Enrolment Models. 
a However, as of April 1, 2009, the DMI is expanded to cover all family physicians 
practicing in Ontario. 
Source: (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2006)25 
Hyperlink: http://www.anl.com/MOHGUIDE/00 Diabetes Management Incentive - April 
2006.pdf 
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart for the selection of study population 
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Table 3.2: Number of patients in each study group in the balanced and unbalanced 
panels for fiscal years 2002 to 2008 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of patients in the balanced 
panela 
Number of patients in the 
unbalanced panelb 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
2002 15,559 156,892 15,559 162,643 
2003 15,559 156,892 15,559 321,160 
2004 15,559 156,892 15,559 361,036 
2005 15,559 156,892 15,559 412,363 
2006 15,559 156,892 15,559 464,958 
2007 15,559 156,892 15,559 464,958 
2008 15,559 156,892 15,559 464,958 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive. 
a The sum of the number of patients from both study groups and for all fiscal years 
combined results in the total number of patient-year observations for the balanced panel 
(i.e. 1,207,157 patient-year observations).  
b The sum of the number of patients from both study groups and for all fiscal years 
combined results in the total number of patient-year observations for the unbalanced 
panel (i.e. 2,760,989 patient-year observations).  
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Table 3.3: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group before DMI was introduced 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Patient characteristics 
Number of 
patients 
15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 
Age, mean (SD) 60.22 
 (11.97) 
59.24 
(12.61) 
61.22  
(11.97) 
60.24 
(12.61) 
62.22 
 (11.97) 
61.24 
(12.61) 
63.22  
(11.97) 
62.24 
(12.61) 
Sex, n (%)         
Male 8,229 
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
8,229 
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
8,229 
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
8,229 
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
Female 7,330 
(47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
7,330 
(47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
7,330 
(47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
7,330 
(47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
Rural residence, n (%)         
No 15,553 
(99.96%) 
156,416 
(99.70%) 
15,529 
(99.81%) 
155,803 
(99.31%) 
15,514 
(99.71%) 
155,434 
(99.07%) 
15,500 
(99.62%) 
155,109 
(98.86%) 
Yes 6 
 (0.04%) 
476 
(0.30%) 
30  
(0.19%) 
1,089 
(0.69%) 
45 
(0.29%) 
1,458 
(0.93%) 
59  
(0.38%) 
1,783 
(1.14%) 
Number of ADGs,         
mean (SD) 4.92  
(2.83) 
4.79  
(2.85) 
4.93  
(2.85) 
4.84  
(2.89) 
5.11  
(2.90) 
4.97 
(2.97) 
5.14  
(2.95) 
5.06 
(3.02) 
Duration of diabetes (years),        
mean (SD) 5.74  
(3.55) 
5.62  
(3.58) 
6.74  
(3.55) 
6.62 
 (3.58) 
7.74 
 (3.55) 
7.62 
(3.58) 
8.74  
(3.55) 
8.62 
(3.58) 
Material deprivation quintiles, n (%)       
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Q1  
(least deprived) 
2,320 
(14.91%) 
29,616 
(18.88%) 
2,405 
(15.46%) 
30,779 
(19.62%) 
2,531 
(16.27%) 
31,735 
(20.23%) 
2,592 
(16.66%) 
32,515 
(20.72%) 
Q2 3,235 
(20.79%) 
34,255 
(21.83%) 
3,235 
(20.79%) 
34,085 
(21.73%) 
3,256 
(20.93%) 
34,196 
(21.80%) 
3,293 
(21.16%) 
34,333 
(21.88%) 
Q3 3,490 
(22.43%) 
34,055 
(21.71%) 
3,509 
(22.55%) 
34,056 
(21.71%) 
3,445 
(22.14%) 
33,848 
(21.57%) 
3,434 
(22.07%) 
33,717 
(21.49%) 
Q4 3,399 
(21.85%) 
30,864 
(19.67%) 
3,327 
(21.38%) 
30,266 
(19.29%) 
3,286 
(21.12%) 
29,840 
(19.02%) 
3,232 
(20.77%) 
29,486 
(18.79%) 
Q5  
(most deprived) 
3,115 
(20.02%) 
28,102 
(17.91%) 
3,083 
(19.81%) 
27,706 
(17.66%) 
3,041 
(19.54%) 
27,273 
(17.38%) 
3,008 
(19.33%) 
26,841 
(17.11%) 
Income quintiles, n (%)        
Q1  
(lowest income) 
3,385 
(21.76%) 
30,132 
(19.21%) 
3,574 
(22.97%) 
32,592 
(20.77%) 
3,531 
(22.69%) 
32,316 
(20.60%) 
3,480 
(22.37%) 
32,024 
(20.41%) 
Q2 3,753 
(24.12%) 
36,052 
(22.98%) 
3,943 
(25.34%) 
36,844 
(23.48%) 
3,887 
(24.98%) 
36,493 
(23.26%) 
3,883 
(24.96%) 
36,315 
(23.15%) 
Q3 3,486 
(22.41%) 
33,419 
(21.30%) 
3,115 
(20.02%) 
31,719 
(20.22%) 
3,163 
(20.33%) 
31,877 
(20.32%) 
3,198 
(20.55%) 
32,108 
(20.47%) 
Q4 2,773 
(17.82%) 
29,989 
(19.11%) 
2,742 
(17.62%) 
28,947 
(18.45%) 
2,776 
(17.84%) 
29,370 
(18.72%) 
2,796 
(17.97%) 
29,606 
(18.87%) 
Q5  
(highest income) 
2,162 
(13.90%) 
27,300 
(17.40%) 
2,185 
(14.04%) 
26,790 
(17.08%) 
2,202 
(14.15%) 
26,836 
(17.10%) 
2,202 
(14.15%) 
26,839 
(17.11%) 
DMI and DMA fee code billings 
Patients with DMI billeda,         
n (%) - - - - - - - - 
Patients with DMA billed, n (%)       
< 3 15,499 
(99.61%) 
155,910 
(99.37%) 
15,478 
(99.48%) 
155,414 
(99.06%) 
15,479 
(99.49%) 
154,792 
(98.66%) 
15,476 
(99.47%) 
154,211 
(98.29%) 
≥ 3  60  
(0.39%) 
982 
(0.63%) 
81 
 (0.52%) 
1,478 
(0.94%) 
80  
(0.51%) 
2,100 
(1.34%) 
83  
(0.53%) 
2,681 
(1.71%) 
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DMA fee codes billed,         
mean (SD) 0.04  
(0.27) 
0.07  
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
0.09  
(0.43) 
0.05  
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.49) 
0.05  
(0.31) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
Physician characteristicsb 
Number of 
physiciansc 
1,191 6,525 1,088 6,408 1,012 6,315 875 5,783 
Age, mean (SD) 53.56 
 (12.15) 
49.61 
(10.95) 
54.17 
 (12.09) 
50.04 
(10.85) 
54.82  
(11.93) 
50.56 
(10.67) 
55.83 
 (12.03) 
51.06 
(10.43) 
Sex, n (%)         
Male 898 
 (75.40%) 
4,343 
(66.56%) 
817  
(75.09%) 
4,235 
(66.09%) 
750  
(74.11%) 
4,166 
(65.97%) 
640  
(73.14%) 
3,774 
(65.26%) 
Female 293  
(24.60%) 
2,182 
(33.44%) 
271 
 (24.91%) 
2,173 
(33.91%) 
262  
(25.89%) 
2,149 
(34.03%) 
235  
(25.86%) 
2,009 
(34.74%) 
Years since graduation,        
mean (SD) 26.12  
(12.24) 
22.18 
(11.13) 
26.76  
(12.16) 
22.61 
(11.07) 
27.47 
 (12.07) 
23.11 
(10.93) 
28.44 
 (12.22) 
23.64 
(10.73) 
IMGs, n (%) 301  
(25.27%) 
948 
(14.53%) 
287  
(26.38%) 
946 
(14.76%) 
274 
 (27.08%) 
998 
(15.80%) 
241  
(27.54%) 
960 
(16.60%) 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; SD, standard deviation; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; DMA, Diabetic Management 
Assessment; IMGs, International Medical Graduates.  
a DMI was introduced on April 1, 2006. 
b Physician-level characteristics for physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison group versus DMI group. 
c Based on the DMI group definition used in this study, some of the patients in the DMI group had a family physician practicing 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) prior to 2006. Therefore, some of the FFS physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison 
group were the same physicians who provided care to some of the patients in the DMI group in the above fiscal years. Therefore, there 
is some overlap in the number of physicians who provided care in each study group.  
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Table 3.4: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group after DMI was introduced 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Patient characteristics 
Number of patients 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 
Age, mean (SD) 64.22  
(11.97) 
63.24  
(12.61) 
65.22  
(11.97) 
64.24 
 (12.61) 
66.22 
 (11.97) 
65.24  
(12.61) 
Sex, n (%)       
Male 8,229  
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
8,229 
 (52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
8,229  
(52.89%) 
80,847 
(51.53%) 
Female 7,330 
 (47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
7,330 
 (47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
7,330  
(47.11%) 
76,045 
(48.47%) 
Rural residence, n 
(%)  
      
No 15,486  
(99.53%) 
154,788 
(98.66%) 
15,467  
(99.41%) 
154,536 
(98.50%) 
15,444  
(99.26%) 
154,332 
(98.37%) 
Yes 73  
(0.47%) 
2,104 
 (1.34%) 
92  
(0.59%) 
2,356 
 (1.50%) 
115  
(0.74%) 
2,560  
(1.63%) 
Number of ADGs,      
mean (SD) 5.18  
(3.00) 
5.10 
 (3.04) 
5.25 
 (3.03) 
5.14 
 (3.09) 
5.37 
 (3.15) 
5.27 
 (3.20) 
Duration of diabetes (years),      
mean (SD) 9.74 
 (3.55) 
9.62  
(3.58) 
10.74  
(3.55) 
10.62 
 (3.58) 
11.74 
 (3.55) 
11.62 
 (3.58) 
Material deprivation quintiles, n (%)      
Q1 (least deprived) 2,686  
(17.26%) 
33,290 
(21.22%) 
2,776  
(17.84%) 
33,863 
(21.58%) 
2,824 
 (18.15%) 
34,313 
(21.87%) 
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Q2 3,279  
(21.07%) 
34,530 
(22.01%) 
3,243  
(20.84%) 
34,562 
(22.03%) 
3,294  
(21.17%) 
34,633 
(22.07%) 
Q3 3,414  
(21.94%) 
33,469 
(21.33%) 
3,429 
 (22.04%) 
33,274 
(21.21%) 
3,364 
 (21.62%) 
33,160 
(21.14%) 
Q4 3,206  
(20.61%) 
29,207 
(18.62%) 
3,175  
(20.41%) 
29,020 
(18.50%) 
3,175 
 (20.41%) 
28.844 
(18.38%)  
Q5 (most deprived) 2,974  
(19.11%) 
26,396 
(16.82%) 
2,936  
(18.87%) 
26,173 
(16.68%) 
2,902  
(18.65%) 
25,942 
(16.53%) 
Income quintiles, n (%)      
Q1 (lowest income) 3,450  
(22.17%) 
31,784 
(20.26%) 
3,438 
 (22.10%) 
31,703 
(20.21%) 
3,431  
(22.05%) 
31,641 
(20.17%) 
Q2 3,854 
 (24.77%) 
35,982 
(22.93%) 
3,825  
(24.58%) 
35,722 
(22.77%) 
3,782  
(24.31%) 
35,431 
(22.58%) 
Q3 3,211  
(20.64%) 
32,314 
(20.60%) 
3,235  
(20.79%) 
32,380 
(20.64%) 
3,263 
 (20.97%) 
32,543 
(20.74%) 
Q4 2,833  
(18.21%) 
29,847 
(19.02%) 
2,846  
(18.29%) 
30,145 
(19.21%) 
2,872  
(18.46%) 
30,317 
(19.32%) 
Q5 (highest income) 2,211  
(14.21%) 
26,965 
(17.19%) 
2,215  
(14.24%) 
26,942 
(17.17%) 
2,211  
(14.21%) 
26,960 
(17.18%) 
DMI and DMA fee code billings 
Patients with DMI billed,      
n (%) 0 
 (0%) 
34,381 
(21.91%) 
0  
(0%) 
37,574 
(23.95%) 
0  
(0%) 
43,032 
(27.43%) 
Patients with DMA billed, n (%)      
< 3 15,486 
 (99.53%) 
150,660 
(96.03%) 
15,436 
 (99.21%) 
147,969 
(94.31%) 
15,280  
(98.21%) 
144,576 
(92.15%) 
≥ 3  73 
 (0.47%) 
6,232 
 (3.97%) 
123  
(0.79%) 
8,923 
 (5.69%) 
279  
(1.79%) 
12,316 
 (7.85%) 
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DMA fee codes billed,       
mean (SD) 0.05 
 (0.32) 
0.34 
 (0.79) 
0.08 
 (0.40) 
0.42 
 (0.90) 
0.11 
 (0.51) 
0.52 
 (1.01) 
Physician characteristicsa 
Number of physicians 835 4,800 802 5,238 797 5,600 
Age, mean (SD) 56.54 
 (12.01) 
51.16  
(10.07) 
56.88  
(12.14) 
51.20  
(10.34) 
57.11 
 (12.24) 
51.48  
(10.50) 
Sex, n (%)       
Male 609  
(72.93%) 
3,044  
(63.42%) 
584 
 (72.82%) 
3,279  
(62.60%) 
574 
 (72.02%) 
3,465  
(61.88%) 
Female 226  
(27.07%) 
1,756 
 (36.58%) 
218  
(27.18%) 
1,959 
 (37.40%) 
223 
(27.98%) 
2,135  
(38.12%) 
Years since graduation,      
mean (SD) 29.18  
(12.26) 
23.75 
 (10.41) 
29.52 
 (12.48) 
23.76 
 (10.71) 
29.79  
(12.53) 
24.01  
(10.90) 
IMGs, n (%) 228  
(27.31%) 
735  
(15.31%) 
212  
(26.43%) 
878  
(16.76%) 
225  
(28.23%) 
1,013  
(18.09%) 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; SD, standard deviation; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; DMA, Diabetic Management 
Assessment; IMGs, International Medical Graduates.  
a Physician-level characteristics for physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison group versus DMI group. 
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Figure 3.2: a) Average number of DMA fee codes billed for patients by patient’s physician; b) Proportion of patients with 
three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician per year 
Both graphs show the trends in the DMA fee code billings from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on the graphs 
point the period when DMI was introduced. 
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Table 3.5: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed 
by patient’s physician 
Variables Model 1: 
 DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled OLS 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted 
Pooled OLS 
 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 3: 
Fixed-Effects 
DID 
 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 4: 
High-
dimensional 
Fixed-Effects 
DID 
!  
(95% CI) 
DMI 0.007*** 0.002***   
 (0.006, 0.007) (0.002, 0.003)   
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
-0.021*** 
(-0.023,  
-0.020) 
-0.020*** 
(-0.022,  
-0.019) 
-0.016*** 
(-0.017, 
 -0.014) 
-0.011*** 
(-0.016,  
-0.006) 
DMI*Period    
(DID Effect) 0.042*** 
(0.040, 0.043) 
0.040*** 
(0.039, 0.042) 
0.040*** 
(0.039, 0.042) 
0.021*** 
(0.015, 0.026) 
" (time trend) 0.008*** 
(0.007, 0.008) 
0.008*** 
(0.007, 0.008) 
-2.805*** 
(-3.197, 
 -2.413) 
 
Patient characteristics  
Age  0.002***   
  (0.001, 0.002)   
Age-squared  -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
  (-0.000,  
-0.000) 
(0.000, 0.000) (0.002, 0.002) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
 -0.003*** 
(-0.004,  
-0.002) 
  
 
Rural residence 
(Ref: Urban)  
 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.002, 0.007) (-0.009, 0.002) (-0.008, 0.006) 
Number of 
ADGs 
 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.001,  
-0.001) 
(-0.001,  
-0.001) 
(-0.001, 
 -0.001) 
Duration of 
diabetes (years) 
 0.000** 
(0.000, 0.000) 
2.799*** 
(2.407, 3.191) 
0.332 
(-0.593, 1.257) 
Material deprivation quintiles 
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
   
Q2  
 
0.002** 
(0.000, 0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001, 0.005) 
-0.000 
(-0.003, 0.002) 
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Q3  0.001 
(-0.000, 0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001, 0.006) 
-0.002 
(-0.004, 0.001) 
Q4  0.003*** 
(0.002, 0.005) 
0.007*** 
(0.005, 0.009) 
0.000 
(-0.003, 0.004) 
Q5  
(most deprived) 
 0.003*** 
(0.002, 0.005) 
0.008*** 
(0.005, 0.011) 
-0.000 
(-0.004, 0.003) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
   
Q2  0.001 
(-0.001, 0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.002, 0.005) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 0.003) 
Q3  -0.000 
(-0.002, 0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.002, 0.006) 
0.001 
(-0.002, 0.003) 
Q4  -0.002** 
(-0.004,  
-0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.002, 0.006) 
-0.000 
(-0.003, 0.002) 
Q5  
(highest income) 
 -0.002** 
(-0.004, 
 -0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.003, 0.008) 
-0.001 
(-0.003, 0.002) 
Physician characteristics  
Age  0.000** 0.004*** 0.000 
  (0.000, 0.001) (0.004, 0.005) (-0.001, 0.001) 
Age-squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
  (-0.000,  
-0.000) 
(-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
 0.002*** 
(0.001, 0.003) 
0.004*** 
(0.002, 0.007) 
0.001 
(-0.003, 0.004)  
IMG status 
(Ref: CMG)  
 -0.007*** 
(-0.008, 
 -0.006) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 0.004) 
0.002 
(-0.003, 0.007) 
Constant -15.237*** -15.185*** 150.173***  
 (-15.710, 
 -14.764) 
(-15.718, 
 -14.652) 
(129.136, 
171.210) 
 
R-squared 0.021 0.026 0.029 0.528 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 172,451 172,451 172,451 
 
Observations 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID, 
Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; 
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical 
Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
94 
 
Table 3.6: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician in the two subgroups 
Outcome Variable Model 1: 
 DID Unadjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted Pooled 
OLSa 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 3:  
Fixed-Effects DIDa 
 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 4:  
High-dimensional 
Fixed-Effects DIDa 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Subgroup Analysis #1: Comorbidity  
(Comparing patients with below versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline) 
 < 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
Three or more DMA 
fee codes billed  
0.043*** 
(0.041, 
0.046) 
0.041*** 
(0.039, 
0.042) 
0.042*** 
(0.040, 
0.044) 
0.039*** 
(0.038, 
0.041) 
0.041*** 
(0.039, 
0.044) 
0.040*** 
(0.038, 
0.041) 
0.022*** 
(0.014, 
0.030) 
0.020*** 
(0.015, 
0.025) 
Subgroup Analysis #2: Sex  
(Comparing males versus females) 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Three or more DMA 
fee codes billed 
0.045***  
(0.043, 
0.047) 
0.038***  
(0.036, 
0.040) 
0.044***  
(0.042, 
0.045) 
0.037***  
(0.035, 
0.039) 
0.043***  
(0.041, 
0.045) 
0.037***  
(0.036, 
0.039) 
0.023*** 
(0.017, 
0.029) 
0.018*** 
(0.012, 
0.024) 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least 
squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups. 
a Models 2-4 controlled for patient characteristics (age, age-squared, sex, rural residence, number of Aggregated Diagnosis Groups, 
duration of diabetes, material deprivation quintiles, neighborhood income quintiles), and physician characteristics (age, age-squared, 
sex, International Medical Graduate status). 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01 
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Note: Each of the two subgroup analyses were performed separately using Models 1-4 each. Full regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A3.1: Information on the DMI and DMA 
Table 3.7: Additional information on the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) 
and Diabetic Management Assessment (DMA) fee code 
Diabetes 
care 
Billing 
Codes 
Additional Notes 
DMI 
(Q040) 
• ‘Payable to FPs providing ongoing management to a diabetic patient in 
consistent with the Clinical Practice Guidelines set by Diabetes Canada 
• FPs must provide documentation that tracks the following at minimum: 
a. HbA1C, cholesterol, lipids, body mass index, weight, blood 
pressure, and medication dosage 
b. Discussion and preventive measures must be offered that includes 
vascular protection, influenza and pneumococcal vaccination 
c. Patient self-management support and health promotion 
counselling 
d. Albumin to creatinine ratio 
e. Discussion and offer referral for dilated eye examinations 
f. Foot and neurologic examinations 
• A flow sheet or any other documentation that records all the required 
elements from the most current Diabetes Canada’s Clinical Practice 
Guidelines that were provided to the patient during the previous 12 
months must be kept in the patient’s medical record’27 
DMA 
(K030) 
• ‘All-inclusive service paid to the most responsible physician for 
providing continuous diabetes management to the diabetic patient 
• Service includes: an intermediate assessment, level 2 paediatric 
assessment, or a partial assessment that focuses on the diabetic target 
organ systems, counselling, and a diabetic flow sheet must be kept in 
the patient’s medical record 
• Flow sheet must track the following: 
• HbA1C, lipids, cholesterol, urinalysis, medication dosage, blood 
pressure, fundal examination, weight, body mass index, and 
peripheral vascular examination 
• If the above record is not kept or if the DMA is provided to the patient 
the same day as any other consultation or visit by the same physician, 
the DMA will be paid at no cost to the physician’27 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; FPs, 
family physicians; HbA1C,	glycated hemoglobin. 
Source: (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2015)27 
Hyperlink:http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/ohip/sob/physserv/sob_master2
0181115.pdf 
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Figure 3.3: Sample diabetes patient care flow sheet from April 2006 
Source: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care: Diabetes Management Incentive.25 
Hyperlink: http://www.anl.com/MOHGUIDE/00 Diabetes Management Incentive - April 
2006.pdf 
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Appendix A3.2: DMA Fee Code Billings Compared at Baseline and Final Year 
Table 3.8: DMA fee code billings compared between comparison and DMI group at baseline and final fiscal year 
Variables 2002 2008 
Comparison 
group 
(n = 15,559) 
DMI  
group 
(n = 156,892) 
p-value Comparison 
group 
(n = 15,559) 
DMI  
group 
(n = 156,892) 
p-value 
Patients with DMA fee codes billed, n (%)       
< 3 15,499  
(99.61%) 
155,910 
(99.37%) 
 
<0.001 
15,280  
(98.21%) 
144,576  
(92.15%) 
 
<0.001 
≥ 3  60  
(0.39%) 
982  
(0.63%) 
279  
(1.79%) 
12,316  
(7.85%) 
Average number of DMA fee codes billed, 
mean (SD) 
0.04 (0.27) 0.07 (0.36) <0.001 0.11 (0.51) 0.52 (1.01) <0.001 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; SD, standard deviation. 
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Appendix A3.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model 
Table 3.9: The estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes 
billed by patient’s physician compared between the Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
versus a Logit model 
Variables Model 1:  
DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled OLS 
(LPM) 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled Logit 
Model 
 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted 
Pooled OLS 
(LPM) 
 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DID Adjusted 
Pooled Logit 
Model	 
 
 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DMI 0.024*** 
(0.024, 0.025) 
0.024*** 
(0.024, 0.025) 
0.020*** 
(0.019, 0.021) 
0.023*** 
(0.022, 0.024) 
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
0.016*** 
(0.015,  
0.017) 
0.012*** 
(0.011, 0.013) 
0.016*** 
(0.015, 0.017) 
0.011*** 
(0.010, 0.012) 
DMI*Period    
(DID Effect) 0.042*** 
(0.040, 0.043) 
0.042*** 
(0.040, 0.043) 
 
0.040*** 
(0.039, 0.042) 
0.040*** 
(0.038, 0.041) 
" (time trend) 0.008*** 
(0.007, 0.008) 
0.010*** 
(0.009, 0.010) 
0.008*** 
(0.007, 0.008) 
0.010*** 
(0.009, 0.010) 
Patient Characteristics  
Age   0.002*** 0.004*** 
   (0.001, 0.002) (0.004, 0.005) 
Age-squared   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
   (-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.000,  
-0.000) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.003*** 
(-0.004,  
-0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(-0.004,  
-0.002) 
  
Rural residence 
(Ref: Urban)  
  0.003 
(-0.002, 0.007) 
0.002 
  (-0.002, 0.005) 
Number of 
ADGs 
  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-0.001,  
-0.001) 
(-0.001,  
-0.001) 
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Duration of 
diabetes (years) 
  0.000** 
(0.000, 0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000, 0.000) 
Material deprivation quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
   
Q2  
 
 0.002** 
(0.000, 0.003) 
0.001* 
(-0.000, 0.003) 
Q3   0.001 
(-0.000, 0.003) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 0.002) 
Q4   0.003*** 
(0.002, 0.005) 
0.003*** 
(0.001, 0.004) 
Q5  
(most deprived) 
  0.003*** 
(0.002, 0.005) 
0.003*** 
(0.001, 0.005) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
   
Q2   0.001 
(-0.001, 0.002) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 0.002) 
Q3   -0.000 
(-0.002, 0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.002, 0.001) 
Q4   -0.002** 
(-0.004,  
-0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(-0.004,  
-0.001) 
Q5  
(highest income) 
  -0.002** 
(-0.004,  
-0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(-0.004,  
-0.001) 
Physician Characteristics 
Age   0.000** 
(0.000, 0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001, 0.002)    
Age-squared   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
   (-0.000,  
-0.000) 
(-0.000,  
-0.000) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  0.002*** 
(0.001, 0.003) 
0.002*** 
(0.000, 0.003)   
IMG status 
(Ref: CMG)  
  -0.007*** 
(-0.008, 
 -0.006) 
-0.008*** 
(-0.009,  
-0.007) 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 172,451 172,451 172,451 
Observations 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID, 
Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; LPM, Linear Probability Model; 
95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; 
IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
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a Average marginal effect indicates the effect of the variable on the probability of having 
three or more DMA fee codes billed by the patient’s physician. The estimated coefficient 
(#) in the LPM can be directly interpreted as the average marginal effect, however, this 
cannot be done for the logit model. For the logit model, the average marginal effect is 
calculated by first determining the derivative of the equation for the logistic regression 
with respect to a specific variable of interest.57,60 Following this, the observed values in the 
data were used to calculate the average marginal effect. The average marginal effect was 
calculated using the margins command in Stata 15.1.   
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4  
4 The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on 
Hospitalizations and Mortality Risk in Ontario 
4.1 Introduction 
Diabetes is one of the most common chronic disease in the world, and was estimated to 
be the seventh leading cause of death in 2016.1 In 2017, more than 2.2 million Canadians 
aged 12 and older were living with diabetes.2 From this population, 965,100 individuals 
were from the province of Ontario.2 The estimated direct cost of diabetes to the 
healthcare system in Ontario was $1.5 billion in 2018,3 and hospitalizations account for a 
large portion of this cost.4  
Hospitalizations in patients with diabetes are often due to diabetes-related short-term and 
long-term complications. Patients with diabetes develop a number of short-term 
complications such as hypoglycemia, and complications caused from severe 
hyperglycemia such as diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state.5–8 
Over time, patients with diabetes develop micro- and macrovascular complications which 
are complications due to damages in the small and large blood vessels respectively.7 
Some of the long-term complications include retinopathy, nephropathy, neuropathy, and 
circulatory complications.5,8,9 It is no wonder that patients with diabetes are more likely 
to be hospitalized. In 2008/09, compared to those without diabetes, diabetic individuals 
were three times more likely to be hospitalized for cardiovascular disease, 12 times more 
likely to be hospitalized for an end-stage renal disease, and 20 times more likely to be 
hospitalized for non-traumatic lower limb amputation.3,7 Diabetes complications do not 
only lead to hospitalizations, but can also be linked with premature death.3,10  
Although there is currently no cure to diabetes, effectively monitoring and managing the 
disease can reduce the incidence of diabetes-related complications. Specifically, effective 
diabetes management at primary care settings can reduce the risk of hospitalizations, thus 
diabetes is an ambulatory care sensitive condition (ACSC).5,6,11–15 Patients who have 
access to a family physician (FP) providing sufficient care will order necessary tests, and 
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help patients control and manage their disease by targeting modifiable risk factors, thus, 
reducing the risk of hospitalizations for acute and long-term complications.6,11,13,16,17 
Effective diabetes management can also reduce the risk of hospitalization costs, and 
mortality from several causes such as chronic kidney disease, stroke, and ischaemic heart 
disease.16,18   
In an effort to improve access to primary care and place more emphasis on chronic 
disease management, Ontario introduced a primary care reform in the early 2000s. The 
Ontario government developed a number of new primary care organizational and funding 
models (i.e. Patient Enrolment Models (PEMs)) which physicians and patients can 
voluntarily enroll in.19 Prior to the reform, FPs were paid through a fee-for-service (FFS) 
basis.20 However, physicians who were practicing in the new models were reimbursed 
through various blends of payments including fee-for-service, capitation (fixed payment 
per patient per annum), salary, and pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives for preventive 
care services and chronic disease management such as diabetes.19,21  
P4P incentives are monetary rewards given to physicians in addition to their existing base 
payment (i.e. FFS or capitation) for achieving specific performance targets such as 
improving preventive and chronic care provided to patients.22,23 Some evidence suggests 
that P4P incentives increase the services provided to diabetic patients (e.g. ordering tests 
and prescribing medications), and improve intermediate outcomes (e.g. hemoglobin A1C 
(HbA1C), cholesterol, blood pressure, and serum creatinine levels).24 Overtime, 
improvements in the patient’s health, and reduction in hospitalization costs are 
expected.11,12,25  
Several countries have introduced P4P incentives to improve diabetes management at 
primary care such as the United Kingdom (UK), Taiwan, Italy, and Canada.6,11,12,22,25 
However, the literature on the effect of these incentives on hospitalizations and mortality 
have been mixed. In England, a longitudinal study found that after the introduction of the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) P4P scheme, the admission rate for ACSCs 
including diabetes incentivized under this program, was lower than the rate for non-
incentivized ACSCs and non-ACSCs.23 In Taiwan, two studies found that patients with 
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diabetes in the Taiwan’s P4P program for diabetes had fewer hospitalizations compared 
to those who were not enrolled in the program.25,26 In Hawaii, Chen et al. (2010)27 found 
diabetic patients who saw a P4P-participating physician for three years consecutively 
were less likely to be hospitalized compared to those who visited a non-P4P participating 
physician. In Italy, Fiorentini et al. (2011)15 found P4P and Pay-for-Compliance (P4C) 
incentives decreased the probability of avoidable hospitalizations for several diseases, 
including diabetes in the patient population. In contrast, the Pay-for-Participation (P4Pa) 
incentive had a statistically significant negative effect only when assessed in the type 2 
diabetic patient subpopulation.15  
A few studies found that P4P incentives for diabetes care have no effect on diabetes-
related hospitalizations. For instance, Bottle et al. (2008)28 found a nonsignificant 
association between the QOF points for diabetes care and diabetes admissions in patients 
under the age of 60. In the QOF, family practises earned points for patients who attained 
the targets for clinical indicators.23 Bruni et al. (2009)6 found the P4C in Italy did not 
have a significant effect on hyperglycemic emergency admissions in patients with type 2 
diabetes. One study conducted in Canada observed that the policy change at primary care 
in British Columbia (BC) in 2003 (i.e. introduced financial incentives for disease 
management such as diabetes to FPs) had no significant effect on the diabetes-related 
hospitalization rate.11 In contrast, one study in Taiwan found an increase in emergency 
visits for diabetic hypoglycemia.29  
To date, very limited literature exists on the relationship between financial incentives for 
diabetes care and hospitalization costs. A study from Taiwan found that diabetic patients 
in the P4P program had lower expenses for inpatient services (i.e. diabetes-related 
hospitalizations) compared to those not enrolled in the program.25 Cheng et al. (2012)26 
also observed similar findings for patients enrolled in the P4P program in Taiwan 
consecutively for five years compared to their comparison group. Two other studies 
briefly mentioned the estimated reduction in hospitalization costs that came with the 
decrease in hospitalizations after QOF was introduced in UK.12,23 In contrast, one study 
that examined the relationship between the quality of disease management after QOF was 
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introduced, and total hospital costs for ten chronic diseases (including diabetes), found a 
significant reduction in hospital costs for stroke care only.13  
The literature on the effect of financial incentives for diabetes care on mortality also 
produced conflicting results. Fleetcroft et al. (2010)30 estimated the potential mortality 
reduction associated with the QOF P4P scheme (2004 and 2006 versions) in England. 
Findings from the study revealed potential mortality reduction was seen over one year 
with the 2004 version, however, no additional mortality reduction was seen with the 2006 
contract. Moreover, diabetes was one of the diseases with the largest estimated mortality 
reduction.30 Likewise, Lin et al. (2016)31 found that the risk of all-cause mortality was 
lower in type 2 diabetic patients who were part of the P4P program in Taiwan compared 
to those who were not. Conversely, two longitudinal studies that assessed the QOF 
scheme found no statistical significant effect on mortality.16,17 This is contrast to 
Fleetcroft et al. (2010),30 which was a cross-sectional study.  
Overall, the relationship between P4P incentives for diabetes care on patient outcomes 
(i.e. hospitalizations, mortality), and hospitalization costs have been mixed. The reasons 
behind these mixed findings are due to the differences in the institutional setting of the 
study, the design of the study, and the context of the P4P incentive.23,31 Additionally, 
certain limitations from some of the existing studies such as the use of an ecological 
study design, not controlling for potential confounders, and the lack of a control group 
may also explain the inconsistent findings.  
In Ontario, the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) introduced a P4P 
incentive for diabetes management to FPs on April 1, 2006 called the Diabetes 
Management Incentive (DMI).22,32–34 This incentive is a $60 annual payment per patient 
provided to FPs for delivering ongoing management of diabetes to patients, and tracking 
the required elements for diabetes care in accordance with the Clinical Practice 
Guidelines set by Diabetes Canada (Appendix A3.1).22,32–34 To claim the DMI, the FP 
must bill the Q040 code for their patient once per 12-month period.32,33,35 When DMI was 
first introduced, only FPs practicing in specific PEMs were eligible to bill for their 
enrolled patients (see Table 3.1 for the specific PEMs). DMI was ineligible to FPs 
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practicing in the traditional FFS, FPs not practicing in the specific PEMs eligible for 
DMI, and non-enrolled patients (i.e. patients not enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs). 
However, as of April 1, 2009 all FPs are eligible to bill the DMI, and regardless of the 
patient’s enrollment status.22,33  
As of now, it is unknown if the introduction of DMI is associated with a reduction in 
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in Ontario. Moreover, findings 
from existing literature cannot be applied to the DMI context due to the inconsistent 
results, study limitations, and the differences in the P4P incentives’ design. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to assess the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, 
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with diabetes in Ontario. 
This will be examined comparing patients enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs eligible for 
DMI to patients affiliated with a FP practicing in the traditional FFS.  
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Data Sources 
Data for this study were obtained from multiple healthcare administrative databases 
housed at ICES. These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers and 
analyzed at ICES. Overall, this data was a longitudinal population-based data that 
extended from fiscal years (April 1st to March 31st of the following year) 2002 to 2008.   
The Ontario Diabetes Dataset (ODD) was used to identify adult patients (19 years and 
older) diagnosed with diabetes, and it contains those diagnosed from April 1, 1991 and 
onwards.5,36 The ODD identified an adult diabetic patient if within two years they had at 
least two Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) claims with a diabetes diagnosis, one 
diabetes-related hospital admission, or one OHIP fee code: Q040 (DMI), K029 (Insulin 
Therapy Support), K030 (Diabetic Management Assessment [DMA]), K045 (Diabetes 
management by a specialist), and K046 (Diabetes team management) claim.5,36 
Individuals with gestational diabetes are not included in the ODD, and this database does 
not distinguish between type 1 and type 2 diabetes.37 Although, the majority of the 
individuals included would be expected to have type 2 diabetes.37 The ODD provides 
information regarding the patient’s diagnosis such as the age or date they were first 
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diagnosed. The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) Discharge Abstract 
Database (DAD) was used to obtain information on inpatient hospitalizations. The CIHI-
DAD provided patient demographic, administrative, and clinical information for hospital 
discharges in Ontario.5,38 Additionally, the intensity of resources consumed by the patient 
during their stay at the hospital can be determined using CIHI-DAD.38,39  
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) was used to obtain demographic information 
such as age, and sex for those eligible for the Ontario’s healthcare coverage (OHIP).5,36,40 
The RPDB and the Statistics Canada Postal Code Conversion File (PCCF) were used to 
determine patient’s income (measured using neighbourhood income quintiles) at the 
census dissemination area (DA) level, and rural residence.41 Individuals were considered 
to be in rural and small town if they were in areas with an urban area population less than 
10,000, and in rural areas.42 The Ontario Marginalization Index was used to determine 
material deprivation, the inability for individuals and communities to access and attain 
basic material needs.43–45 The Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (ADGs) from the Johns 
Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) System Version 10.0 were used to measure 
patient’s comorbidity.46 Each patient can have between zero and 32 ADGs47,48; and the 
more ADGs they have the more comorbid they are.  
Two databases, the Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables and Corporate 
Provider Database (CPDB), were used to identify patients enrolled to FPs practicing in 
PEMs, and identify the PEM they were enrolled to. A virtual roster method was used for 
patients who were not formally enrolled to a FP from CAPE. This method linked the 
patient to the FP who claimed the highest number of OHIP billings for 18 common 
primary care fee codes during the previous two years.49,50 Information on the FP’s 
eligibility were also obtained from the CPDB. The FP’s demographic information (i.e. 
age, sex, International Medical Graduate (IMG) status, year they graduated from their 
medical degree) were obtained from the ICES Physician Database (IPDB). Lastly, the 
OHIP claims database provided details on the OHIP billings that were claimed for the 
patient by their FPs in Ontario.      
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4.2.2 Study Population 
Adults diagnosed with diabetes at or between the ages 19 to 75 years from April 1st, 1991 
to April 1st of each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008 were identified using the ODD. Patients 
were excluded from the study if they had missing data for age, sex, or ICES key number 
(IKN) for fiscal years 2002 to 2008, or died on or before April 1st, 2002. The IKN is an 
unique encoded patient identifier. Patients were further excluded from the study if they 
had missing data for any of the other patient- and physician-level characteristics used in 
this study (listed in Section 4.2.3), or for the location of physician’s practice using Local 
Health Integration Networks (LHINs).  Patients were then classified into one of the two 
study groups. Patients with FPs exposed to DMI for at least three years (2006 to 2008 
fiscal years) were part of the DMI eligible group. The FPs must be in the ‘Eligible for 
DMI’ section from Table 3.1. Conversely, patients affiliated with a FP practicing in the 
traditional FFS throughout the study period were part of the DMI ineligible group (i.e. 
patients’ FPs were never exposed to DMI during the study period). The DMI eligible and 
DMI ineligible groups are labelled as the “DMI group” and “comparison group,” 
respectively throughout the thesis. Patients who did not fit the criteria for either group 
were excluded from the study. The above inclusion/exclusion criterions left the study 
with 2,760,989 patient-year observations (DMI group: 2,652,076 observations; 
comparison group: 108,913 observations). This dataset was an unbalanced panel which 
implies that not all patients in the dataset had observations or data for all years in the 
study.  
A couple of issues with using an unbalanced panel data are: potential computation and 
estimation issues,51 and potential efficiency loss with having missing data52 which affects 
the validity of the study.53 Therefore, patients from the balanced panel (i.e. patients with 
observations for every fiscal year from 2002 to 2008) were selected as the main study 
population. The balanced panel has 1,207,157 patient-year observations. The unbalanced 
panel data were still used to perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the 
study findings. A flow chart depicting the process of how the study population was 
selected is found on Figure 3.1, while Table 3.2 shows the number of patients in the DMI 
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and comparison groups for each fiscal year for the main study population (i.e. balanced 
panel) and unbalanced panel data.  
4.2.3 Variables 
The exposure variable of interest in this study was a dichotomous variable that indicated 
whether the patient’s FP was eligible to bill the DMI during the fiscal years 2006 to 2008. 
This variable took a value of 1 for patients in the DMI group and a value of 0 for those in 
the comparison group. For the outcome variables of interest, there were three main types: 
(1) hospitalizations for diabetes-related complications divided into two categories: (i) 
short-term and (ii) long-term; (2) associated hospitalization costs for diabetes-related 
complications that were: (i) short-term and (ii) long-term; and (3) Mortality Risk Score 
(MRS). The hospitalization outcomes were measured by examining each fiscal year and 
identifying whether or not the patient had at least one hospitalization for diabetes-related 
short-term complications in that year, and also separately done for long-term 
complications. This was denoted using two dichotomous variables; one for short-term 
complications, and the other for long-term complications. In addition, there were two 
other variables that measured the number of hospitalizations the patient had during each 
year for each type respectively. Similar to Petrosyan et al. (2017)5, the diabetes-related 
hospitalizations were identified by focusing on the most responsible diagnosis code 
(using the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases [ICD-10] codes) of 
diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications as defined in the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Healthcare Quality Indicator 
(HCQI) Project.54–57 The hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications 
included were those with a diagnosis of diabetic ketoacidosis, mixed ketoacidosis, 
hyperglycemic hyperosmolar coma, or hypoglycemic or insulin coma.5,56,57 The diabetes-
related long-term complications included were circulatory complications, neurologic, 
ophthalmic, renal, or multiple complications.5,56,57 Appendix A4.1 shows the specific 
ICD-10 codes that coded these complications.  
The hospitalization cost outcomes measured the associated costs for the patient’s 
hospitalization(s) for diabetes-related (i) short-term complications, and (ii) long-term 
complications for each fiscal year. Patients who were not hospitalized for diabetes-related 
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short-term complications for that fiscal year took a value of zero for their cost outcome 
for short-term complications; this was also similarly done for long-term complications. 
Hospitalization costs were computed using the ICES costing macro, which calculated the 
cost for each inpatient case by multiplying the resource intensity weight (RIW) with the 
cost per weighted case (CPWC) (see Box 4.1).39 Each hospital inpatient has a RIW, the 
amount of hospital resources used by that inpatient compared to an average inpatient 
(RIW = 1.0000).39,58 To determine the RIW, patients are first assigned to a Case Mix 
Group based on their clinical and resource utilization in the hospital, and then are 
stratified into an age group under the Case Mix Group. A base RIW is already calculated 
for each Case Mix Group age group, thus, for each case their RIW is adjusted based on 
their comorbidity, length of stay, and interventions received. The CPWC is the unit cost 
for acute inpatient hospitalizations, and is calculated by summing up the total hospital 
costs for inpatient acute care in Ontario, and divided by the sum RIWs for all Ontario 
cases (Box 4.1).39 All hospitalization costs were standardized to 2002 Canadian dollars.  
The last outcome was the MRS which predicts patient’s risk of all-cause death within one 
year. The MRS is a point-scoring system calculated for patients each fiscal year using 
their age, sex, and 28 of the 32 ADG categories according to Austin & Walraven 
(2011).48 To calculate the patient’s MRS, the following must be summed together: 
patient’s age minus 20 years, the component for patient’s sex (i.e. if patient was a male 
then they got a score of three), and the component scores for each of the ADGs the 
patient had (see Box 4.2).48 The scores for each of the 28 ADGs, sex, and age used to 
calculate MRS is presented in Austin & Walraven.48 The MRS ranges from negative to 
positive scores, and the lower the score, the lower the patient’s risk of death is within one 
year. 
Variables for patient- and physician-level characteristics were also included. Patient-level 
characteristics included were age, sex, rural residence, comorbidity (measured using the 
number of ADGs), duration of diabetes (measured in years), income quintiles (ranged 
from quintile 1 (Q1) = lowest income to quintile 5 (Q5) = highest income), and material 
deprivation (ranged from Q1 = least deprived to Q5 = most deprived). The physician-
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level characteristics included were age, sex, years since graduation (measured their 
experience), and IMG status (0 = Canadian Medical Graduate (CMG), and 1 = IMG).  
4.2.4 Statistical Analysis  
4.2.4.1 Main Analysis   
Descriptive data were obtained to describe patient-level characteristics, DMI billings, and 
outcome measures by study group for each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008. The continuous 
variables were described using mean and standard deviations, while categorical variables 
were expressed as frequencies and percentages. The number of hospitalizations for 
diabetes-related short-term complications, and the associated cost outcome were focused 
only in those who had been hospitalized for this complication at least once during the 
study period. This was done to examine how the number of hospitalizations, and costs 
changed over time in patients hospitalized for that complication. Furthermore, it ensures 
us that the outcomes are focused on the same group of patients each year. A similar 
approach was adopted for the number of hospitalizations, and associated cost for long-
term complications. Outcome measures were compared between the DMI and 
comparison group at baseline (2002) and final year (2008), using a chi-square test for the 
dichotomous hospitalization variables, Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the number of 
hospitalizations and hospitalization cost variables, and a t-test for MRS. This was 
performed to detect if differences in the outcomes were present between the two study 
groups at the beginning and end of the study period. Descriptive statistics were also 
reported for physician-level characteristics of FPs of patients in the DMI group, and FPs 
of patients in the comparison group. 
This study used multivariable linear regression models with a difference-in-difference 
(DID) approach to assess the relationship between DMI and each of the following 
outcomes: diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated costs, and MRS. A natural-log 
transformation was performed for the number of diabetes-related hospitalizations, and 
associated costs. This transformation was applied to help alleviate the skewness found in 
the residuals.59 Moreover, there was a large number of zero values for the number of 
hospitalizations and cost outcomes, and the natural logarithm function of zero is 
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undefined, thus, a value of one was added to all values for those variables prior to the 
transformation to ensure no zero values were present.59  In addition, similar to the 
descriptive statistics, analyses performed for the number of hospitalizations and cost 
outcome for diabetes-related short-term complications were performed only in those 
hospitalized at least once for this complication throughout the study. For the number of 
hospitalizations, and the associated cost outcome for diabetes-related long-term 
complications, a similar approach was used.  
The DID approach computes the difference in the outcomes between the DMI and 
comparison group, comparing before-and-after DMI was introduced.60,61 The regression 
models used included a dichotomous variable that indicated if the patient was in the DMI 
or comparison group, a pre-post binary variable that indicated if the observation was 
from before DMI was introduced (2002 to 2005 fiscal years) or after DMI was introduced 
(2006 to 2008 fiscal years), and a variable for the interaction between the previous two 
dichotomous variables.60–62 The interaction variable presented the DID estimate (i.e. the 
effect of DMI on the outcome). This model also included a variable for time trend. The 
first model was the DID unadjusted pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Model 
1). Patients in this study had repeated observations over time, thus, within-clustering of 
patients was accounted for. In addition, it is essential to acknowledge that certain 
observable patient- and physician-level characteristics such as age and sex can potentially 
confound the study relationship. Therefore, this study assessed the effects of DMI on 
each outcome controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics.6,13,15,17,31,63,64  
All patient and physician characteristics mentioned in section 4.2.3, except for 
physician’s years since graduation as it was correlated with physician’s age, were 
included. Furthermore, both patient’s and physician’s age-squared variables were 
included in this model. This model was the DID adjusted pooled OLS model (Model 2). 
Although Model 2 accounted for observed heterogeneity, the concern of potential 
individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity such as patient’s race or their preferences 
can bias the effect of DMI on the outcomes.51,63 To reduce this bias, a DID model with 
individual patient fixed-effects was used to control for any unobserved patient-specific 
heterogeneity that were assumed to be time-invariant51,62 (Model 3). This model also 
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controlled for patient- and physician-level characteristics, and accounted for within-
clustering of patients. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that each patient has their 
own specific time trend as their behaviours (i.e. medical compliance to treatments, 
lifestyle modifications) can change over time. This should be accounted for to get closer 
to the true effect of DMI. Therefore, a high-dimensional fixed-effects DID model 
controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual fixed-effects, and  
the patient-specific time trend65 (Model 4) was used. This model also accounted for a 
two-way clustering (i.e. within patients, and between physicians).  
In the current study, the majority of the outcomes were treated as a continuous outcome, 
however two of the hospitalization outcomes were binary outcomes. These two outcome 
variables measured ‘whether or not the patient had at least one hospitalization’ for 
diabetes-related short-term complications, and another for the diabetes-related long-term 
complications in each fiscal year. Frequently, nonlinear probability models (i.e. logit, 
probit models) are used to assess binary outcomes.66,67 However, a linear regression 
model can also be used to assess these outcomes, and it is called the linear probability 
model (LPM).66–68 In this study, a LPM was used to assess the effect of DMI on the 
probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term, and long-term 
complications. To show that the coefficients from the LPM are reliable, coefficients from 
this model will be compared to the average marginal effects from a logit model69,70 
performed for the diabetes-related short-term complication. Both quantities can be 
compared as they present the average marginal effects, and the focus will be on the 
interaction term (i.e. DID estimate). This comparison will be performed for Models 1 and 
2 only as estimating a logit model with fixed-effects is difficult to estimate and a high-
dimensional fixed-effects logit model is not available.  
The equations for the four multivariable linear regression models with the DID 
methodology used in this study are indicated below: 
$%& 	= 	#(	 + 	#*	+,-%	 + 	#./01234& + 	#5+,-%×/01234& + #78 + 	9%&			                                  (1)  
$%& 	= 	#(	 + 	#*	+,-%	 + 	#./01234& + 	#5+,-%×/01234& + #78 + 	#:	;%& + 	9%&	                     (2) 
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$%& 	= 	#(	 + 	#*	+,-%	 + 	#./01234& + 	#5+,-%×/01234& + #78 + 	#:	;%& + <% + 	9%&	         (3) 
$%& 	= 	#(	 + 	#*	+,-%	 + 	#./01234& + 	#5+,-%×/01234& + 	#:	;%& + <% + =%& + 	9%&	         (4) 
Equations (1) to (4) specify Models 1 to 4 respectively. In the above four models, $%& is 
the binary or continuous outcome variable (i.e. the probability of being hospitalized or 
natural logarithm of the number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term or 
long-term complications; natural logarithm of the hospitalization costs for diabetes-
related short-term or long-term complications; or MRS) for patient 2 in fiscal year >; 
+,-%	 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if patient 2 is in the DMI group and 0 if 
patient 2 is in the comparison group; /01234& is a pre- and post- dichotomous variable 
equal to 1 if the year of the observation is after DMI was introduced and 0 if it was 
before; +,-%×/01234& is the interaction variable which denotes the DID estimate;	8	is a 
time trend; ;%& is the set of observable covariates (i.e. patient and physician-level 
characteristics); <% is the unobserved individual patient fixed-effects; =%& is the high-
dimensional fixed-effects in which the patient interacts with their own time trend; and  
9%& is the error term. All data analyses were performed using Stata 15.1 at the ICES 
Western site.  
4.2.4.2 Subgroup Analysis   
Subgroup analyses were performed to examine if the impact of DMI on the study 
outcomes differed among different subpopulations: 1) comorbidity (patients with below 
versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline), and 2) sex (males versus 
females). Subgroup analyses were not performed for the number of hospitalizations and 
cost outcomes due to the small sample size. Interactions were performed for the 
respective subgroup if findings from that subgroup analysis revealed the effect of DMI on 
the outcome to be statistically significant, with a large difference in the magnitude of 
effect among the levels of that subgroup. Subgroup analysis by comorbidity was 
performed as patients with comorbidities or multiple chronic conditions have more 
complex health needs, and are likely to have poor outcomes.71–73 There is also a strong 
correlation with greater number of comorbidities and increase in healthcare utilization 
(e.g. FP care, hospital admissions), and it has also been linked with greater healthcare 
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expenses.73,74 Some studies have also indicated that P4P incentive schemes may not 
benefit patients with multiple chronic conditions as the specific-guidelines for these 
incentives focus on specific diseases,75,76 or that these patients are likely to be excluded 
from the P4P.77 Therefore, it is vital to assess if the impact of the DMI on the outcomes 
differed based on patient’s comorbidity. Subgroup analysis by sex was also performed, 
because female diabetic patients are less likely to attain the recommended targets for 
diabetes, have medical compliance, have high-use of diabetes preventive care, and 
receive monitoring and treatment for diabetes.78–80  In addition, they have a greater risk of 
depression81–83 which is associated with increased healthcare utilization (i.e. hospital 
inpatient stays, emergency department visits) and overall healthcare expenditure.83 
Existing literature have found female diabetic patients to have higher hospitalization rates 
compared to males,84,85 however, contrasting results have also been observed.86 The 
literature have also found female diabetic patients to have a greater risk of mortality 
compared to males.87 As a result, it would be worthwhile to investigate if the impact of 
DMI on the study outcomes differed based on patient’s sex.  
4.2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis   
A sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the robustness of the study findings. The 
sensitivity analysis was performed in the unbalanced panel dataset (i.e. all patients, which 
also includes those without observations for some of the years in the study) following the 
main and subgroup analyses performed in the main study population (i.e. balanced 
panel). This was performed to alleviate potential selection bias that was derived from 
focusing only on patients who were in the balanced panel. Patients in the unbalanced 
panel included those who were in the DMI group that entered the study after April 1, 
2002 but on or prior to April 1, 2006, those in the DMI group without any data for some 
of the fiscal years, and those in the balanced panel.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive Results    
The main study population consisted of 172,451 adult patients with diabetes from Ontario 
(156,892 patients in the DMI group, and 15,559 patients in the comparison group). The 
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characteristics for this patient population and for their FPs by study group are presented 
in Table 3.3 for prior to the introduction of DMI, and Table 3.4 for after the introduction 
of DMI. In contrast to the comparison group, patients in the DMI group were marginally 
younger, had fewer years diagnosed with diabetes, and fewer number of ADGs. 
Moreover, in the DMI group compared to the comparison group, there was a greater 
proportion of female patients, and patients located in rural areas, in lower-deprived 
quintiles, and higher income quintiles. As for the FPs, those who provided care to 
patients in the DMI group were younger, less likely to be IMGs, and had fewer years of 
experience. There was also a greater proportion of female FPs providing care to patients 
in the DMI group versus the comparison group.  
Once the DMI was introduced, the proportion of patients in the DMI group who had a 
DMI billed increased from 21.91% in 2006 to 27.43% in 2008 (Table 3.4). The 
descriptive statistics for the study outcomes by study group before and after DMI was 
introduced are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Since the analysis for the 
‘number of hospitalizations’ and ‘hospitalization costs’ were performed in a subset of the 
main study population, Table 4.1 indicates the number of patients included in the analysis 
for those outcomes. Analysis for all other study outcomes were performed using the 
entire main study population, thus, to be more coherent, Table 4.1 will also display the 
number of patients in each study group for the main study population. On average, the 
proportion of patients hospitalized and the number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related 
short-term and long-term complications were greater in the DMI group compared to the 
comparison group. In 2008, 0.18% and 0.70% of the patients in the DMI group were 
hospitalized for short-term and long-term complications respectively, while in the 
comparison group it was 0.15% and 0.63%. However, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the two study groups for almost all diabetes-related 
hospitalization outcomes at baseline and final year of study (Appendix A4.2).  A 
statistical significant difference was only observed for the proportion of those 
hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term complications at baseline, and it was 
significant at the 10% level. In addition, in both study groups, a greater proportion of 
patients were hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term than short-term complications. 
The average hospitalization cost for diabetes-related short-term complications increased 
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in the DMI group from $733.19 in 2002 to $1,959.91 in 2008, and was greater than the 
average costs in the comparison group during fiscal years 2003 to 2008. The average 
hospitalization cost for long-term complications increased in the DMI group from 
$913.89 in 2002 to $3,923.89 in 2008. Increase in the hospitalization costs were also 
found in the comparison group. The hospitalization costs were compared between the two 
groups at baseline and final year of study, and no statistically significant differences were 
detected (Appendix A4.2). The average MRS increased in both study groups throughout 
the study, but was slightly lower in the DMI group than the comparison group. A 
statistically significant difference was detected between the two groups for MRS at 
baseline and final year (Appendix A4.2). Figures 4.1 to 4.3 presents the trends in the 
diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS. These figures showed 
that there were no significant changes between the two groups for the above outcomes 
comparing before and after DMI was introduced.  
4.3.2 Regression Results  
The estimated impact of DMI on the hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term 
complications (i.e. probability of being hospitalized, and the number of hospitalizations) 
are presented in Table 4.4. Estimates from all four models indicate that DMI has no 
statistically significant effect on the probability of being hospitalized                      
(Model 4: #5 = 0.000; 	95%	E3FG240FE0	2F>01HIJ	 K- − 0.001, 0.001), and on the 
number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications                 
(Model 4: #5 = −0.005; 	95%	CI	 − 0.097, 0.086). Only results from Model 4 are 
reported here since this model is the closest in estimating the true effect of DMI on the 
outcomes. The average marginal effects of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized 
for short-term complications from Models 1 and 2 were compared to equivalent logistic 
regression models (Appendix A4.3). Both estimation methods presented similar 
estimated marginal effects, thus, confirming that the estimates from the linear regression 
models are reliable. As for the patient-level characteristics, patient’s age and sex 
(females) had a negative effect on hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term 
complications as of Model 2. Patient’s age was not identified in Models 3 and 4 as it was 
correlated with the time trend variable, however, the quadratic term for age was present. 
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This term was positive and statistically significant in Model 4 for the probability of being 
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications only. In addition, the number 
of ADGs increased the hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications. For 
the physician-level characteristics, patients with female physicians were less likely to be 
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications, however, there was no 
statistically significant effect on the number of hospitalizations. All other patient- and 
physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect in the final 
model (Model 4).    
The estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term 
complications (i.e. probability of being hospitalized, and the number of hospitalizations) 
are presented in Table 4.5. All four regression models revealed DMI to have no 
statistically significant effect on the probability of being hospitalized                       
(Model 4: #5 = −0.000; 	95%	K- − 0.002, 0.001), and on the number of hospitalizations 
(Model 4: #5 = −0.007; 	95%	K- − 0.056, 0.042) for diabetes-related long-term 
complications. The patient-level characteristics revealed specific effects on the 
hospitalization outcomes. Overall, the effect of patient’s age on hospitalizations for 
diabetes-related long-term complications was inconsistent across models. Patient’s sex 
(females) had a negative effect on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term 
complications as of Model 2. In contrast, patients with greater number of ADGs had 
increased hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term complications. The remaining 
patient- and all physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant 
effect in the final model.     
Table 4.6 presents the impact of DMI on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-
and long-term complications. Once again, in all four models the effect of DMI on 
hospitalization costs was not statistically significant for diabetes-related short-term 
(Model 4: #5 = −0.165; 	95%	K- − 1.193, 0.863), and long-term complications    
(Model 4: #5 = −0.049; 	95%	K- − 0.616, 0.518). In addition, patient’s age had an 
inconsistent effect on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short- and long-term 
complications. Female patients (based on Model 2) displayed lower hospitalization costs, 
while the number of ADGs increased the hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short- 
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and long-term complications in the final model. All other patient- and all physician-level 
characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect in the final model.      
Lastly, for the estimated impact of DMI on MRS (Table 4.7), findings from all four 
models revealed that the effect of DMI on MRS was not statistically significant  
(Model 4: #5 = 0.060; 	95%	K- − 0.103, 0.223). In addition, patient’s age (Model 2) 
and its’ squared term (Models 2 to 4) had a positive effect on MRS. This implied that 
patient’s age had a nonlinear relationship with MRS, and that the MRS increased at a 
stronger rate as patients get older. Patients with increasing number of ADGs also had a 
greater MRS. Conversely, a decreased MRS was found in female patients (based on 
Model 2), patients with a longer duration of diabetes, patients in income quintiles 3 
(statistically significant at 10% level) and 4 compared to the lowest income quintile, and 
those in material deprivation quintiles 4 and 5 (Q5 was statistically significant at 10% 
level) compared to the least deprived quintile. Furthermore, physician’s age had a 
nonlinear relationship with the patient’s MRS. A reduced MRS was found in patients 
whose physicians were IMGs. The remaining patient- and physician-level characteristics 
did not have a statistically significant effect in the final model.         
4.3.3 Results from the Subgroup Analysis  
Findings from the two subgroup analyses are presented in Table 4.8. The two subgroup 
analyses by comorbidity, and sex revealed that DMI had no statistically significant effect 
on the probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related short- and long-term 
complications, and on the MRS in all subgroups.  
4.3.4 Results from the Sensitivity Analysis  
The sensitivity analysis was performed using the unbalanced panel dataset, and contained 
480,517 adult patients with diabetes. Table 3.2 indicates the number of patients available 
in each study group each year. Similar to the results from the main analysis, DMI had no 
statistically significant effect on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, 
and MRS. Subgroup analyses were also conducted in these patients, and the results were 
similar to the results from the subgroup analyses in the main study. It is important to note 
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that there was a slight change in the comorbidity subgroup analysis performed in the 
unbalanced panel. The patients here were compared using the exact same median number 
of ADGs at baseline used in the main study. This was done, because: 1) to be consistent 
with the main study, and 2) not all the patients in the unbalanced panel were present at 
baseline (2002), therefore, the median number of ADGs at baseline could not be 
determined in this cohort. The sensitivity analysis results are not presented in this 
chapter, but are available upon request.   
4.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of DMI, introduced in Ontario in 
2006, on diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated hospitalization costs, and mortality 
risk in patients with diabetes in Ontario. The descriptive results of this study revealed 
that, although the proportion of patients hospitalized and the number of hospitalizations 
for diabetes-related complications were greater in the DMI group compared to the 
comparison group, there were no statistically significant differences between the two 
groups for most hospitalization outcomes at baseline and final year. Additionally, more 
patients were hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term compared to short-term 
complications in both study groups. This finding was in contrast to Petrosyan et al. 
(2017)5 as they found a higher incidence of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-
term than long-term complications in Ontario adults with diabetes. Potential reasons for 
the contrasting results are possibly due to the differences in the cohort selection, and the 
difference in the study window as they observed the diabetes-related hospitalization 
outcomes from 2009 to 2011. Findings from the current study also revealed that overall 
there was an increase in the average hospitalization cost for diabetes-related 
complications in both groups. Regarding the MRS, increase in the average MRS was 
consistently observed in both groups throughout the study, however, the MRS was lower 
in the DMI group.  
Findings from the multivariable linear regression models with the DID approach revealed 
that DMI had no effect on the probability of being hospitalized, number of 
hospitalizations, or hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term 
complications, and on MRS. All four DID models revealed consistent findings for the 
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above outcomes. Subgroup analyses performed in the two type of subgroups confirmed 
that DMI had no effect on the study outcomes. Following this, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted assessing the impact of DMI on the above study outcomes using the 
unbalanced panel dataset. This was done to assess the consistency of the study findings, 
and since this patient cohort was much larger, therefore, testing the objectives in this 
cohort can help improve the external validity of the study results. Results from this 
analysis were consistent with the main study findings.  
Overall, P4P incentives were introduced in several countries to improve care for chronic 
conditions such as diabetes.12,23 The motivation for this type of incentive is potential 
long-term benefits such as improvements in patient outcomes (i.e. hospitalizations, 
mortality) and reduce hospital costs.6,11,12,16 However, findings from the current study 
revealed that Ontario’s DMI did not reduce hospitalizations due to diabetes related short-
term and long-term complications, hospitalization costs, or mortality risk. There are 
several potential reasons as to why this was observed. First, the low uptake of the DMI 
could be a potential reason, as in 2008, only 27.43% of the patients in the DMI group had 
a DMI billed. Second, based on Chapter 3 it was observed that the impact of DMI was an 
increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s 
physician in the neighbourhood of two percentage points. This is a very small impact on 
the provision of diabetes-related services, and it is not large enough to translate to reduce 
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk.  Third, the study period was not 
long enough to detect the long-term effect of the DMI on the chosen outcomes. This 
study used three years of post-DMI data; and perhaps, more time is required in order to 
see improvements in these outcomes. Fourth, there may be other factors outside of the 
primary care settings, which may have led to the findings observed in this paper. For 
instance, the ranges of specialist or multidisciplinary care the patient received, or how 
they self-managed the disease at home can have an effect on the study outcomes and 
these factors were not accounted for. Finally, regarding the hospitalization outcome, the 
proportion of those who were hospitalized were low for both types of complications in 
this study. Therefore, this may have also been a reason to why the effect of DMI on the 
hospitalization outcomes was not observed. A few of the existing studies with a diabetic 
patient cohort5,11,29,31 such as Petrosyan et al. (2017)5 from Ontario and Lin et al. (2016)31 
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from Taiwan also had a small proportion of patients hospitalized or number of 
hospitalizations in their study. However, their rates were slightly higher than what was 
found in this study.   
 Previous published literature that have assessed the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes 
care on diabetes-related hospitalizations have been mixed. Findings from the current 
study were consistent with a few studies that found P4P to have no impact on 
hospitalizations,6,11,28,63,88 however, a number of studies found P4P incentives for diabetes 
care reduced diabetes-related hospitalizations.6,12,15,23,25–28,31,89 For instance, Lin et al. 
(2016)31 found that in Taiwan, diabetic patients with full-participation in the diabetes P4P 
program had a lower risk of being hospitalized for chronic diabetic complications 
compared to the comparison group.  
Additionally, the current study revealed that certain patient- and physician-level 
characteristics had effects on patients being hospitalized for diabetes-related 
complications. Patients who were older were more likely to be hospitalized for diabetes-
related short-term complications, females were less likely to be hospitalized and had 
fewer diabetes-related hospitalizations, and patients with female physicians were less 
likely to be hospitalized for short-term complications only. In contrast, those more 
comorbid were more likely to be hospitalized and have a greater number of 
hospitalizations. Similar results have been observed in a few of the previous studies, 
especially in the research on the P4P schemes, regarding patient’s sex,15,31,63 age,15 and 
comorbidity15,27,63 on hospitalizations that included diabetes. However, contrasting results 
were also found in the literature such as, one study in Ontario found diabetic patients 
with comorbidities to less likely be hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term 
complications.5 
Regarding the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related 
hospitalization costs, there is currently a lack of literature in this area. Nevertheless, 
findings from this study were consistent with the results from one study. Dusheiko et al. 
(2011)13 used data from the QOF P4P scheme, and found disease management for 9 
chronic diseases including diabetes were not significantly associated with reduced 
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hospital costs. Only disease management for stroke care was linked with reduced hospital 
costs.13 The majority of the other studies found P4P was associated with a reduction in 
hospitalization costs, with two studies briefly mentioning the estimated reduction in costs 
due to the reduction in hospitalizations.12,23,25,26 Interestingly, Cheng et al. (2012)26 found 
compared to the comparison group (i.e. those who had never been enrolled in P4P), 
hospitalization costs were significantly lower only in diabetic patients who stayed in the 
P4P program throughout the study (i.e. 2005 to 2009). The current study also found 
certain patient characteristics were associated with the hospitalization costs. For instance, 
female patients had lower hospitalization costs for both types of complications while 
those with a higher comorbidity had greater hospitalization costs.       
Existing literature on the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes on mortality have also 
been limited and inconsistent. Similar to this study, both Ryan et al. (2016)16 and 
Kontopantelis et al. (2015)17 found the QOF P4P scheme16, and the primary care 
performance for the quality indicators included in the QOF17 had no statistically 
significant effect on population-mortality. On the contrary, Fleetcroft et al. (2010)30 
found the QOF scheme (2004 version) reduced mortality. Another study that assessed the 
P4P program in Taiwan found the risk of mortality to be lower in diabetic patients 
participating in this program compared to their comparison group.31 Regarding the 
patient- and physician-level characteristics, similar to the current study, Lin et al. 
(2016)31 also found that the risk of all-cause mortality was higher in male diabetic 
patients. Counterintuitively, the current study also found that MRS was lower in patients 
who were in higher deprivation quintiles compared to those who were least deprived. 
This finding was found in the final two models, while Model 2 found MRS higher in 
patients who were in higher deprivation quintiles compared to those who were least 
deprived. The opposing findings that were observed can be due to the lack of variation in 
the data as there were only two years of census data (2001 and 2006 census years) for the 
material deprivation measure.44 This study also revealed that patients who are older, and 
those who are more comorbid had a greater MRS, while, those with longer duration of 
diabetes, from income quintiles 3 and 4 compared to the lowest income quintile, and with 
physicians who are IMGs had a lower MRS.   
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In this study, the MRS was used to measure the risk of mortality instead of using actual 
deaths, because the score provided more information regarding the patient’s risk of death. 
A surviving patient may have a high MRS which indicates that even though the patient is 
alive their risk of death is high, and such information cannot be obtained when analyzing 
actual deaths. In addition, diabetes is often not reported as the primary cause of death, 
and instead the cause is reported to be due to its’ related complications.7 As a result, 
analysis of death data due to diabetes can lead to underestimating the deaths caused by 
diabetes. This is one of the reasons to why MRS is used as an outcome in this study. 
Finally, the mortality trends in diabetic patients in Ontario from 1996 to 2009 have 
shown that the mortality rate has decreased in this patient population, and this is most 
likely due to the improved treatments, screenings, and management of diabetes.90 
Therefore, it is possible that there might not have been a lot of actual patient deaths in 
this study if this data were used, and it would be difficult to assess the true relationship 
between DMI and mortality risk in diabetic patients. 
There are a number of strengths of this study. First, this is the first study to assess the 
impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, 
and mortality risk in patients with diabetes in Ontario. Second, panel data spanning from 
fiscal years 2002 to 2008 was used to assess the impact of DMI in this study. An 
advantage of using panel data is using statistical methods to control for unobserved 
patient heterogeneity, thus being able to capture the effects of the policy change that 
cannot be detected in pure cross-sectional data.51,91 Third, the diabetic patient cohort was 
derived from validated health administrative databases.5,36 Finally, a comparison group 
was used to assess the impact of DMI on the study outcomes.  
Nevertheless, there were also some limitations of this study. First, the time period of the 
study was not sufficiently long enough to see the effect of DMI on hospitalizations, 
associated costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients. Second, the comparison group 
was much smaller compared to the DMI group in this study, and this can result in having 
two study groups that are not similar with each other. Third, potential selection bias may 
be an issue in this study. The majority of the FPs who provided care to patients in the 
DMI group were initially practicing in the traditional FFS and switched into PEMs 
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voluntarily. However, FPs who provided care to patients in the comparison group 
practiced in the traditional FFS throughout the study period. Therefore, differences in the 
physicians’ performance or their unobserved characteristics between the two study 
groups could have introduced some bias. Fourth, in the past, the performance of the MRS 
was assessed only in the general adult population in Ontario, and not in disease-specific 
cohorts.48 Therefore, it is unclear how well this score predicts the risk of mortality in 
diabetic patients. Finally, the diabetes-related hospitalizations in this study were 
identified based on the most responsible diagnosis code for the patient’s stay at the 
hospital, therefore, hospitalizations that instead had diabetes-related short-term or long-
term complications as the secondary diagnosis would have been missed out in this study. 
Furthermore, hospitalizations included in this study were acute inpatient hospitalizations 
from the CIHI DAD database where the patient had at least one overnight stay. 
Therefore, same-day surgeries or procedures for diabetes would also have not been 
captured.  
Future research can build on what was performed in this paper by investigating the 
effects of the DMI on the patient outcomes and hospitalization costs beyond the fiscal 
year 2008. This analysis can be performed in patients enrolled to physicians in PEMs and 
patients affiliated with traditional FFS physicians separately. Outside of DMI, there are a 
number of other P4P incentives introduced in Ontario (e.g. Heart Failure Management 
incentive), thus, exploring the effectiveness of these incentives in improving patient 
outcomes and costs can help us gain more knowledge on the effectiveness of Ontario’s 
P4P incentives. Furthermore, future research can identify which P4P incentives have 
produced large benefits to the population and the healthcare system, so features from that 
scheme can be used to revise other P4P incentives.  
4.5 Conclusions 
The effectiveness of P4P incentives for diabetes care in improving patient outcomes, and 
hospitalization costs are mostly inconsistent in the existing literature. This study uses data 
from healthcare administrative databases to assess the effect of DMI on diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with 
diabetes in Ontario. Using four multivariable linear DID regression models comparing 
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patients in the DMI group to those in the comparison group, this study demonstrates that 
DMI has no significant impact on hospitalizations or associated costs for diabetes-related 
short-term and long-term complications, and on MRS. Similar findings were observed in 
all subgroups. Therefore, these results suggest that the introduction of DMI was not 
effective in reducing diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality 
risk in diabetic patients in Ontario.  
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4.6 Tables and Figures    
 
Box 4.1: Methods used to calculate the diabetes-related hospitalization costs 
Note: RIW is the resource intensity weight for the specific patient; CPWC is the cost per 
weighted case for inpatient acute care for Ontario cases. The first formula shows how the 
hospitalization cost was calculated for a specific patient while the second formula shows 
how the cost per weighted case was calculated.  
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Box 4.2: Method used to calculate the MRS 
Note: MRS is the Mortality Risk Score for the specific patient; ADGs is the Aggregated 
Diagnosis Groups the specific patient had. The formula in the top indicates the MRS 
calculation as per Austin & Walraven (2011).48 
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Table 4.1: The number of patients hospitalized for diabetes-related complications and the total number of patients from the 
main study population (i.e. Balanced panel) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of patients for diabetes-
related short-term complicationsa 
Number of patients for diabetes-
related long-term complicationsb 
Total number of patientsc 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
2002 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2003 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2004 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2005 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2006 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2007 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
2008 93 1,147 338 4,152 15,559 156,892 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive. 
a The number of patients in each study group for diabetes-related short-term complications are patients who were hospitalized at least 
once for this complication throughout the study. This is a subset of patients from the main study population. Descriptive statistics and 
multivariable regression analyses performed for the ‘number of hospitalizations’, and ‘hospitalization costs’ outcomes for this 
complication were performed in those patients.  
b The number of patients in each study group for diabetes-related long-term complications are patients who were hospitalized at least 
once for this complication throughout the study. This is a subset of patients from the main study population. Descriptive statistics and 
multivariable regression analyses performed for the ‘number of hospitalizations’, and ‘hospitalization costs’ outcomes for this 
complication were performed in those patients. 
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c The number of patients in each study group in the main study population. Descriptive statistics and multivariable regression analyses 
for all other outcome variables (i.e. the two binary diabetes-related hospitalization variables, and Mortality Risk Score) were 
performed in those patients. 
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Table 4.2: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study group before DMI was introduced 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
group 
Number of 
patients 
15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 
Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs   
Short-term complications 
Patients hospitalized,         
n (%) 20 
 (0.13%) 
191  
(0.12%) 
14 
(0.09%) 
191 
(0.12%) 
18 
 (0.12%) 
218 
(0.14%) 
19 
(0.12%) 
218 
(0.14%) 
Number of hospitalizationsa        
 21 237 17 229 24 263 20 278 
Hospitalization costsa ($ CAD),       
mean (SD) 898.69 
(2,138.15)  
733.19 
(2,925.45) 
675.76 
(1,900.60) 
760.51 
(2,495.49) 
813.42 
(2,009.62) 
942.26 
(3,412.89) 
829.68 
(2,025.76) 
978.17 
(2,840.83) 
Long-term complications 
Patients hospitalized,         
n (%) 29  
(0.19%) 
406 
(0.26%) 
39 
(0.25%) 
459 
(0.29%) 
42 
(0.27%) 
585  
(0.37%) 
51 
(0.33%) 
679 
(0.43%) 
Number of hospitalizationsb        
 35 490 49 542 45 678 57 809 
Hospitalization costsb ($ CAD),       
mean (SD) 
 
569.01 
(2,475.65) 
913.89 
(4,119.48) 
1,742.87 
(7,264.44) 
1,284.43 
(6,392.21) 
1,761.20 
(11,153.79) 
1,591.11 
(6,232.89) 
1,424.14 
(4,501.63) 
1,902.25 
(6,619.33) 
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Mortality risk 
MRS,  
mean (SD) 
45.09 
(14.94) 
44.03 
(15.56) 
46.26 
(15.01) 
45.24 
(15.71) 
47.71 
(15.21) 
46.63 
(15.98) 
49.02 
(15.43) 
47.96 
(16.25) 
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation. 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. 
b Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.3: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study group after DMI was introduced 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 
 Comparison 
group 
DMI  
group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
 group 
Comparison 
group 
DMI 
 group 
Number of 
patients 
15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 15,559 156,892 
Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs 
Short-term complications 
Patients hospitalized,      
n (%) 12 
(0.08%) 
211 
(0.13%) 
20  
(0.13%) 
240  
(0.15%) 
23  
(0.15%) 
278  
(0.18%) 
Number of hospitalizationsa      
 13 258 21 302 30 329 
Hospitalization costsa ($ CAD),      
mean (SD) 937.81 
(3,626.66) 
1,114.16 
(3,463.04) 
1,147.29 
(3,174.23) 
1,594.18 
(7,647.11) 
1,631.44 
(4,149.05) 
1,959.91 
(7,477.28) 
Long-term complications 
Patients hospitalized,      
n (%) 75 
(0.48%) 
904 
(0.58%) 
81 
(0.52%) 
1,028 
(0.66%) 
98 
(0.63%) 
1,095 
(0.70%) 
Number of hospitalizationsb      
 83 1,078 97 1,218 111 1,280 
Hospitalization costsb ($ CAD),      
mean (SD) 2,375.30 
(6,749.92) 
2,816.62 
(9,203.06) 
2,671.33 
(8,899.13) 
3,257.52 
(12,489.18) 
4,108.91 
(11,801.96) 
3,923.89 
(15,677.26) 
Mortality risk 
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MRS,  
mean (SD) 
50.23 
(15.76) 
49.22 
(16.50) 
51.67 
(16.08) 
50.63 
(16.85) 
53.15 
(16.60) 
52.11 
(17.28) 
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation. 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. 
b Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: a) and b) Average number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-
term and long-term complications respectively in patients; c) and d) Proportion of 
patients hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications 
respectively 
 
The four graphs show the trends in the diabetes-related hospitalizations for fiscal years 
2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on the graphs point to the period when DMI was 
introduced.   
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Figure 4.2: a) and b) Average hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications respectively in 
patients 
 
Both graphs show the trends in the diabetes-related hospitalization costs from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on 
the graphs point to the period when DMI was introduced. 
146 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Average Mortality Risk Score (MRS) in patients 
 
The above graph shows the trends in the MRS from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study 
group. The arrow on the graph points to the period when DMI was introduced.  
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Table 4.4: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications 
Variables Model 1:  
DID Unadjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 3:  
Fixed-Effects DID 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 4:  
High-dimensional Fixed-
Effects DID 
!  
(95% CI) 
 Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
DMI 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.003     
 (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.037,  
0.025) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.033, 
0.026) 
    
Period 
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
-0.000 -0.036 -0.000* -0.019 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 -0.008 
(-0.001,  
0.000) 
(-0.089, 
0.017) 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.064, 
0.026) 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.052, 
0.041) 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.097, 
0.081) 
DMI*Period        
(DID Effect) 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 
(-0.000,  
0.001) 
(-0.031,  
0.072) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.036, 
0.051) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.043, 
0.043) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.097, 
0.086) 
" (time trend) 0.000*** 0.012*** -0.000** 0.010*** -0.037 -1.978   
(0.000,  
0.000) 
(0.005,  
0.018) 
(-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
(0.003, 
0.016) 
(-0.133, 
0.059) 
(-10.759, 
6.803) 
  
Patient Characteristics 
Age   -0.001*** -0.007***     
   (-0.001, 
 -0.001) 
(-0.010, 
 -0.003) 
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Age-squared   0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000** 0.001 
   (0.000,  
0.000) 
(0.000,  
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001, 
0.003) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.000*** 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
-0.039*** 
(-0.053, 
 -0.025) 
    
Rural residence        
(Ref: Urban)   0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.025 
  (-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.085, 
0.043) 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
(-0.080, 
0.077) 
(-0.002, 
0.003) 
(-0.083, 
0.133) 
Number of 
ADGs 
  0.001*** 0.036*** 0.001*** 0.052*** 0.001*** 0.054*** 
  (0.001, 
0.001) 
(0.033, 
0.038) 
(0.001, 
0.001) 
(0.050, 
0.055) 
(0.001, 
0.001) 
(0.051, 
0.057) 
Duration of diabetes        
(years)   0.000*** -0.003*** 0.038 1.978 0.006 0.546 
  (0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.005, 
 -0.001) 
(-0.058, 
0.134) 
(-6.799, 
10.755) 
(-0.100, 
0.112) 
(-9.104, 
10.195) 
Material deprivation quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
      
Q2   0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.000 0.010 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.016, 
0.025) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.049, 
0.037) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.047, 
0.067) 
Q3   0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014 -0.000 0.009 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.022, 
0.023) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.031, 
0.059) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.050, 
0.068) 
Q4   0.000** 0.013 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.034 
   (0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.012, 
0.037) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.032, 
0.075) 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
(-0.030, 
0.098) 
Q5 (most   0.001*** 0.016 0.000 -0.010 -0.000 -0.013 
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deprived) 
   (0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.013, 
0.046) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.067, 
0.048) 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
(-0.088, 
0.063) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
       
Q2   0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.021, 
0.021) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
0.005 
(-0.028, 
0.038) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.008 
(-0.033, 
0.049) 
Q3   0.000 0.025* 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.023 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001, 
0.051) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.019, 
0.063) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.027, 
0.074) 
Q4   -0.000 0.022 0.000 0.048* -0.000 0.013 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.005, 
0.049) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.000, 
0.096) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.045, 
0.070) 
Q5 (highest 
income) 
  -0.000 0.021 0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.023 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.009, 
0.052) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.047, 
0.058) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.086, 
0.040) 
Physician Characteristics  
Age   -0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
0.002 
(-0.004, 
0.007) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
0.005 
(-0.005, 
0.014) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
0.006 
(-0.010, 
0.021) 
Age-squared   0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
Female    -0.000 -0.006 -0.001*** -0.009 -0.001*** -0.033 
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(Ref: Male)   (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.021, 
0.010) 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.048, 
0.031) 
(-0.002, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.092, 
0.027) 
IMG status 
(Ref: CMG) 
  -0.001*** -0.005 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.022 
  (-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.024, 
0.014) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.033, 
0.053) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.041, 
0.084) 
Constant -0.219*** -23.495*** 0.165** -18.898*** 2.004 82.995   
(-0.342, 
 -0.096) 
(-36.861, 
 -10.130) 
(0.030, 
0.299) 
(-31.758, 
 -6.039) 
(-3.149, 
7.158) 
(-286.844, 
452.835) 
  
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.188 0.004 0.250 0.411 0.503 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 1,240 172,451 1,240 172,451 1,240 172,451 1,240 
Observations 1,207,157 8,680 1,207,157 8,680 1,207,157 8,680 1,207,157 8,680 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; 
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses. 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition, 
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term complications 
Variables Model 1:  
DID Unadjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 3:  
Fixed-Effects DID 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 4:  
High-dimensional Fixed-
Effects DID 
!  
(95% CI) 
 Probability of 
being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
Probability 
of being 
hospitalized 
Number of 
hospitalizat-
ionsa (Log-
transformed) 
DMI 0.001*** 
(0.000, 
0.001) 
0.008 
(-0.006, 
0.022) 
0.001*** 
(0.001, 
0.002) 
0.013* 
(-0.001, 
0.028) 
    
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
0.001* 0.039*** 0.001** 0.039*** 0.001 0.037*** 0.001 0.036 
(-0.000, 
0.002) 
(0.010, 
0.068) 
(0.000, 
0.002) 
(0.014, 
0.065) 
(-0.000, 
0.002) 
(0.010, 
0.064) 
(-0.001, 
0.003) 
(-0.013, 
0.085) 
DMI*Period        
(DID Effect) 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.005 -0.000 -0.007 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.039, 
0.016) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.032, 
0.017) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.029, 
0.019) 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
(-0.056, 
0.042) 
" (time trend)  0.001*** 
(0.000, 
0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.014, 
0.020) 
-0.000*** 
(-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.004, 
0.010) 
0.093 
(-0.086, 
0.272) 
0.911 
(-3.902, 
5.724) 
  
Patient Characteristics 
Age   -0.000*** 0.000     
  (-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
(-0.002, 
0.003) 
    
Age-squared   0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 
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  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(0.000, 
0.000) 
(0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.003*** 
(-0.003, 
 -0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(-0.026, 
 -0.015) 
    
Rural residence        
(Ref: Urban)   0.003*** 0.011 0.004*** 0.049* 0.001 0.034 
  (0.001, 
0.004) 
(-0.013, 
0.035) 
(0.001, 
0.006) 
(-0.004, 
0.102) 
(-0.003, 
0.005) 
(-0.042, 
0.110) 
Number of 
ADGs 
  0.003*** 0.029*** 0.003*** 0.044*** 0.003*** 0.046*** 
  (0.003, 
0.003) 
(0.028, 
0.030) 
(0.003, 
0.003) 
(0.043, 
0.045) 
(0.003, 
0.003) 
(0.045, 
0.048) 
Duration of diabetes        
(years)   0.001*** 0.000 -0.094 -0.923 -0.094 -1.465 
  (0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.273, 
0.085) 
(-5.734, 
3.887) 
(-0.292, 
0.103) 
(-6.779, 
3.850) 
Material deprivation quintiles   
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
      
Q2   0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.003 
(-0.013, 
0.006) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.004 
(-0.020, 
0.027) 
-0.000 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.033, 
0.033) 
Q3   0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.003 
(-0.014, 
0.008) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
-0.007 
(-0.032, 
0.018) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 
0.003) 
0.008 
(-0.027, 
0.043) 
Q4   0.001*** 
(0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.012, 
0.011) 
-0.001 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
-0.010 
(-0.035, 
0.016) 
-0.000 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
-0.013 
(-0.050, 
0.024) 
153 
 
Q5 (most 
deprived) 
  0.001*** 
(0.001, 
0.002) 
0.002 
(-0.012, 
0.017) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
-0.004 
(-0.032, 
0.024) 
0.000 
(-0.002, 
0.002) 
0.002 
(-0.039, 
0.043) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
       
Q2   -0.000* 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.009* 
(-0.000, 
0.018) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.010 
(-0.006, 
0.026) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.003 
(-0.019, 
0.024) 
Q3   -0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.012* 
(-0.001, 
0.024) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.013 
(-0.007, 
0.033) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.007 
(-0.020, 
0.033) 
Q4   -0.001*** 
(-0.002, 
 -0.000) 
0.010 
(-0.002, 
0.023) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.020* 
(-0.003, 
0.042) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.011 
(-0.019, 
0.040) 
Q5 (highest 
income) 
  -0.001*** 
(-0.002, 
 -0.001) 
0.006 
(-0.008, 
0.019) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.004 
(-0.022, 
0.030) 
-0.001 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
-0.013 
(-0.048, 
0.022) 
Physician Characteristics  
Age   -0.000 -0.002* -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.006 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.005, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.010, 
0.001) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.016, 
0.003) 
Age-squared   0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
Female 
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.000 -0.011*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 
  (-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.018, 
 -0.004) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.024, 
0.021) 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
(-0.034, 
0.038) 
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IMG status 
(Ref: CMG) 
  -0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.023 
  (-0.002, 
 -0.001) 
(-0.006, 
0.008) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.014, 
0.031) 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
(-0.013, 
0.059) 
Constant -1.194*** -33.985*** 0.761*** -14.333*** -5.034 -49.935   
(-1.414, 
 -0.974) 
(-40.479, 
 -27.492) 
(0.531, 
0.991) 
(-20.580, 
 -8.086) 
(-14.659, 
4.590) 
(-311.540, 
211.670) 
  
R-squared 0.001 0.024 0.017 0.161 0.012 0.218 0.369 0.398 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 4,490 172,451 4,490 172,451 4,490 172,451 4,490 
Observations 1,207,157 31,430 1,207,157 31,430 1,207,157 31,430 1,207,157 31,430 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; 
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses. 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition, 
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications 
Variables Model 1:  
DID Unadjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 3:  
Fixed-Effects DID 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 4:  
High-dimensional Fixed-
Effects DID 
!  
(95% CI) 
 Short-terma  
(Log-
transformed) 
Long-termb 
(Log-
transformed) 
Short-terma  
(Log-
transformed) 
Long-termb 
(Log-
transformed) 
Short-terma  
(Log-
transformed) 
Long-termb 
(Log-
transformed) 
Short-terma  
(Log-
transformed) 
Long-termb 
(Log-
transformed) 
DMI -0.102 0.082 -0.065 0.144*     
(-0.409, 
0.205) 
(-0.078, 
0.242) 
(-0.359, 
0.229) 
(-0.022, 
0.310) 
    
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
-0.389 0.454*** -0.202 0.460*** -0.031 0.453*** 0.039 0.406 
(-0.965, 
0.187) 
(0.123, 
0.784) 
(-0.690, 
0.286) 
(0.165, 
0.755) 
(-0.534, 
0.473) 
(0.146, 
0.759) 
(-0.965, 
1.043) 
(-0.161, 
0.973) 
DMI*Period        
(DID Effect) 0.239 -0.140 0.100 -0.090 0.011 -0.060 -0.165 -0.049 
(-0.318, 
0.796) 
(-0.454, 
0.174) 
(-0.368, 
0.569) 
(-0.368, 
0.188) 
(-0.446, 
0.469) 
(-0.334, 
0.214) 
(-1.193, 
0.863) 
(-0.616, 
0.518) 
"	(time trend) 0.138*** 
(0.067, 
0.209) 
0.212*** 
(0.174, 
0.249) 
0.109*** 
(0.043, 
0.175) 
0.097*** 
(0.061, 
0.132) 
-32.701 
(-128.006, 
62.604) 
-1.036 
(-57.136, 
55.064) 
  
Patient Characteristics 
Age   -0.057*** 0.016     
  (-0.088, 
 -0.026) 
(-0.005, 
0.036) 
    
Age-squared   0.000** -0.000* 0.000 0.002*** 0.015 0.008 
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  (0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
(0.001, 
0.002) 
(-0.006, 
0.036) 
(-0.005, 
0.020) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.356*** 
(-0.485, 
 -0.227) 
-0.227*** 
(-0.287, 
 -0.167) 
    
Rural residence        
(Ref: Urban)   -0.234 0.112 -0.010 0.576** 0.319 0.385 
  (-0.879, 
0.410) 
(-0.159, 
0.383) 
(-0.873, 
0.854) 
(0.010, 
1.143) 
(-0.854, 
1.492) 
(-0.445, 
1.214) 
Number of 
ADGs 
  0.374*** 0.339*** 0.577*** 0.514*** 0.598*** 0.544*** 
  (0.353, 
0.395) 
(0.329, 
0.349) 
(0.554, 
0.599) 
(0.502, 
0.527) 
(0.571, 
0.625) 
(0.528, 
0.559) 
Duration of diabetes        
(years)   -0.033*** -0.002 32.659 0.860 13.211 -6.318 
  (-0.052, 
 -0.014) 
(-0.012, 
0.007) 
(-62.603, 
127.920) 
(-55.215, 
56.935) 
(-90.877, 
117.299) 
(-68.165, 
55.529) 
Material deprivation quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
      
Q2   0.052 -0.051 -0.060 -0.008 0.047 -0.037 
  (-0.148, 
0.253) 
(-0.160, 
0.057) 
(-0.504, 
0.383) 
(-0.269, 
0.253) 
(-0.565, 
0.659) 
(-0.421, 
0.348) 
Q3   -0.000 -0.043 0.088 -0.041 -0.022 0.141 
  (-0.217, 
0.216) 
(-0.162, 
0.077) 
(-0.376, 
0.551) 
(-0.321, 
0.239) 
(-0.652, 
0.608) 
(-0.270, 
0.552) 
Q4   0.142 -0.041 0.238 -0.120 0.276 -0.141 
  (-0.102, 
0.386) 
(-0.167, 
0.085) 
(-0.290, 
0.766) 
(-0.408, 
0.168) 
(-0.385, 
0.938) 
(-0.561, 
0.279) 
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Q5 (most 
deprived) 
  0.118 
(-0.163, 
0.399) 
-0.023 
(-0.167, 
0.121) 
-0.117 
(-0.718, 
0.485) 
-0.042 
(-0.360, 
0.275) 
-0.204 
(-0.978, 
0.570) 
0.080 
(-0.390, 
0.551) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
       
Q2   0.003 0.083* 0.025 0.099 0.032 0.036 
  (-0.207, 
0.213) 
(-0.014, 
0.180) 
(-0.321, 
0.372) 
(-0.082, 
0.279) 
(-0.409, 
0.472) 
(-0.210, 
0.282) 
Q3   0.244* 0.085 0.188 0.093 0.181 0.063 
  (-0.009, 
0.498) 
(-0.031, 
0.200) 
(-0.250, 
0.626) 
(-0.128, 
0.314) 
(-0.360, 
0.723) 
(-0.246, 
0.371) 
Q4   0.209 0.076 0.390 0.204 -0.058 0.128 
  (-0.057, 
0.475) 
(-0.055, 
0.206) 
(-0.096, 
0.877) 
(-0.048, 
0.455) 
(-0.647, 
0.531) 
(-0.215, 
0.471) 
Q5 (highest 
income) 
  0.184 0.020 -0.003 0.004 -0.279 -0.202 
  (-0.108, 
0.476) 
(-0.124, 
0.165) 
(-0.538, 
0.532) 
(-0.292, 
0.300) 
(-0.955, 
0.396) 
(-0.607, 
0.203) 
Physician Characteristics  
Age   0.030 -0.017 0.062 -0.041 0.079 -0.051 
  (-0.025, 
0.086) 
(-0.045, 
0.011) 
(-0.039, 
0.162) 
(-0.101, 
0.020) 
(-0.082, 
0.240) 
(-0.156, 
0.055) 
Age-squared   -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.002, 
0.001) 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.042 -0.116*** -0.175 -0.024 -0.416 -0.007 
  (-0.190, 
0.105) 
(-0.194, 
 -0.037) 
(-0.568, 
0.218) 
(-0.277, 
0.230) 
(-1.006, 
0.173) 
(-0.418, 
0.404) 
158 
 
IMG status 
(Ref: CMG) 
  -0.032 -0.002 0.108 0.111 0.237 0.291 
  (-0.212, 
0.147) 
(-0.082, 
0.078) 
(-0.371, 
0.586) 
(-0.143, 
0.365) 
(-0.486, 
0.960) 
(-0.129, 
0.711) 
Constant -275.611*** -423.127*** -218.310*** -195.143*** 1,372.792 50.005   
(-417.578, 
-133.645) 
(-497.756, 
-348.499) 
(-350.524, 
 -86.097) 
(-266.321, 
 -123.966) 
(-2,641.304, 
5,386.888) 
(-2,999.308, 
3,099.317) 
  
R-squared 0.004 0.027 0.189 0.164 0.264 0.226 0.469 0.390 
Number of 
patients 
1,240 4,490 1,240 4,490 1,240 4,490 1,240 4,490 
Observations 8,680 31,430 8,680 31,430 8,680 31,430 8,680 31,430 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; 
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.  
Robust 95% CI in parentheses. 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition, 
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.  
b Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition, 
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: Estimated impact of DMI on MRS  
Variables Model 1:  
DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled OLS 
 
!  
(95% CI)  
Model 2:  
DID 
Adjusted 
Pooled OLS 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 3: 
Fixed-Effects 
DID 
 
 
!  
(95% CI) 
Model 4: 
High-
dimensional 
Fixed-Effects 
DID 
!  
(95% CI) 
DMI -1.054*** 0.196***   
(-1.290, -0.818) (0.117, 0.274)   
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
-0.077 0.004 -0.010 -0.145* 
(-0.176, 0.022) (-0.080, 
0.087) 
(-0.096, 
0.077) 
(-0.305, 
0.014) 
DMI*Period    
(DID Effect) 0.024 0.036 0.033 0.060 
(-0.074, 0.121) (-0.045, 
0.118) 
(-0.048, 
0.115) 
(-0.103, 
0.223) 
" (time trend) 1.355*** 0.116*** -0.896  
(1.343, 1.366) (0.105, 0.128) (-14.992, 
13.201) 
 
Patient Characteristics 
Age  0.839***   
  (0.827, 0.852)   
Age-squared  0.002*** 0.004*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002, 0.002) (0.004, 0.005) (0.016, 0.024) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
 -4.198***   
 (-4.241,  
-4.156) 
  
Rural residence    
(Ref: Urban)  0.839*** 0.313*** 0.204 
 (0.668, 1.010) (0.109, 0.516) (-0.074, 
0.481) 
Number of ADGs  1.614*** 1.551*** 1.519*** 
 (1.607, 1.622) (1.543, 1.558) (1.508, 1.529) 
Duration of diabetes    
(years)  0.031*** 1.571 -17.730** 
 (0.026, 0.037) (-12.520, 
15.662) 
(-34.057, 
 -1.404) 
Material deprivation quintiles   
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
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Q2  -0.037 
(-0.099, 
0.025) 
-0.088** 
(-0.173,  
-0.002) 
-0.019 
(-0.134, 
0.095) 
Q3  0.089** -0.073 -0.039 
 (0.021, 0.158) (-0.165, 
0.020) 
(-0.161, 
0.083) 
Q4  0.109*** -0.187*** -0.145** 
 (0.033, 0.185) (-0.289,  
-0.084) 
(-0.284,  
-0.006) 
Q5  
(most deprived) 
 0.289*** -0.200*** -0.145* 
 (0.199, 0.378) (-0.319,  
-0.082) 
(-0.301, 
0.010) 
Income quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
   
Q2  -0.127*** -0.086** -0.066 
 (-0.191,  
-0.063) 
(-0.153,  
-0.020) 
(-0.150, 
0.018) 
Q3  -0.204*** -0.088** -0.096* 
 (-0.277,  
-0.132) 
(-0.167,  
-0.010) 
(-0.195, 
0.003) 
Q4  -0.256*** -0.069 -0.111** 
 (-0.335,  
-0.177) 
(-0.156, 
0.019) 
(-0.220,  
-0.001) 
Q5  
(highest income) 
 -0.335*** -0.083 -0.096 
 (-0.422,  
-0.248) 
(-0.183, 
0.017) 
(-0.224, 
0.031) 
Physician Characteristics  
Age  -0.016* 0.026** 0.045*** 
 (-0.034, 
0.001) 
(0.005, 0.046) (0.012, 0.078) 
Age-squared  0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000, 0.000) (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.001,  
-0.000) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
 -0.120*** -0.042 -0.028 
 (-0.169,  
-0.071) 
(-0.125, 
0.040) 
(-0.140, 
0.084) 
IMG status  
(Ref: CMG) 
 -0.587*** -0.303*** -0.294*** 
 (-0.637,  
-0.537) 
(-0.388,  
-0.219) 
(-0.413,  
-0.174) 
Constant -2,667.129*** -250.712*** 64.462  
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 (-2,690.107, 
 -2,644.151) 
(-273.577, 
 -227.846) 
(-692.529, 
821.452) 
 
R-squared 0.027 0.834 0.396 0.927 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 172,451 172,451 172,451 
Observations 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DID, Difference-in-
difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref, 
Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; 
CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8: Estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related complications, and on MRS in 
the two subgroups 
Outcome Variables Model 1: 
 DID Unadjusted Pooled 
OLS 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID Adjusted Pooled 
OLSa 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 3:  
Fixed-Effects DIDa 
 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Model 4:  
High-dimensional 
Fixed-Effects DIDa 
!" 
(95% CI) 
Subgroup Analysis #1: Comorbidity  
(Comparing patients with below versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline) 
 
  
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
< 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
≥ 4 ADGs 
at baseline 
Hospitalized for short-term complications       
(Binary) -0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
Hospitalized for long-term complications       
(Binary) 0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
-0.001 
(-0.003, 
0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.002, 
0.002) 
MRS 0.049 
(-0.098, 
0.197) 
-0.014 
(-0.142, 
0.113) 
-0.019 
(-0.138, 
0.099) 
0.085 
(-0.023, 
0.194) 
-0.009 
(-0.128, 
0.110) 
0.072 
(-0.036, 
0.180) 
0.054 
(-0.177, 
0.284) 
0.054 
(-0.157, 
0.264) 
Subgroup Analysis #2: Sex  
(Comparing males versus females) 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
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Hospitalized for short-term complications       
(Binary) 0.001* 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.002) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
Hospitalized for long-term complications       
(Binary) -0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.001 
(-0.000, 
0.002) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.001 
(-0.000, 
0.002) 
-0.000 
(-0.001, 
0.001) 
0.001 
(-0.000, 
0.002) 
-0.001 
(-0.004, 
0.001) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 
0.003) 
MRS 0.038 
(-0.097, 
0.174) 
0.014 
(-0.126, 
0.154) 
0.050 
(-0.062, 
0.161) 
0.019 
(-0.099, 
0.138) 
0.048 
(-0.064, 
0.159) 
0.019 
 (-0.100, 
0.137) 
0.181 
(-0.035, 
0.396) 
-0.079 
(-0.290, 
0.132) 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% 
CI, 95% confidence interval; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups. 
a Models 2-4 controlled for patient characteristics (age, age-squared, sex, rural residence, number of Aggregated Diagnosis Groups, 
duration of diabetes, material deprivation, neighborhood income quintiles), and physician characteristics (age, age-squared, sex, 
International Medical Graduate status). 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses. 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Each of the two subgroup analyses were performed separately using Models 1-4 each. Full regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A4.1: ICD-10 Codes for Diabetes-related Hospitalizations 
Table 4.9: The ICD-10 codes for hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications 
Diabetes-related complications ICD-10 codes Description of complications included 
Diabetes-related short-term complications E10.0, E10.1, E10.11, E10.12, E11.0, 
E11.1, E11.11, E11.12, E13.0, E13.1, 
E13.11, E13.12, E14.0, E14.1, E14.11, 
E14.12 
Type 1, type 2, other specified, or 
unspecified diabetes mellitus with: 
 
Hyperglycemic hyperosmolar coma, 
hypoglycemic coma, insulin coma, 
ketoacidosis, or mixed ketoacidosis 
Diabetes-related long-term complications E10.2, E10.3, E10.4, E10.5, E10.6, E10.7, 
E11.2, E11.3, E11.4, E11.5, E11.6, E11.7, 
E13.2, E13.3, E13.4, E13.5, E13.6, E13.7, 
E14.2, E14.3, E14.4, E14.5, E14.6, E14.7 
Type 1, type 2, other specified, or 
unspecified diabetes mellitus with: 
 
Renal, ophthalmic, neurologic, 
circulatory, or multiple complications 
ICD-10, 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases  
Source: Petrosyan et al., 20175; OECD, 200856; OECD, 200957 
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Appendix A4.2: Hospitalizations, Hospitalization Costs, and MRS Compared at Baseline and Final Year  
Table 4.10: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS compared between comparison and DMI group at 
baseline and final fiscal year 
Variables 2002 2008 
Comparison 
group 
(n = 15,559) 
DMI  
group 
(n = 156,892) 
p-value Comparison 
group 
(n = 15,559) 
DMI  
group 
(n = 156,892) 
p-value 
Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs 
Short-term complications 
Patients hospitalized, n (%)       
0 15,539 
(99.87%) 
156,701 
(99.88%) 
 
0.82 
15,536 
(99.85%) 
156,614 
(99.82%) 
 
0.40 
1 20 
(0.13%) 
191 
(0.12%) 
23  
(0.15%) 
278 
(0.18%) 
Number of hospitalizationsa*, Rank sum  60,115.5  709,304.5 0.27  58,266  711,154 0.82 
Hospitalization costsa* ($ CAD),  
Rank sum 
 60,487  708,933 0.20  58,002.5  711,417.5 0.91 
Long-term complications 
Patients hospitalized, n (%)       
0 15,530 
(99.81%) 
156,486 
(99.74%) 
 
0.09 
15,461 
(99.37%) 
155,797 
(99.30%) 
 
0.33 
1 29 
(0.19) 
406 
(0.26%) 
98 
(0.63%) 
1,095 
(0.70%) 
Number of hospitalizationsb*, Rank sum  750,181  9,332,114 0.45  777,405  9,304,890 0.30 
177 
 
Hospitalization costsb* ($ CAD),  
Rank sum 
 749,544.5  9,332,750.5 0.42  779,059.5  9,303,235.5 0.26 
Mortality risk 
MRS, mean (SD) 45.09  
(14.94) 
44.03  
(15.56) 
<0.001 53.15 
(16.60) 
52.11 
 (17.28) 
<0.001 
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation 
a Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. 
b Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. 
* Wilcoxon Rank sum test was used to assess if the medians for the variables differed between the two groups.  
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Appendix A4.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model 
Table 4.11: The estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for 
diabetes-related short-term complications compared between the Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) versus a Logit model 
Variables Model 1:  
DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled OLS 
(LPM) 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DID 
Unadjusted 
Pooled Logit 
Model 
 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
Model 2:  
DID 
Adjusted 
Pooled OLS 
(LPM) 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DID Adjusted 
Pooled Logit 
Model	 
 
 
 
Average 
Marginal 
Effecta 
(95% CI) 
DMI 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
(-0.000, 0.001) (-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
Period  
(Ref: Pre-DMI 
period) 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.000,  0.000) (-0.000,  
0.000) 
(-0.000,  
0.000) 
(-0.000,  0.000) 
DMI*Period    
(DID Effect) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.000,  0.001) (-0.000, 
0.001) 
(-0.000,  
0.001) 
(-0.000, 0.001) 
" (time trend) 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
(0.000,  0.000) (0.000,  
0.000) 
(-0.000,  
-0.000) 
(-0.000,  
-0.000) 
Patient Characteristics  
Age   -0.001*** -0.000*** 
   (-0.001, 
 -0.001) 
(-0.000, 
 -0.000) 
Age-squared   0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000,  0.000) (0.000, 0.000) 
Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.000*** 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
  
Rural residence     
(Ref: Urban)    0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.001, 
0.001) 
(-0.001, 0.000) 
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Number of ADGs   0.001*** 0.000*** 
  (0.001, 0.001) (0.000, 0.001) 
Duration of diabetes    
(years)   0.000*** 
(0.000, 0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000, 0.000) 
Material deprivation quintiles  
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived)) 
   
Q2   0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.001) 
Q3   0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.001) 
Q4   0.000** 0.000* 
  (0.000, 0.001) (-0.000, 0.001) 
Q5  
(most deprived) 
  0.001*** 0.001** 
  (0.000, 0.001) (0.000, 0.001) 
Income quintiles 
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income)) 
   
Q2   0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
0.000 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
Q3   0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.001) 
Q4   -0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
Q5 
(highest income) 
  -0.000 0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
Physician Characteristics  
Age   -0.000 
(-0.000, 
0.000) 
-0.000 
(-0.000, 0.000)    
Age-squared   0.000 0.000 
   (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
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Female  
(Ref: Male) 
  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.000, 
0.000) 
(-0.000, 0.000) 
IMG status  
(Ref: CMG)  
  -0.001*** 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(-0.001, 
 -0.000) 
Number of 
patients 
172,451 172,451 172,451 172,451 
Observations 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 1,207,157 
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary 
least squares; LPM, Linear Probability Model; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref, 
Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; 
CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate. 
a Average marginal effect indicates the effect of the variable on the probability of being 
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications. The estimated coefficient (#) in 
the LPM can be directly interpreted as the average marginal effect, however, this cannot be 
done for the logit model. For the logit model, the average marginal effect is calculated by 
first determining the derivative of the equation for the logistic regression with respect to a 
specific variable of interest given by the model.68,70 Following this, the observed values in 
the data were used to calculate the average marginal effect. The average marginal effect 
was calculated using the margins command in Stata 15.1. 
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusions and Future Research 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Diabetes management provided at primary care is key in improving the health of diabetic 
patients. Effective disease management provided by family physicians (FPs) can 
potentially reduce the risk of hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality.1–3 
Therefore, financial incentives (i.e. pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives) for FPs were 
introduced in several countries to improve management of diabetes at primary care. 
Previous literature found that financial incentives tend to increase diabetes-related 
services provided to patients4–7; however, some studies report otherwise.8,9 To date, the 
impact of these incentives on hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality is 
unclear. Furthermore, it is unknown if the introduction of the Diabetes Management 
Incentive (DMI), introduced in Ontario, is associated with increased diabetes-related 
services and decreased diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated costs, and mortality 
risk in diabetic patients. Therefore, in this thesis, a literature review was first conducted 
examining the impact of financial incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality to understand and 
summarize the results of the previous literature. Following this, the impact of DMI on 
diabetes-related services, diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated hospitalization 
costs, and mortality risk was examined in patients diagnosed with diabetes in Ontario. 
This was assessed by comparing patients enrolled to FPs eligible for DMI to patients who 
were affiliated with a FP practicing in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model (not 
eligible for DMI).   
In Chapter 2, a literature review assessing the impact of financial incentives for diabetes 
care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality was 
performed. This review found that existing studies evaluating this relationship had 
inconsistent findings. The majority of the studies found the incentives were associated 
with reduced hospitalizations, nevertheless, a handful of studies also found that there was 
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no effect, and one study found an increase in emergency visits for diabetes. Findings 
were inconsistent for diabetes-related hospitalization costs and mortality as well. In 
addition, there was a high degree of heterogeneity found among the included studies in 
terms of their study population, study setting, study design, nature of the financial 
incentives, and the outcomes measured. 
In Chapter 3, the impact of the DMI on diabetes-related services in patients with diabetes 
in Ontario was examined. The diabetes-related services were measured using the Diabetic 
Management Assessment (DMA) fee code, which is billed by FPs for providing diabetes-
related services to their diabetic patients.9–11 This outcome measure was defined as a 
dichotomous variable which measured whether or not the patient had three or more DMA 
fee codes billed by their physician during each fiscal year. Results from this chapter 
suggested that the introduction of DMI increased the provision of diabetes-related 
services in Ontario. The effect of DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or 
more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician by 2.1 percentage points, after 
controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, patient fixed-effects, and 
patient-specific time trend. Subgroup analyses were also performed and findings revealed 
that the effect of DMI on diabetes-related services to be similar across the comorbidity 
groups, however, the effect of DMI was slightly larger in males than in females. 
In Chapter 4, the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related 
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients in Ontario was examined. The 
hospitalizations and associated costs were categorized into two categories: (i) diabetes-
related short-term complications, and (ii) diabetes-related long-term complications. The 
diagnosis codes that identified each type of complication were based on the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Healthcare Quality Indicator 
(HCQI) Project.12–16 The hospitalization costs were calculated using the ICES costing 
macro discussed in Chapter 4, and the mortality risk was measured using the Mortality 
Risk Score (MRS), which estimated the patient’s risk of all-cause death within one year. 
The MRS was computed using the algorithm proposed by Austin & Walraven (2011).17 
Results from this analysis revealed that DMI had no statistically significant effect on 
hospitalization and hospitalization cost for diabetes-related short-term and long-term 
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complications, and on MRS. Patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual 
fixed-effects, and patient-specific time trend were controlled for. Subgroup analyses by 
comorbidity, and sex were also performed to explore the impact of DMI on some of the 
outcomes. Findings showed that DMI has no effect on the probability of being 
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications, and on MRS in 
all subgroups. 
Overall, the introduction of DMI was associated with an increase in the provision of 
diabetes-related services in Ontario, however, it had no effect on the patient outcomes 
(measured by hospitalizations, and the risk of mortality), and hospitalization costs. There 
are some possible explanations as to why DMI had no effect on these outcomes in this 
study. First, the study period is not sufficiently long enough. It is possible that a longer 
period post-DMI may be required to see improvements in these long-term patient 
outcomes and cost savings. Second, although DMI was associated with an increase in the 
provision of diabetes-related services, the magnitude of this effect was actually very 
small. Therefore, no effects were observed on the patient outcomes and hospitalization 
costs. Third, the low uptake of DMI as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 may be another 
possible explanation. This implies that not a lot of patients were getting the complete 
diabetes management during the study period. Finally, there are other factors outside of 
the primary care settings, such as the ranges of specialist and multidisciplinary care the 
patient received, patient’s self-management of the disease at home and if they were 
referred to or had access to diabetes education centres, could have affected the outcomes 
but were not accounted for in this paper.  
Findings from this study are relevant to policy makers as it informs them the effect of the 
DMI on the diabetes-related services provided, patient outcomes, and hospitalization 
costs. As for the policy implications, a suggestion would be that the policy makers should 
not scrap the DMI. Although no improvements were observed in the diabetes-related 
hospitalizations, associated hospitalization costs, and the mortality risk; the DMI did 
increase the provision of diabetes-related services in diabetic patients. If DMI is 
scrapped, it may affect the severe diabetic patients who are in high need of the diabetes-
related services, and would compromise their health. Instead, further research is required 
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to understand the potential benefits of this incentive. The impact of this incentive on 
other patient-relevant outcomes (e.g. quality of life, patient satisfaction with care, user 
experience, lifestyle changes) is unknown. Therefore, additional research should be 
performed to gain a better understanding of the DMI, and to determine what areas in the 
DMI needs to be focused on to observe improvements in patients’ health and healthcare 
system costs. 
5.2 Future Research 
Future research can further investigate the impact of DMI through several ways. The 
impact of this incentive on diabetes-related services, hospitalizations, hospitalization 
costs, and mortality risk were only examined until March 2009 in this study; therefore, 
future studies can investigate the impacts on patient outcomes and costs beyond 2009. 
Through this, the study period post-DMI will be much longer, and improvements in the 
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs, if any, can be more likely seen. Additionally, 
future research in this area should keep note that all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI 
(including FPs practicing in the traditional FFS) as of April 1, 2009.18,19 Second, future 
research can also explore the effect of DMI on patients’ lifestyle changes, satisfaction 
with care, quality of life, and treatment compliance. Third, it is also important to assess if 
there are any potential harms associated with the implementation of DMI such as any 
health disparities in the patient population, if certain groups of patients are being avoided, 
or if it affects FPs’ motivations to provide care that is incentivized instead of the best care 
to address the patients’ needs. Future research can also explore the effectiveness of other 
P4P incentives outside of the DMI (e.g. Heart Failure Management incentive, incentives 
for cancer screening) in Ontario. Similar methodologies from this study can be used to 
understand the effectiveness of these incentives in improving patient’s health and/or 
healthcare system costs. On the whole, further research in the area of DMI and P4P 
incentives can educate us more about the impact of these incentives, and assist with 
revising the DMI to improve its desired outcomes.   
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